

The Fourth Korean-Japanese Conference of British History

Tradition and Modernity in British History

12-14 November, 2010, the Fourth Korean-Japanese Conference of British History will be held with taking as its theme *Tradition and Modernity in British History*. Modernity is one of the key topics of academic debates covering history, humanities and social sciences. Modernity is different from modernization, and there existed multiple types of modernity. For examples, ‘colonial modernity’ was an important agenda in the post-colonial studies. Moreover, meanings of modernity varied from place to place and from time to time. Modernity did not necessarily mean the rupture or revolutionary change. There were the cases in which modernity meant ‘gradual development’ or ‘gradual evolution’ rather than change. It also might be possible to talk about ‘modernity’ in the medieval times, if we confined the meaning of the word in a specific usage.

The Conference is going to examine the relationship between tradition and modernity in some phases of British history. It will make clear a uniqueness of historical development of Britain. It will also contribute to reconsider what is ‘historical development’ not only in British history but in our own history. The concept of a linear development of history, that is ‘progress’, would be questioned. Moreover, the analysis would lead to reconsider our concept of ‘the Western’, which has been often taken not only as the geographic location, but also as an ‘advanced culture’ or ‘civilization’. The Conference will consider continuity and discontinuity, and its unique combination in British history from wider and global perspectives.

This Conference is sponsored by Kumamoto University, in cooperation with the Society of European Medieval History, and JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research: Grants-in-Aid (A) (No. 20242013, Global History, Osaka University), and Grants-in-Aid (B) (No. 30258694, Reconsidering the Church Systems in Medieval British Isles, Hokkaigakuen University).

Conference Organizers

Professor Hirokazu Tsurushima (Kumamoto University, Japan)

Professor Daeryoon Kim (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)

PROGRAMME

12th – 15th November 2010

Kusunokikaikan Hall, Kumamoto University

12th November

19:00- 21:00 Reception for Delegates

Venue: Italian restaurant ‘SALUTE’, nearby the Faculty of Education,
Kumamoto University

*this reception is open only to the delegates of the Conference.

13th November

9:00-12:00 Young Researchers’ Session

chairs: Dr. Young-Kwon Chung (Yonsei University)

Professor Kaoru Kitano (Komazawa University)

‘Cutlers in Fifteenth-Century London: Their Relationships with Others’

Machi Sasai (Ph.D. candidate, Ochanomizu University)

‘The Seventeenth Century's Almanac and Female Writers’

Jiwon Lee (Ph.D. student, Yonsei University)

‘A Token of Tyranny? the Quartering Problems in the Reign of James II’

Satoshi Tsujimoto (Research Fellow, Rikkyo University)

‘The Cabinet of Curiosity: a Prism of 17th Century England’

Jayeun Noh (M.A. student, Yonsei University)

‘Modernity in International Relations: British Empire and the Institutional Development of Sovereignty in the Persian Gulf after the Independence of India’

Shohei Sato (Research Associate, Waseda University)

‘British Labour Government's (1964-70) Immigration-Race Policy’

Eunjae Park (M.A., Seoul National University)

12:00-13:00 Lunch

13:00-13:10 Welcome Speech

Professor Isao Taniguchi (the President, Kumamoto University)

13:10- 13:20 Opening Address

Professor Hirokazu Tsurushima (the Conference Organizer)

13:20- 14:30 Keynote Plenary: Historiography of British History in Asia
chair: Professor Hirokazu Tsurushima

'Moral Economy' Again: E. P. Thompson Retried in Digital Archive Professor Kazuhiko Kondo (University of Tokyo)

'An Mapping of the Ideological British Historiography in Korea: A Story' Professor Seung-Rae Cho (Chongju University)

14:30-14:45 Tea

14:45-17:45 Session1: Memory and Communication in Medieval and Early Modern Britain
chair: Professor Taro Inai (Hiroshima University)

'English National Identity in the Middle Ages'

Professor Robert Bartlett (University of St. Andrews)

'Memory and Communication in the 12th and 13th century Irish Sea World' Associate Professor Hideyuki Arimitsu (Tohoku University)

'The Britishness of the Westminster Assembly'

Vice-Professor Joong-lak Kim (Kyungpook National University)

18:30- 21:00 Conference Dinner (Kusunokikaikan Hall)

14th November

9:00-12:00 Session2: Tradition and Modernity in Welfare History chair: Professor Minoru Takada (Shimonoseki City University)

'Crime, Poverty and the Public Welfare in a Revolutionary Age: the Influence of Patrick Colquhoun'
Associate Professor Paul Tonks (Yonsei University)

'Charity and Poor Law: a Comparison between Britain and Japan'

Associate Professor Shusaku Kanazawa (Kyoto University)

'Two Kinds of Collectivism in the Late 19th and Early 20th century Britain: Conservative Collectivism and Socialist Collectivism'

12:00-13:00 Lunch

13:00- 16:00 Session 3: British History and Global/World History
chair: Professor Shigeru Akita (Osaka University)

'Dutch Commercial Networks in Asia in Transition, 1740-1830'
Professor Ryuto Shimada (Seinan Gakuin University)

'East Asia, the British World System, and the Writing of Global History'
Professor Miles Taylor (IHR, University of London)

'Britain, Modernity and the Change of Historical Consciousness in Korea,
1960-2000'
Professor Young-Suk Lee (Gwanju University)

16:00-16:15 Tea

16:15-16:45 Closing Plenary: Tradition and Modernity in History
chair: Professor Hirokazu Tsurushima

'Two Island Empires Compared: Britain and Japan'
Professor Yoichi Kibata (Seijo University)

16:45-17:00 Closing Remark
Professor Ki-Soon Kim (Hallym University)

15th November

9:00-14:00 Optional Tour

Organizing Committee

Professor Hirokazu Tsurushima
Professor Daeryoon Kim
Professor Sangsoo Kim
Professor Young-Suk Lee
Professor Suk-Min Hong (Ewha Women's University)
Dr. Young-Kwon Chung
Professor Shigeru Akita
Professor Taro Inai
Professor Minoru Takada

Translators & Supporters

Yoon Ji Lee (Yonsei University)
Mincheol Lim (Yonsei University)
Jini Kim (Osaka University)
Kiyoka Tsuneki (Ochanomizu University)

Campus Map



(access map & campus map: <http://ewww.kumamoto-u.ac.jp/about/access/>)

*Opening address:
Tradition and Modernity in British History*

Hirokazu Tsurushima
(Conference Organizer)

It is my privilege and honour to pronounce the opening address of the 4th Korean Japanese Conference of British History here, at Kumamoto University, today on 13th, November 2010. The Main theme is 'Tradition and Modernity in British History'. This conference does not necessarily compel any contributors strictly to follow the main theme. The title itself is so wide that any topics should have some kind of relationship with the main theme. However two motives have combined to make me address all of you.

It is impossible to tell you how many times people have asked me the reason why I study the history of a foreign country, that is Britain, and of the distant past, namely medieval times. However people should have known that this kind of question was better given not to me but to themselves. The more Britain is to be recognized as a mother country of the modern times, the more this is the case: local government (or authority), cabinet, parliament, capitalism etc. When I was a student, it was often declared that there was the particular type of historical research into the western history for Japanese people. For these polemics of post-war school, Britain, particularly England was an ideal type of historical development for the modern society. However it seems to me that they lacked an outlook on the Far East countries. The "Wind of Westernization" was blowing through the east and either countries would adopt the movement to "taste the fruit of (western) civilization". It is a matter of course that the same wind was blowing to Korea. However and unfortunately, it was Japan that colonialized Korea. Considering this historical fact, it should have been said that there were particular types (plural) of historical research into the western history for the far-east peoples. Although the post-war school produced tremendous academic results, it seems to me that they were too indifferent to our neighboring countries. As far as history is a human science, I do not think that history has its own methodology inherent to a nation. This belongs to philosophy or ideology. However why does the side of the blown have a chance to get together and to discuss the tastes of the fruit of civilization with the side of the bowing.

In the second place, I jump to the other topic, that is, place-names. Meiji government tried to build the local administration system by using local elites (wealthy farmer or gentlemen) as the notable just before the promulgation of Meiji constitution in 1889 and the establishment of Diet in 1890. The central government entrusted them as their duty with a part of governmental businesses. Their jobs were honorary (unpaid) offices. As a result, smaller municipal communities which failed to bear these burdens were merged into larger and wealthier ones. The

governmental necessity of the notables changed the local communities on which they were based. The Meiji mergers slashed the total number of municipalities from 71,314 to 15,859. The great Shōwa mergers in the mid-1950s further reduced the number of municipalities from 9,868 to 3,472 in 1961. And as the result of the great Heisei mergers, which was enforced by Koizumi government, the number has been reduced to 1,721 in and after 2006. It is very interesting that it was the same prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro, who privatized the postal service. May I say that he issued an ultimatum to notable local governmental system? Is it a sort of comedy or a joke in poor taste that his son succeeded to his father's election district? Anyway we must remember that these radical and great mergers form 71,314 to 1,721 municipal communities, during 120 years resulted in a holocaust of old and traditional names, which had their own derivations and histories. If we compare the fate of these names with the English case, we may see the other side of the coin of "tradition and modernity in Britain". There if you want to confirm the location of Domesday name in 1086, you still may consult with an AA road-map on your either hand.

Young Researchers' Session

Expecting development of historical research in future and encouraging communication between young historians of both countries, each forum tried to organize the young researchers' session. This year six young historians will give papers in this session. The papers should be read within 20 min., and discussion of 10 min. will follow.

Cutlers in Fifteenth-Century London: Their Relationships with Others

Machi Sasai

(Ph.D. Candidate, Ochanomizu University, Tokyo)

Introduction

This paper will consider the relationships which London craftsmen created, maintained, and made use of in the fifteenth century in order to understand everyday life in medieval London. One particular craft, that of the cutlers, who made knives and swords, will be studied to present a specific picture.

The crafts and trades in medieval London have attracted the attention of historians since the end of the nineteenth century and detailed studies of some of the crafts and trades have been published. With regard to cutlers, the study by Charles Welch in 1916 has been almost the only substantial research.¹ While this work cannot be underestimated, he tended to focus only on the economic activity of the cutlers' guild and the cutlers' occupations, and not on the lives of individual cutlers. Therefore, there is room for further study concerning various aspects of the lives of individual cutlers. This paper will pay special attention to cutlers' relationships with others, since this viewpoint will enable us to connect each cutler with the world surrounding him.

Sources for this study are sixty wills of fifty-eight cutlers in fifteenth century London, written in either Latin or English (See Table).² These wills are analysed with particular attention paid to the recipients of bequests and to the executors of the wills in order to reveal a part of the testators' relationships with others. Yet, we should be cautious when using wills as sources because those who appear in wills merely represent part of the testators' relationships with other people.³ Nevertheless, the analysis of the wills of cutlers can certainly provide us with a fresh understanding of their world. Moreover, since wills written by members of one particular craft or trade have rarely been examined as a main subject, this study will be able to show the effectiveness of using wills for the study of medieval craftsmen and merchants.

1. Cutlers in Fifteenth Century London

¹ Charles Welch, *History of the Cutlers' Company of London: And of the Minor Cutlery Crafts: With Biographical Notices of Early London Cutlers*, 2 vols (London, 1916-23), I: *From Early Times to the Year 1500* (1916), II: *From 1500 to Modern Times* (1923); Charles Welch, 'Cutlers Hall', *Journal of the London Society*, 254 (1939), pp. 58-64.

² These wills are registered in the Archdeaconry Court of London, the Commissary Court of London, Court of Husting, London, and the Prerogative Court of Canterbury.

³ Clive Burgess, 'Late-medieval Wills and Pious Convention: Testamentary Evidence Reconsidered', in *Profit, Piety and the Professions in Later Medieval England*, ed. by Michael Hicks (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 14-33.

Before looking at wills, I will give an outline of the cutlers in medieval London.⁴

Cutlers were those who were engaged in making or selling tools for cutting, such as knives and swords. It is said that they were already active in twelfth-century London. They had come together as the cutlers' guild in 1328 at the latest, when seven cutlers who were elected by their colleagues swore before the mayor and aldermen to govern their craft.⁵ The oldest extant regulations of the craft were the ones approved by the mayor and aldermen in 1344. In 1416, the cutlers' guild received its first charter from Henry V. The cutlers built a hall in the early fifteenth century, and used it on the occasion of events such as the elections of masters and wardens and annual feasts.

Thus, the cutlers' craft in fifteenth century London was under the control of the cutlers' guild. Then, how does this group appear in individual cutlers' wills? In the first place, did the lives of cutlers consist only of being cutlers? I try to reveal a part of the cutlers' concerns based on their wills.

2. Relationships with Others: From the Wills of Cutlers

I would now like to examine the wills of the cutlers. Those who appear in the wills can be divided into the following categories: families and relatives; the cutlers' guild and fellow cutlers; and others who were neither family members nor involved in their craft.⁶

2-1. Families and Relatives

First, references to families and relatives should be considered. As is usual with male testators' wills in medieval England, their wives were chosen as executors, either alone or with other people.⁷ Forty-five cutlers clearly had wives who were still alive when they wrote their wills, and among them, forty-three nominated their wives as executors.⁸ Looking at the recipients of the bequests of cutlers, we again find the typical feature of late medieval wills of laymen. Many of the testators were concerned only about their sons and daughters, sometimes their siblings and parents, but not about their extended family members. This cannot be regarded as evidence that proves the cutlers' lives involved only a small circle of their families and relatives, but could lead to the assumption that this was the case.

For some cutlers, the relationships with their families and relatives had some

⁴ This chapter is based on the study of Welch. Welch, *History of the Cutlers' Company of London*, I, pp. 1-10, 120-123.

⁵ Cutlers formed a fraternity, which was a religious and social organization, no later than 1370. Although it is not clear when exactly this fraternity was founded, it may have provided the foundation for the craft-oriented group, the cutlers' guild.

⁶ Hereinafter, a bracketed figure after the name of a cutler corresponds with the number placed beside every cutler in the Table.

⁷ Jacqueline Murray, 'Kinship and Friendship: The Perception of Family by Clergy and Laity in Late Medieval London', *Albion*, 20 (1988), pp. 369-385 (pp. 376-377).

⁸ The will of John Howes (Howys) (25) does not clearly say the executor 'Emot' is his wife. Yet it is reasonable to regard Emot as his wife since a woman called 'Emot Howys' received a pension from the cutlers' guild between 1461 and 1475. Female recipients of this pension were mainly the wives and widows of cutlers. Therefore, John Howes's will is included in the number of the wills in which wives are chosen as executors. London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), Guildhall Library (GL), MS 7146/11-22 (Cutlers' Company Wardens' Accounts).

sort of craft-oriented aspects. John Bulle (39) had a cutler son and bequeathed his tools for cutlery to that son, and John Twyford (7) also had a cutler son, Richard Twyford (3).⁹ Only these were found as examples of cutlers who mentioned their cutler sons in their wills. But we should not conclude that the succession of children to the craft was unusual since bequests may have been made before the wills were made. What is revealed here is the fact that there were some families who were connected with the craft of cutlery down through the generations.

Another interesting point demonstrated by the wills is the cutlers' relationship with their in-laws. There were two cutlers, John Twyford (7) and William Hertwell (58), who nominated their in-laws as executors, and interestingly, these in-laws were also cutlers. Both Twyford and Hertwell nominated their daughters' husbands as their executors.¹⁰ It can be said that the relationships with in-laws may have been strengthened when they were engaged in the same occupation as the testators.

2-2. The Cutlers' Guild and Fellow Cutlers

Next, the cutlers' relationships with their fellow craftsmen, namely other cutlers, will be examined. This topic is discussed from the following perspectives: cutlers and the guild; cutlers and poor cutlers; cutlers and apprentices; and mutuality among cutlers.

2-2-1. Cutlers and the Guild

As I mentioned above, cutlers formed their own guild. Some of the cutlers seem to have remembered their guild when writing their wills; fourteen out of fifty-eight cutlers made bequests to the cutlers' guild. Among them, eleven left small goods such as tableware and cloth, while another two left cash, and Richard Twyford (3) left one third of his goods and chattels, in the event that his children died before they became of age or got married.¹¹

Why did these testators make bequests to the guild? Some of them evidently wished that the members of the guild would pray for their souls. For example, John Fordham (37) left a mazer to the guild and requested that his name be written on it so that the members would remember him in their prayers.¹² Since this suggests that the guild was one of the places where cutlers could request that their souls be prayed for, it is possible to assume that other cutlers felt the same way as John Fordham.

2-2-2. Cutlers and Poor Cutlers

Among the fifty-eight cutlers, seven remembered their poor colleagues.¹³ Four out of

⁹ Although John Bulle (39), son and recipient of the tools for cutlery is not mentioned as a cutler, it is possible to regard him as a cutler. Welch, *History of the Cutlers' Company of London*, I, p. 205.

¹⁰ Thomas Clarence (42) nominated Thomas Pope (45), cutler and father of his wife as one of his overseers.

¹¹ Wills nos. 9, 23, 28, 33, 37, 38, 44, 54, 56, 57, 58 left small goods and will nos. 20 and 26 left cash. Thomas Calys (20) left three shillings to the 'common box' of the cutlers' guild, and Thomas Brokman (26) left twelve shillings to pay for a new tapestry for the guild.

¹² The guild responded to this request, as sixteen shillings was paid to repair the mazer in 1470, according to the account of the guild. LMA, GL, MS 7146/18. Similar request was made by Thomas Barete (38).

¹³ Wills nos. 19b/c, 26, 44, 48, 49, 51, 54.

seven left money or goods to needy people, such as the poor in their own parish or inmates of hospitals, in addition to poor cutlers.¹⁴ In another three wills, bequests to the poor were made only to the poor of their craft.¹⁵ In particular, Thomas Brokman (26) and Robert Pykmere (54) also made bequests to the cutlers' guild, which may imply that they had a stronger attachment to their craft than to other institutions, at least judging from their wills.

It would be rash to assume these bequests to poor cutlers were simply an act of charity, because it is difficult to know whether these bequests were actually passed on to the poor cutlers. Moreover, what was important for the testators may have been that those poor cutlers would pray for their souls in exchange for money. However, it can be assumed that the relationships created through the craft stimulated some cutlers to remember their poor colleagues when making their wills.

2-2-3. Cutlers and Apprentices

These wills also tell us of the relationship between masters and apprentices at the end of the masters' careers.

Of the fifty-eight cutlers whose wills survive, twelve mentioned one or two of their male apprentices in their wills.¹⁶ Many of these twelve left goods or cash to their apprentices. Four cutlers exempted their apprentices from the rest of the term of their training, mainly a period of one or two years, and one asked his wife to train his two apprentices till the end of their terms.¹⁷ Apprentices may have been the ones to whom masters left the tools of their craft; two left their tools to their apprentices, and one gave his apprentice priority over others in buying his tools.¹⁸ These provisions for apprentices indicate that cutlers tried to fulfil their responsibility as masters when thinking of their own death or retirement from their craft.

2-2-4. Mutuality among Cutlers

Wills tell us about relationships among the cutlers as well. It is possible to see the ties that existed among the cutlers in their choice of executors, since the tasks of the executors had to be carried out by trustworthy people.¹⁹ Out of fifty-eight cutlers, twenty-two nominated their fellow cutlers as one of the executors of their wills.²⁰ It is not easy to make a clear link between the choice of colleagues as executors and the bequest pattern of the cutlers' wills. Yet eleven cutlers, that is half of those who nominated their fellow cutlers as executors, made craft-related provisions such as bequests to the guild or to the poor cutlers, or made some sort of provisions for their own apprentices. Of the fourteen cutlers who made bequests to the cutlers' guild, seven nominated cutlers as executors, and of the seven cutlers who bequeathed cash

¹⁴ Wills nos. 19b/c, 44, 48, 49.

¹⁵ Wills nos. 26, 51, 54.

¹⁶ Wills nos. 6, 23, 33, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 56, 58.

¹⁷ Exemption of the remaining terms, wills nos. 33, 44, 46, 47; training by his wife, will no. 56.

¹⁸ Wills nos. 23, 38, 47.

¹⁹ For the roles of executors, see for example, Michael M. Sheehan, 'English Wills and the Records of the Ecclesiastical and Civil Jurisdictions', *Journal of Medieval History*, 14 (1988), pp. 3-12.

²⁰ Out of these twenty-two testators, five testators include people who were cutlers and were also family members as their executors. They are Richard Twyford (3) (father), John Twyford (7) (husband of daughter), John Bulle (39) (son), Robert Pykmere (54) (cousin), and William Hertwell (58) (husband of daughter).

to their poor colleagues, three chose cutlers as executors. Of the twelve cutlers who mentioned their own apprentices in their wills, seven chose cutlers as executors. These facts indicate a strong and positive influence of their craft on the lives of the craftsmen.

A relationship of trust among cutlers can also be observed in other ways, such as guardianship of their colleagues' children and bequests of goods to their colleagues. For example, William Lucas (13) asked Thomas Belgrave to be custodian of his son.²¹

2-3. Others who were Neither Family Members nor Involved in their Craft

Lastly, we should not forget the cutlers' relationships outside their family and their craft. Twenty-three cutlers chose people who were not cutlers as one of their executors.²² There is no particular occupation which especially stands out among the wills of the cutlers. Unfortunately in many cases it is impossible to know how the relationships between these cutlers and non-cutlers came about. They may have lived in the same parish, or they may have come to know each other through their work.²³

In addition, as I have already mentioned, some testators left goods or cash to poor people in various institutions.²⁴ Four cutlers requested that their money be distributed among the poor in the parish where they lived.²⁵ Not only parishes, but also parish fraternities, which were religious and social organizations based on particular parish churches, were recipients of bequests. For instance, John Dey (49) bequeathed money to the fraternity of penny brotherhood in the church of St. Lawrence Jewry, the parish church of his residential area.

It is hard to generalize with regard to the intended recipients of the bequests. But in wills, we can see a few aspects of a wide range of cutlers' relationships with others.

Conclusion

From the analysis of wills, two features can be observed concerning the relationships of cutlers in medieval London.

First, their lives as cutlers created strong relationships which each cutler could rely on other people with regard to matters concerning the salvation of his soul, the disposition of his property and providing care for those he left behind. Cutlers could expect their guild to pray for their souls and could also find trustworthy people among their colleagues to whom they could entrust various tasks after their death.

Second, cutlers' relationships were not only confined to the ones formed within

²¹ As an another example, John Hichecok (43) requested that ten marks be given to his servant Thomas Smith when he married, by another cutler William Haydore (44). This suggests that William Haydore was supposed to look after the money.

²² These twenty-three only include testators whose executors' occupations are mentioned.

²³ It is evident that some of the executors lived in the same parish as testators, judging from the executors' own wills. They are Hugh Harlewyne, Philip Waltham (9)'s executor, John Newenham, John Heglyngton (18)'s executor, and John Abraham, William Haydore (44)'s executor. Hugh Harlewyne's will: LMA, GL, MS 9171/4, f. 3r.; John Newenham's will: LMA, GL, MS 9171/6, f. 164v.; John Abraham's will: LMA, GL, MS 9171/6, f. 338r.

²⁴ About the bequest to the poor, see J. A. F. Thomson, 'Piety and Charity in Late Medieval London', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 16 (1965), pp. 178-195.

²⁵ Wills nos. 19b/c, 20, 29, 44.

their craft. Each cutler probably formed friendly relationships with various people and groups around him.

As we have seen, the analysis of cutlers' wills revealed the wide relationships of cutlers and what each cutler could expect to request from individuals and groups. The analysis of wills of other craftsmen and merchants may give us a different picture with regard to their relationships with others, or, it may be that we are provided with a similar picture. In either case, the study of wills paying particular attention to testators' relationships will definitely broaden our understanding of medieval everyday life.

Table: Wills of Cutlers in Fifteenth-Century London

Sources

London Metropolitan Archives, Corporation of London Records Office, Husting Court Rolls of Deeds and Wills, Rolls 139 and 164
 London Metropolitan Archives, Guildhall Library (GL), MS 905/1, Register of Wills proved in the Archdeaconry Court of London
 MS 917/1-8, Registers of Wills proved in the Commissary Court of London
 The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), PROB 11/5, 6, 8, and 12, Registers of Wills proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury

Notes

Name: The surname is given as written in the original material, and the first name is written in modernised form.

Year: The year of will-making is given.

Burial Place: When the name of a saint is given, it indicates the parish church dedicated to the saint. For example, John Gerold (1) wished to be buried in the parish church of St. Lawrence Jewry.

No.	Name	Year	Reference	Burial Place	Executors (C=cutler, W=wife) [Overseers]	Cutler(s) as executors	Bequest to the cutlers' guild	Bequest to the poor cutters	Provisions for apprentices
1	John Gerold	1400	GL, MS 905/1, ff. 91r & 91v.	St. Lawrence Jewry	William Foulger (saddler), Edmond Cassaudin				
2	John Combe	1404	GL, MS 917/2, ff. 49v. & 50r.	St. Lawrence Pountney	Joan (W), John Trenchener (chandler), John Monte (C)	O			
3	Richard Twyford	1406	GL, MS 905/1, ff. 163v. & 164r.	St. Thomas of Acre	John Twyford (C, father), John Norton (grocer)	O	O		
4	William Randolph	1407	GL, MS 905/1, f. 178v.	St. Michael Cornhill	Joan (W)				
5	Richard Full	1411	Husting Court Roll 139 (27)	Not mentioned	Juliana (W), William Mullen (C), John Halie (boothemaker)	O			
6	John Hyde	1412	GL, MS 917/2, ff. 219v. & 220r.	St. Magnus the Martyr	Margery (W), Thomas Joly's (armourer), Roger Geldt (bowyer)			O	
7	John Twyford	1414	GL, MS 905/1, ff. 330v. & 331r.	St. Thomas of Acre	William Grainger (C, husband of daughter)	O			
8	William Clyffe	1419	GL, MS 917/3, ff. 22v. & 23r.	St. Martin in the fields at Charing Cross	Joan (W), John Vannmeth de Charyng (brewer)				
9	Philip Waltham	1426	GL, MS 917/3, f. 158v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Ellen (W), Hugh Harlewyne (spurrier)	O			
10	Richard Wellom	1428	GL, MS 917/3, f. 195v.	Chanceryhouse	Nicholas Roole (C), William Thyske (C)	O			
11	Barth Umfray	1430	GL, MS 917/3, f. 245v.	Dominican Friary	Agnes (W), Thomas Wovant, John Umfray				

No.	Name	Year	Reference	Burial Place	Executors (C=curtler, W=wife) [Overseers]	Curtler(s) as executors	Bequest to the cutlers' guild	Bequest to the poor cutlers	Provisions for apprentices(s)
12	John Richer	1430	GL, MS 917/3, f. 248r.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Isabelle (W), [Stephan Herner (C)]				
13	William Lucas	1430	GL, MS 917/3, f. 260r.	St. Mildred Poultry	Margaret (W), Thomas Belgrave (C), Richard Battail (C)	O			
14	John Currys	1431	GL, MS 917/3, f. 294r.	'where my wife Joan considers the best' (translation from Latin)	Joan (W)				
15	John Haverill	1432	GL, MS 917/3, f. 324v.	St. Botolph without Aldgate	John South, Agnes (wife of John South), Thomas Denyngton				
16	Nicholas Ryke	1433	GL, MS 917/3, f. 366v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Margaret (W), Roger Dawney (Joiner), John Mylennham (Joiner)				
17	John Ponder	1434	GL, MS 917/3, f. 373v.	St. Magnus the Martyr	Isabelle (W), Thomas Moier (pinner)				
18	John Heglyngton (Eglynge)	1434	GL, MS 917/3, f. 374v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	John Grammer (bouwer), Thomas Otehyl [C], John Newenham (Joiner)	O			
19a	John Chaddle	1428	GL, MS 917/3, f. 438v.	'Fully set out in my another will' (translation from Latin)	John Pope, Richard Lyndesay				
19b	John Chaddle	1435	GL, MS 917/3, ff. 436v. & 437r.	St. Mildred Poultry	Joan (W), William Granger (C), Walter Norwold (C)	O			
19c	John Chaddle	1435	Husting Court, Roll 164 (28)	St. Mildred Poultry	Joan (W), William Granger (C), Walter Norwold (C)				
20	Thomas Calys	1435	GL, MS 917/3, f. 424r.	St. Martin Ludgate	William Bonum (C), Master Thomas More (chaplain)	O	O		
21	Stephan Herner	1442	GL, MS 917/4, f. 91v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Joan (W), John Otehill (C), Thomas Otehill (C)	O			
22	Thomas Chymbach	1442	GL, MS 917/4, f. 127v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Marion (W), Gilbert Page, [Thomas Gay (tailor), Robert Nyng (tailor)]				
23	Geoffrey Gybon	1446	GL, MS 917/4, f. 209v.	St. Lawrence Pountney	John Boileond (brewer), William Streach (lawyer)				
24	John Parker	1450	GL, MS 917/5, f. 16r.	St. Paul	Joan (W), [Walter Nonholt (C)]	O			
25	John Howes (Howry's)	1451	GL, MS 917/5, f. 21v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Emot (W)* ¹				
26	Thomas Blakeman	1452	GL, MS 917/5, f. 60v.	St. Mildred Poultry	Robert Suel, John Roos, Thomas Bovy, [William Blakely]	O	O		

*1 See footnote 8 in the text.

No.	Name	Year	Reference	Burial Place	Executors (C=curtler, W=wife) (Overseers)	Cutter(s) as executors	Bequest to the cutlers' guild	Bequest to the poor cutlers	Provisions for apprentices
27	Henry Kendale	1453	GL, MS 9171/5, ff. 311v. & 312v.	St. Mildred Poultry	Agnes (W), John Roos (C), Thomas Hogges (C)	O			
28	William Broun	1453	GL, MS 9171/5, ff. 100r & 100v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Agnes (W), [William Melbom senior]	O			
29	William Multon	1454	GL, MS 9171/5, ff. 149r. & 149v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Agnes (W), John Frost (mercier), Henry Dene (tailor)				
30	John Boydon	1455	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 169r.	St. Magnus the Martyr	Joan (W), [John Palyngham, John Tyweyn, parishioners of St. Magnus the Martyr]				
31	Thomas Thomas	1456	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 192v.	St. Lawrence Jewry	Agnes (W), William Gyre (pewterer)				
32	Thomas Chantrell	1457	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 224v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Margery (W), Thomas Oehill (C), John Garlondne (prior)	O			
33	William Smith	1450	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 300r.	St. Thomas of Acre	Joan (W), [William Clover (writer of court letters), John Roos (C), John Bremp]	O		O	
34	Thomas Orell	1461	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 382v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Agnes (W), William Seyon (C)	O			
35	John Eland	1463	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 341v.	St. Thomas the Apostle	Margaret (W), William Lee, Robert Sterne				
36	Thomas Tryle	1465	TNA, PRO PROB 11/5	St. John the Baptist upon Walbrook	Margaret (W), Thomas Oehill (C), Robert Orchard (gentleman)	O			
37	John Fordham	1466	GL, MS 9171/5, f. 379v.	St. Magnus the Martyr	Alice (W), Thomas Lowys (tailor), Thomas Pope (C), [William Gill (girdler)]	O		O	
38	Thomas Barete	1466	GL, MS 9171/5, ff. 390r & 390v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Margaret (W), William Seton (C), John Touker (C)	O		O	
39	John Bulle	1467	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 2v. & 3r.	St. Botolph without Aldgate	John Bulle (C7, son)*2, Agnes (W), [John Roberts (C)]	O			
40	Thomas Hogges	1468	GL, MS 9171/6, f. 30r.	St. Michael Bassishaw	Alice (W), John Ingold (founder)				
41	Stephen Plummer	1468	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 44r. & 44v.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Joan (W), John Chirche (C)	O		O	
42	Thomas Clarence	1468	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 30v & 31r.	Dominican Friary	Agnes (W), [Thomas Pope (C, father of wife), Roger Maryn (brewer)]				
43	John Hicheock	1469	GL, MS 9171/6, f. 48v.	St. Michael Wood Street	Thomas Smyth (servant), Thomas Pert (timbermonger)				

*2 See footnote 9 in the text.

No.	Name	Year	Reference	Burial Place	Executors (C=curtler, W=wife) (Overseers)	Curtler(s) as executors	Beguest to the poor cutlers	Beguest to the apprentices
44	William Haydore	1470	GL, MS 9171/6, f. 154r.	St. Lawrence Jewry	Mariona (W), John Dey (C), John Ball (C), John Abraham (goldbeater)	O	O	O
45	Thomas Pope	1470	GL, MS 9171/6, f. 75r.	'where executors prefer' (translation from Latin)	Margaret (W), Henry Robert (broiderer)			
46	Richard Church	1473	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 124v. & 125r.	St. Paul	Katherine (W), John Church (father)			O
47	John Robertson	1473	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 131v. & 132r.	St. Bride Fleet Street	John Pyrulas, Richard Robertson (C)	O		O
48	John Anell	1474	TNA, PRO, PROB 11/6	St. Michael Paternoster Royal or Whittington's College	Richard Arnold (haberdasher), Thomas Marion (stainer)			O
49	John Dey	1475	TNA, PRO, PROB 11/6	St. Lawrence Jewry	Margaret (W), John Pykton (mercer)		O	
50	John Catour	1478	GL, MS 9171/6, ff. 223v. & 224r.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Jean (W), William Hayford (grocer)			
51	Richard Wodecock	1480	GL, MS 9171/6, f. 298v.	St. Martin Ludgate	Alice (W), [William Seton (C)]			O
52	John Towker	1484	GL, MS 9171/7, ff. 10r. & 10v.	St. Magnus the Martyr	John (W), [John Humphrey (brewer), Robert Peché (leatherseller)]			
53	Robert Boys	1485	GL, MS 9171/7, f. 28r.	'where it shall please our lord god'	Florence (W), John Chamber			
54	Robert Pykmere	1488	TNA, PRO, PROB 11/8	St. Bride Fleet Street	Thomas Pykmere (C, cousin), [William Vale (C)]	O	O	O
55	Thomas Teversham	1489	GL, MS 9171/8, f. 4r.	St. Bride Fleet Street	Alianora (W), Thomas Teversham (sister and brother), [John Teversham (brother)]			
56	William Store	1490	GL, MS 9171/8, f. 17v.	St. Magnus the Martyr	Agnes (W), [William Herwell (C)]	O		O
57	John Robyns	1492	GL, MS 9171/8, ff. 39v & 40r.	St. Martin Ludgate	Master John Reed, William Seton, William Berell	O		
58	William Herwell	1497	TNA, PRO, PROB 11/12	St. Magnus the Martyr	William Herwell (son), John Wilford (C, husband of daughter), [Simon Newington (C)]	O	O	
				Total	22	14	7	12

The Seventeenth Century's English Almanacs and Female Writers

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Introduction

An almanac is the book which tells about the movements of the sun, moon and stars. In early modern England, almanac enjoyed its popularity any other genre ever had. In 1640s, the heyday of almanacs, its sales averaged about forty thousand copies annually, a figure which suggests that roughly one family in three bought an almanac each year.¹ In seventeenth century, more than two thousand almanacs were published and more than two hundred writers wrote them. In addition, there came out almanacs for a variety of occupations, regions, religions, and political inclinations. Almanac writers were from different social backgrounds from aristocrats or gentries to farmers or cobblers. At the end of the century, at last, appeared female writers.

In 1692, the satirical *Poor Robin's Almanack* claimed that it had been 56 years "since Women began to learn to make Almanacks."² However, there is no evidence of them written before 1650s. It is presumed that, these almanacs might be disappeared or written under pseudonyms. The acknowledged female almanac writers in this period are only three and eight almanacs are attributed to them.

The appearance of such almanacs coincided with a period of increasing number of 'female authorized texts' from the late 1640s into the late 1650s. Many of these works focused either on religious or political matters, such as Petitions to Parliament and Cromwell. In the late 1650 and 1660s, a growing number of women produced scientific, pharmaceutic and medical text. It may be that some far-thinking members of the Stationers' Company decided to capitalize on these trends by producing an astrological publication attributed to a female writer.³

In this article, three female writers and their eight almanacs will be examined. Through this process, it will be discussed that three female almanac writers and their identities.

1. English Almanacs

Traditional European almanacs consist of two sections. The first section is a table of the astronomical and astrological events of the coming year, such as the movements and conjunctions of the planet and stars in the zodiac, details of eclipses and the dates of the festivals of the Church. The Second section is 'Prognostication',

¹ Bernard Capp, *English Almanacs, 1500-1800: Astrology and the Popular Press* (New York: Cornell UP., 1979), pp. 23-24.

² Poor Robin, *Poor Robin's Almanack* (1682), sig. B4.

³ Lois G. Schwoerer, 'Women's Public Political Voice in England: 1640-1740', in Hilda L. Smith ed., *Women Writers and Early Modern British Political Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP., 1998), pp. 61~63 ; Louis Hill Curth, *English Almanacs, Astrology and Popular Medicine: 1550-1700* (Manchester: Manchester UP., 2008), p. 68.

prophesies about political change, epidemic, war, rebellion as well as weather and harvest. Originally, it was an independent genre, but after the invention of printing, it was absorbed into almanac. When the almanac first appeared, it contained only former section.

England was a late starter in the history of almanac. In the early sixteenth century, most almanacs were imported from Netherland, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. The first native product was not published until 1537 and it did not include prognostication. The English almanac, containing prognostication, first came out anonymously two years later. The first author to reveal his identity was Andrew Borde in 1545.⁴ After that, Anthony Askham published a series of almanacs annually. Although Continental almanacs were still dominant, the rapid growth of the English almanacs began in the middle of century.

During Elizabethan period the almanac assumed its standard form which had two sections. The first section contained a calendar and details of planetary motions and conjunctions, together with a table showing the legal terms, and 'zodiac man'. The second section usually had a separate title-page, and discussed the four quarters of year, with the weather prospects and prevalent disease, medical notes and date on forming and gardening. As Elizabethan almanacs added more information people needed, less foreign almanacs were imported. Until 1600 published English almanacs were more than six hundred copies, and they were increasing⁵.

In the Seventeenth century, the English almanac experienced great development. They contained more specialized information such as very full chronology, detailed lists of fairs and agricultural advice, data on herbal medicine, and forms of bond and will. Titles were varied to aim at particular occupations like seamen, chapmen, weavers, constables, and farriers. These developments were caused by the Stationer's Company which was seeking to guarantee widespread readers. Stationer's Company also published a variety of almanacs for different regions, religions, and political inclinations as well as sex.

2. Sarah Jinner : a definite voice

Sarah Jinner is the earliest female almanac writer. There are four known surviving annual almanacs attributed to Jinner, who referred to herself as a 'student of astrology', and one perpetual woman's almanac under the name of Sarah Ginnor, who referred to herself as a 'student of physick'.⁶ Jinner's annual almanacs are similar to other mainstream almanacs. They contained standard astrological component, combined with a great deal of information on women's health. In addition, the almanacs contained a section on agricultural tasks, as well as advertisements for a range of books, including histories, religious texts and popular medical texts. Especially the almanac for 1660 included a selection of cosmetic recipes for women, such as treating sunburn, fading freckles, removing hair and treating pimples and heat in the face. The absence of advice on specifically male maladies suggests that this had not proved to be a valuable feature the previous

⁴ Andrew Borde, *A Prognostycacyon or an Almanack*, 1545.

⁵ Kieth Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England* (New York: Oxford UP., 1971), p. 294.

⁶ Sarah Jinner, *An Almanack or Prognostication for 1658 ; A New Almanack and Prognostication for 1659; An Almanack or Prognostication for 1660 ; An Almanack for 1664*; (spelt Ginnor, pseud.?) *The Womans Almanack or Prognostication for Ever*(1659).

years.

The formats of Jinner's almanacs were typical, but the voice from the almanacs was distinct. Indeed, she was apparently unnoticed female radical. Her almanacs combined a spirited defence of women with medical notes, social comment and a vigorous political commentary. Her outlook was anti-authoritarian, summed up in the observation that government "hath no other foundation than the humour of the people."⁷ Moreover she declared that the people are "not bound to obey well, when governors do not govern well".⁸ Also Jinner expressed sharp criticism of the misrule of government that "much of our evill that will befall us, is like to be occasioned by the evill minds of some in Power" and looked forward to a time when "the people may have some eminent champion to assert their liberties."⁹

Womans Almanack under the name of Ginnor was controversial. In many aspects, it differs from the other works by her. Even though Ginnor introduced herself as a student of physician, any medical information which was abundant in the Jinner's, can not be found. Instead of medical information, there was physiognomic information. Moreover, there was no prognostication, which was distinctively radical in Jinner's annual almanacs. The crude portrait of writer and print letters are also different from the other works written under the name of Jinner. With these differences, the name, Ginnor, is presumed a pseudonym. Nevertheless, *Womans Almanack* presents the feminist viewpoint. Ginnor lamented "the gift of learning being so little set by in these days amongst those of our Sex." She published "this Tract to stir up others, not to let their great worth in obscurity."¹⁰ Whatever Ginnor's identity was, she expressed a voice as a woman.

3. Mary Holden and Dorothy Partridge: Unknown Identity

Another female writer, Mary Holden, appeared after almost a quarter of a century from Jinner's last almanac. She introduced herself as a midwife in Sudbury and a student in astrology. Her two almanacs had plenty of information people might need.¹¹ The first part of the almanac for 1688 consisted of house tables of twelve months and simple chronology and the second part contains the days of eclipses, the description of 4 seasons, the agricultural tasks of each month, Christian origin of astrology, tables of the hour and minute of sun-rising every day and annuities and reversions. It also provided the list of fairs as well as an advertisement of her medicines "for all women troubled with Vapours, Rising of the Mother, Convulsions and Canker."¹² Her next almanac for 1689 included more information such as zodiac man, table of moon's latitude, treaties on "the seven planets", and high water level at London Bridge.

Holden's almanacs, however, had neither prognostication nor editorial and it is impossible to know the writer's thought, inclination, and even sex. In spite of the title, *the Womans Almanack*, it included more general information rather than female-oriented material. Anybody might expect to see about women's disease or at

⁷ Jinner (1659), sig. C3v.

⁸ Jinner (1659), sig. C3.

⁹ Jinner (1660), sig. B1; (1659), sig. C1v.

¹⁰ Ginnor (1659), sig. A2.

¹¹ Mary Holden, *The Womans Almanack for 1688 ; The Wonans Almanack or An Ephemerides for 1689*.

¹² Holden (1688), sig. B4.

least medical advice for both sexes because the writer referred to herself as a midwife. The only she referred to woman was in the advertisement.

The final almanac attributed to a female author, Dorothy Partridge, appeared in 1694.¹³ There are many suggestions about who she is. Some said she is the celebrated John Partridge's wife, some said she is another Dorothy Partridge who is not related to John Partridge and others said Dorothy is John Partridge or the printer Benjamin Harris's pseudonym.¹⁴

The edition contained far more material of interest to women than that found in Jinner and Holden. It began with "Monthly Observations in Good housewifery", which instructs tasks that women would have carried out. Her almanac showed much less restraint in prescribing "a lusty squab fat bedfellow very good physic at this season" or "a good season to get Children"¹⁵. It also contains various cosmetic on how to beautify the hair and face, as well as miscellaneous knowledge which woman would be curious to know such as how to read palm and face, "make love powder", and "know which shall die first, the Husband or Wife."¹⁶ The female-oriented content does not, however, serious and seems to attempt to entertain.

Conclusion

This essay examined almanacs attributed to seventeenth century female writers. In the golden age of almanacs, there were about two hundred almanac writers and more than two thousand of almanacs were published. But women writers were only three and the number of their almanacs was eight. Even two out of three female writers' sexual identities are not certain. Of course, it is terribly difficult to prove their sexual identities with only almanacs attributed to them because their voices were not heard and male writers might be pretended to be female writers.

Sarah Jinner, the first female almanac writer, showed her sexual identity distinctively. Even though the titles of her almanacs are not 'woman's almanac', they treated plenty of woman's disease. Moreover self-consciousness as a female writer and physician were scattered in most sections. When she referred to woman, she used the words 'our Sex', instead of 'woman' or 'female sex'.

Mary Holden, the second female almanac writer, did not make a voice as a woman. The political atmosphere of James II's reign might restrain the almanac writer from expressing her opinion. However, she did not show contents about woman, except advertisement. Dorothy Partridge's almanac is a little different. Her almanac provided all female-oriented Information. But there is only 'information for woman' rather than her thought or attitude. Therefore the doubt about Holden and Partridge's identities comes out. In other words, it can be considered that the Stationer's Company hired male writers to write 'woman's almanacs' which seemed written by a female writers. This device might serve to increase woman's almanac purchase.

Once Jinner said her almanac for 1658, 'You may wonder to see one of our Sex in print especially in the Celestial Sciences' and goes on but 'why may not women write,

¹³ Dorothy Prtridge, *The Woman's Almanack for 1694*.

¹⁴ In fact, Harris issued counterfeit editions under the name of John Partridge (Curth, *English almanacs* (2007), pp. 71~72; Capp, *English almanacs* (1979), p. 241).

¹⁵ Partridge (1694), sig. A1v.

¹⁶ Partridge (1694), sig. B2v.

I pray?¹⁷ For women the very act publishing was of great significant. It enabled them to make their idea public. However, in seventeenth century many woman circulated their writing in manuscript copies among their family or friends. Also it seemed to be difficult for women to publish almanacs although there were many midwives and intellectual women who had astrological knowledge. Woman's writing was increased, but publishing was another matter.

¹⁷ Jinner (1658), sig. B1.

A Token of Tyranny? The Quartering Problems in the Reign of James II

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The reign of James II saw remarkably severe quartering problems across England. One of the best examples is Kingston-upon-Hull, a large garrison town, where the inhabitants had suffered from the depredations of the forces stationed there. In late October 1687, the town magistrates wrote to the earl of Plymouth, the town's recorder and high-steward, complaining of their 'calamitous condition':

wee have now been forced to give out billets for above 1200 souldiers[.] Our publick houses are full & all the little houses that used to take in souldiers & not onely these but the butchers, bakers, publick brewers, chandlers, showmakers, brandy shops and several others are soe full that the verry masters of sume famelies them selves have for severall nights this week laid on the fflore of their houses[,] the souldiers having taken up their beds¹

Graphic as it may be, the above quotation explains only a part of the town's sufferings. Most strikingly, the army frequently failed or even refused to pay for their quarters. As early as October 1685, the commander of Lord Huntingdon's regiment ordered all his men to stay in public houses and 'pay nothing for their quarters'.² This trick was practised repeatedly by successive troops stationed in the town, with the result that by April 1688 the total debts of soldiers amounted to over £600. Although the town magistrates tried to deal with these troubles, their intervention was snubbed by the army officers. The mayor complained in January 1688, 'we are not saife in our persons when we are in performing his Majesties service but meet with affronts and in danger of assaults from those of the military part who should rather be our protector'.³

Perhaps the hardship visited on Hull was an extreme example, but it was never exceptional. Those complaints voiced by the Hull inhabitants, in fact, were heard everywhere. Uneven distribution of billets, soldiers' debts and their disregard of the civilian authorities were all common grievances not only in other garrison towns but also a number of non-military cities, like Bristol, Leicester, Leeds and Norwich.⁴

The disturbances attendant upon army quartering have often, by contemporaries and historians alike, been linked to James II's arbitrary style of government.

¹ Hull City Archives (hereafter HCA), BRL2759a, ff. 19r-20r.

² HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 1v-2r, 3v.

³ HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 31r-32v.

⁴ John Childs, *The army, James II and the Glorious Revolution* (Manchester, 1980), pp. 86-91; Steve Pincus, *1688: the first modern revolution* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 145-148, 182-183; Satoshi Tsujimoto, 'Restoration garrisons, 1660-1688: the English army in national and local context' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010), ch. 6.

According to this view, the Catholic king, to compel his subjects to submit to his innovative policies, intentionally caused the quartering problems. For instance, Abraham De la Pryme, a contemporary historian and antiquarian, found the reason for the sufferings of the Hull inhabitants in their refusal to cooperate with the king. Pryme argued in his book, *A history of Kingston-upon-Hull*, written in about 1700:

to punish and chastise them for their insolence in not being willing to submit in every thing to his pleasure so he [James II] immediately commanded 1199 soldiers to have free quarters upon the inhabitants of the town and liberty to insult over them as they pleased by which means ... the town in general was exceedingly damnedified⁵

Even during his reign, it was widely believed that the king was employing the army in a 'dragooning system' to impose obedience on his subjects.⁶ After the revolution of 1688, this belief was crystallised in the Bill of Rights, which condemned James for 'raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without consent of Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law'.⁷

The same line of argument has been followed by historians of later ages. Many present-day scholars admit, explicitly or implicitly, that the quartering problems were a product of James's intentions: in one authority's words, 'an authoritarian monarchy supported by a loyal army'.⁸ Thus, there was and is a general agreement that the king was the principal cause of the problems.

Perhaps surprisingly, however, the grounds on which this orthodox interpretation stands are not so firm as they are believed to be. The tyrannical-king explanation, in fact, is not the product of a detailed analysis of evidence; rather, it is based on a plausible, but unproved assumption. The assumption is that because James II depended so much upon the army in pursuing his religious policies, he must have been willing to leave it outside the law, and therefore, connived at, or even encouraged, its undisciplined behaviour among the civilian population.

The aim of this paper is to examine whether this assumption is valid or not by looking closely at the king's stance with regard to the problems. If it is not valid, then the paper attempts to provide an alternative explanation for the causes.

As is well known, James II was the king who actively used the military to promote his heavy-handed Catholicisation policies. The army not only served as a safeguard against possible violent resistance by the Protestant nation, but more importantly it played a prominent part in a series of campaigns by the king to reconstitute national and local government.⁹ From 1687 onwards, a large number of army officers were

⁵ Abraham De la Pryme, *A history of Kingston-upon-Hull*, ed. by A. G. Bell & John Meadley (Hull, 1986), p. 116.

⁶ Stephen Saunders Webb, *Lord Churchill's coup: the Anglo-American empire and the Glorious Revolution reconsidered* (New York, 1995), p. 130.

⁷ 1 Will & Mary sess. 2 c. 2.

⁸ Childs, *The army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, p. 92; Geoffrey Holmes, *The making of a great power: late Stuart and early Georgian Britain 1660-1722* (Harlow, 1993), p. 171; Webb, *Lord Churchill's coup*, p. 130; Pincus, *1688*, p. 145.

⁹ For James II's campaigns at national and local levels, see J. R. Jones, *The revolution of 1688 in England* (London, 1972), ch. 6; P. E. Murrell, 'Bury St. Edmunds and the campaign to pack Parliament, 1687-8', *Historical Research* (hereafter *HR*), 54 (1981), pp. 188-206; V. L. Stater, *Noble government: the Stuart lord lieutenancy and the transformation of English politics*

appointed to various government and local offices; furthermore, in the summer of 1688, when the king decided to summon a new parliament, more than fifty officers were nominated as royal candidates for the coming general election.¹⁰ Such heavy recourse to the army, however, does not necessarily mean that James allowed it to act outside the law; nor does it immediately follow that the king considered the quartering problems to be a necessary evil to secure local obedience. On the contrary, a close examination of James's attitude towards the problems shows that he made considerable attempts at settlement and prevention.

In fact, in his less than four-year reign, James II issued three declarations and at least one general order against the quartering problems.¹¹ Not only did they confirm some accepted rules, such as the illegality of forced private quartering, prohibition of arbitrary distribution of billeting, and due and regular payment for quarters, the royal orders also set up several detailed regulations to effectuate those basic rules. Most remarkably, the king decreed that all commanding officers, when they moved from one place to another, must have it certified by the local magistrate that the soldiers behaved themselves and all their quarters had been paid for. The king thereby secured the civilians an important means to protect themselves against the abuses by the military.

When grievances were laid before him, James II's handling of them was, perhaps surprisingly, not necessarily unfair to civilians. Most importantly, despite a widely-held assumption, no clear proof can be found that the king himself forced free quarter on his subjects, except under extraordinary circumstances. Evidence suggests, on the contrary, that he essentially denied it and recognised the burden borne by civilians. Thus, when the mayor of Bridgewater petitioned against the free quarter imposed upon the town by the stationed troops in July 1685, the king assured the mayor that he 'by no means allows free quarters'.¹² The same complaint from the Hull inhabitants a few months later was also received favourably.¹³ In late 1686, another grievance from Hull against the burden of accepting the Holland Regiment was rewarded by the king's decision that a part of the regiment should move to the adjacent town of Beverley.¹⁴ Even from January 1688 onwards, when the Hull elite showed unwillingness to cooperate with him, the king maintained his position that soldiers had to regulate themselves and pay the due rates for their billeting.¹⁵

These examples demonstrate that James II did make serious efforts to resolve

(Athens, 1994), ch. 6; M. J. Short, 'The corporation of Hull and the government of James II', *Historical Research*, 71 (1998), pp. 172-195; Paul Halliday, *Dismembering the body politic: partisan politics in England's towns, 1650-1730* (Cambridge, 1998), ch. 7; John Miller, *James II* (Yale English Monarchs, New Haven, 2000), chs 11, 12; Tim Harris, *Revolution: the great crisis of the British monarchy, 1685-1720* (London, 2006), ch. 5; Miller, *Cities divided: politics and religion in English provincial towns 1660-1722* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 228-237.

¹⁰ Childs, *The army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, pp. 107-110, Appendices A-C.

¹¹ *London Gazette*, nos 2063, 2299, 2380; The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO26/6, ff. 114-115; PC2/72, ff. 731-732; 'Royal Order to all Commanding Officers and Garrison Governors concerning the Quarter Payment, 30 October 1685', copies of which are found in HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 10v-11r; TNA, WO94/5; Staffordshire Record Office (hereafter SRO), D(W)1778/III/O/6.

¹² *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1685*, nos 1338, 1388.

¹³ HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 10r-12v.

¹⁴ HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 18v-19r.

¹⁵ TNA, WO4/1, ff. 70-71; HCA, BRM386.

the quartering problems from a generally neutral standpoint. The question to be asked is, therefore, why such efforts failed. To answer it we must turn to an essential factor underlying the problems.

To understand the failure of James's efforts, we need first to understand the background against which they were attempted. The most significant point to be noted is that Restoration England had no comprehensive code to regulate army quartering. Although separate sets of regulations, called the 'Articles of War', laid down dozens of punishable military offences,¹⁶ they were mainly designed to deal with troubles within the army, not to control the interactions between the military and civilians. The 1686 Articles of War, for instance, contained only two articles, out of sixty-four, concerning the billeting of soldiers.¹⁷

The absence of an official regulation code indicates that the quartering was conducted largely through personal negotiation between military officers and civil magistrates, or, at best, according to patchy customary rules that had evolved from their previous agreements. At Hull, for instance, it was the normal rule that when troops arrived, they were met by both publicans and other inhabitants at the town parade, received into their houses and provided with quarters at fixed rates.¹⁸ At Portsmouth, some details of soldiers' quartering, such as the rates and methods of payment, were set down by the 'contracts' agreed between the mayor and garrison governor.¹⁹

These locally-based rules inevitably had great diversity. Thus, the rates of quarters were different in terms of both places and periods. The soldiers stationed in Berwick in the 1660s paid six pence per week, whereas at Hull the rates were fixed at eight pence per week.²⁰ At Portsmouth, on the other hand, the mayor and garrison governor agreed in the 1670s that the inhabitants be allowed ten pence per week.²¹ The practice of private quartering was also different from one place to another. In large garrison towns, like Hull and Portsmouth, it was commonly seen. In most other towns, however, soldiers were supposed to quarter at public houses only.

The informal and diverse nature of these regulations was essentially problematic. Informality rendered their authority uncertain; the existence of different rules, some contradictory to others, made matters confusing and could lead to disobedience. Before 1685, however, these problems came to the surface only sporadically, because for most of Charles II's reign the strength of the forces stationed in the provincial towns was rarely beyond their accommodation capacity and generally stable partnerships were maintained between the military and civilian communities.²² Yet

¹⁶ In the Restoration period, the Articles of War were issued in 1662, 1666, 1673, 1674, 1677 and 1686. See Clifford Walton, *History of the British standing army, A.D. 1660-1700* (London, 1894), Appendix LIII, pp. 808-820.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 812, 813.

¹⁸ HCA, BRM382A

¹⁹ SRO, D(W)1778/V/1407, ff. 6r-v,

²⁰ Berwick-upon-Tweed Record Office (hereafter BuTRO), B9/1, ff. 105v-106r; HCA, BRM382A.

²¹ SRO, D(W)1778/V/1407, f. 6r.

²² For the detailed analysis on this point, see Satoshi Tsujimoto, 'Anthony Gilby and civil-military relations in Kingston-upon-Hull, 1660-81', in Kazuhiko Kondo & Miles Taylor

once these favourable conditions were removed, the limitations of the patchwork regulations soon became apparent. That was what happened in James II's reign.

Behind most disputes over the army quartering after 1685 lay the poor authority and ill-defined nature of local rules. In Hull, for instance, Lord Huntingdon's regiment rode roughshod over customary rule in late 1685 because the townsmen, on the arrival of the regiment, did not welcome the soldiers in the usual way. Major Charles Morgan, commander of the regiment, declared that 'people here [are] the first breakers' of the 'old custom' and therefore it was now void. He then imposed upon the town 'proposals' of his own making, in which he boldly demanded that all soldiers be accommodated at public houses and have free quarter. He justified his demand by pointing out that in most other towns in England only public quartering was allowed. His claim was also partly vindicated by a widely-held notion on the military side: soldiers should not pay for their billeting if they bought food and drink at their quarters.²³

The dispute over officers' quarters was another example which shows the ineffectiveness of the customary rules. In Chester in 1687, the town inhabitants fell out with the officers of Lord Huntingdon's regiment over their demand to be provided with the best rooms in houses. The argument was particularly difficult to mediate because both parties insisted that custom was on their side. The inhabitants, backed by Peter Shakerley the sympathetic garrison governor, insisted that officers 'should not take up the First Best Room, which has been the Constant Practise here & so is in other Places' and they successfully obtained the governor's order to refuse them quarters. The officers, on the other hand, blamed the townspeople for their refusal. 'Which was', they claimed, 'contrary to Custom or the usage he [the governor] gave to other Regiments'.²⁴

The customary rules, moreover, barely defined the location of responsibility for the regulation of army quartering,²⁵ which inflamed the situation further. To the vexation of civilians, unsympathetic military officers would never allow civil authorities to intervene, and they themselves did nothing to supervise their men, letting them quarter as they pleased.²⁶ Such irresponsibility was largely left

(eds), *British history 1600-2000: expansion in perspective: proceedings of the 6th Anglo-Japanese conference of historians* (London, 2010), pp. 225-236.

²³ HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 2r-9r; Huntington Library, Hastings Manuscript Collection (hereafter Hastings MS), 9385. Even the earl of Plymouth, the sympathetic governor of Hull, stated, 'it is now three & forty years since I was first a Soldier & from that hour to this I never heard that any Soldier was oblige to pay for his Lodgings'. (HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 1v-2r.) The governor advised the Hull magistrates, 'if the soldiers have paid for all their Dyett & had it of their Landlords[,] then they ought not to pay any more then they have done[,] but if the soldiers bought their own provisions and had onely and the conveyniances as they used to have att private houses for 8d. per weeke[,] then they ought to pay 8d. per weeke for each soldier'. (HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 12v-13r.) In fact, this was a standard rule of public quartering in the Interregnum period. (H. M. Reece, 'The military presence in England, 1649-1660' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1981), p. 115.)

²⁴ Hastings MSS, 2407, 10752

²⁵ This has much to do with the fact that the relationship between military law and common law was not clearly defined in this period. For the details on this point, see John Childs, *The army of Charles II* (London, 1976), pp. 78-81.

²⁶ A typical jurisdictional conflict between military officers and town magistrates over

unchecked unless it caused so intense a conflict as to draw attention from the government.

Thus, a tangle of different views and practices and the vague boundaries between civil and military jurisdictions were not only the root of dispute, but also caused particular difficulty in terms of resolution.

Unfortunately, James II's measures could not overcome these essential problems. After all, they were only makeshift measures. They did not aim at placing different and conflicting rules in order, thereby producing a clearly-defined, unified code. Neither were James's attempts fully institutionalised. No legal responsibilities were imposed upon the individuals to whom royal commands were directed, and consequently the success of the king's efforts was necessarily dependent upon their conscientious cooperation. This lack of enforcement power encouraged many military officers to disregard the king's command. Indeed, when Colonel Cornwall's regiment came to Hull in late September 1687, the commanding officers did not show the king's order that the regiment should be lodged in private houses in the customary way. Instead, they impudently demanded free quarter in public houses. The mayor complained, 'his Majesties orders are slighted' and 'rather disputed than obeyed'.²⁷ The officers also obstructed payment for quarters by retaining money from soldiers, despite having no authority to do so. Even after the king directly commanded them to clear their debt, the town 'mett with no performance'.²⁸

This paper has critically examined the quartering problems in James II's reign, with special focus on the king's role. Two notable conclusions can be drawn from the analysis so far. First, despite a widely-accepted assumption, the problems cannot be attributed to the king's alleged tyranny. There is no reliable evidence that the king himself caused them. On the contrary, he tried hard to combat the problems. What happened was simply that his attempts did not work. Second, behind James's failure lay the lack of an effective code for army discipline. In short, it was not the king's successful use of the army, but rather his inability to control it, that caused such serious quartering problems.

These findings provide us with a revisionary insight into the military aspect of James II's government. Recent historiography has emphasised James's success in creating a completely new-style army. Professor John Childs, in his authoritative book on James II's army, remarks that James 'created a "modern" army' and he 'set about employing it for absolutist ends'.²⁹ This argument has been extended very recently by Professor Steve Pincus.³⁰ The analysis of this paper suggests, however, that James's success had important limitations. His control over the army was, in fact, not so perfect as it is believed to have been, and it is arguable whether the king's intentions were correctly understood by his officers and men; even if they were, it is

quartering was seen in Berwick in late 1670, when the town received seven companies of the First Foot Guards. In this conflict, military officers insisted that 'Mr Major hath nothing to doe with quartering of soldiers; & if Alehouses cannot quarter them they will quarter where they please', whereas the mayor claimed that 'he aincientlye & ever did have the power if quartering soldiers'. (BuTRO, B9/1, ff. 105r-106r.)

²⁷ TNA, WO4/1, ff. 54-55; HCA, BRM382; BRL2759a, ff. 30r-31r, 36r.

²⁸ HCA, BRL2759a, ff. 26r-27r, 39r-40r.

²⁹ Childs, *The army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, p. 204.

³⁰ Pincus, *1688*, pp. 6-7, 144-148, 216.

also debatable whether the army put the king's orders into proper effect.

I have presented more questions than answers in this paper. I hope the questions raised will trigger further research and bring us a fuller understanding of James II and his regime, which are still intriguingly packed with myths and riddles.

The Cabinet of Curiosity: A Prism of 17th Century England

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Introduction

"The lions head and teeth, ribs of whale, the beaks of pelican, several pairs of shoes from Turkey, Peru, China and Russia, a Japanese sword, the birds nest from China, and gloves of Henry VII"¹: these were parts of the inventories which Tradescant's museum at Lambeth in 1656 contained. It was a typical 'cabinet of curiosity' in 17th century in England. The cabinet of curiosity, a type of collection room with a variety of rare, precious, and exotic items. It first made its appearance in the middle of the 16th century and became widespread in the 17th century across Europe.

Scholars have usually studied early modern cabinet of curiosity from two perspectives. Some scholars took notice of the collections of the cabinet of curiosity and conducted their research from the perspective of "History of Collecting"² which flourished in the stream of New Cultural History in the 1980s. Others engaged in the history of museums³, considered the subject to trace the origin of modern museum. However, neither of these two approaches treats the subject as the main theme and attaches any significance to it. Instead, this trend tended to degrade the cabinet as a pre-modern, irrational, anomalous place contrary to modern museum.

The cabinet of curiosity, therefore, has rarely been placed in its proper historical and social context. With a focus on agents who have created the cabinets, this article intends to shed light on the meaning of the emergence of cabinet of curiosity, by analyzing two typical collectors - John Tradescant (1570?-1638) and Sir Robert Cotton (1571-1631)- in 17th century England. And this study will suggest differences when compared with not only the pre-cabinet collection period, mainly monasteries in medieval times and the Studiolo from the 15th century, but also with other cabinets outside England in the 17th century.

1. Prototype of Cabinet of Curiosity

In the 12th century, abbot Suger of Saint-Denis Abbey admired the "different ornaments" of the abbey and kept a record of his admiration.⁴ Like Saint-Denis

¹ John Tradescant, *Musaeum Tradescantia: or a Collections of Rarities Preserved at South-Lambeth neer London*, (London, 1656).

² John Elsner and Roger Cardinal, eds., *The Cultures of Collecting*(London: Reaktion Books, 1994); Philipp Blom, *To have and to hold*(Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press); *Journal of the History of Collections*: <http://jhc.oxfordjournals.org/>.

³ David Murray, *Museums: Their History and Their Use*, 3 vols(Glasgow: McLehose, 1904), Tony Bennet, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*(London: Routledge, 1995). Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1992.).

⁴ Erwin Panofsky, *Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of St-Denis and its Art Treasures*, (New

Abbey, most monasteries and churches in the Middle Age had collections of treasures. The bulk of the collections reflected concern for or symbolized God or Holy Spirit, such as Holy relics, liturgical objects, and the golden Holy Grail⁵.

The collections of these religious institutions functioned in three significant ways. Firstly, the collections functioned as a financial resource when the monastery was in need. In a critical moment, the institutions sold off their collections to overcome famine or to ransom vassals taken hostage.⁶ Secondly, the holy objects and mysterious natural materials provided a source of religious experience for Christians. As Arthur MacGregor mentioned, "possessing of quantities of relics undoubtedly increased the standing of a church in the eyes of the faithful."⁷ The natural materials created by God, such as unicorn's horn, serpents' tongues, fossilized sharks' teeth, were also believed to have magical properties, such as detoxification⁸. Lastly, the collections were used as a tool to show off the power of the owners. The possession of abundant collections represented political, social and military alliances, because most collections were given as gifts to the monastery by the monarchy and prince after their pilgrimage or the Crusades.⁹ Normally these relics and holy objects were not open to public view, except during certain festivals¹⁰.

However, due to the Reformation, the monasteries could not keep onto their collections. In England most monasteries were dissolved by King and the flood of materials coming out of them were distributed to aristocrats and gentries. Regions with dominant Protestant group, like Switzerland, some municipalities could be offered such items by dispossessed monasteries.¹¹

In the 15th century, a new style of collecting started in Studiolo in Italy. Several city-state monarchies in Renaissance Italy boasted this new type of collecting room in their splendid palaces. The Studiolo, originally identified as a private meditating place by Francesco Petrarca, however, was transformed into a place where its openness and display became more emphasized. With this character, it can be concluded that changes had occurred in Renaissance people's attitudes, from *vita contemplativa* to *vita activa*.

The construction of Federico Da Montefeltro (1422-1482)'s Studiolo was completed after three renovations of Palace from 1450. It was lavishly decorated with portraits of famous figures, mostly known for their passion for Humanism, and with the intarsia illustrated by Trompe-l'oeil, symbolizing the Cardinal Virtue, Theological Virtue and Faith and Hope. This Studiolo can be interpreted as an "amalgam of the two contrasting themes of *vita contemplativa* and *vita active*," because its intarsia panels displayed Federico's desire to harmonize liberal and military art and it was used for him both for meditation and for display.¹²

Jersey: Prinston, 1946).

⁵ Katherine Park and Lorrain Daston, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750*(New York: Zone Books, 1998), p. 69.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁷ Arthur MacGregor, *Curiosity and Enlightenment: Collectors and Collections from sixteenth century to the Nineteenth Century*(New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2008), pp. 2-4.

⁸ Katherine Park and Lorrain Daston, p. 75.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹⁰ Erwin Panofsky, pp. 87-89.

¹¹ Arthur MacGregor, *Curiosity and Enlightenment*, pp. 7-8.

¹² 하지은, 「15 세기 이탈리아 군주의 이상과 욕망: 페데리코 다 몬테펠트로의 우르비노 스튜디올로」, 『서양미술사학회 논문집』 제 28 집(2008), pp. 9-31 (Jieun Ha, "The Ideal and

The collection of the Medici family from Cosimo I (1519-1574) onward formed a part of its propaganda program. The *Tribuna*, the most famous collecting space of the family, was an octangular room decorated with treasures and jewels and contained several portraits, sculptures made by famous artists and items from New World. The Medici collection grew during the rule of Cosimo and his sons, Francesco I (1574-87) and Ferdinando I(1587-1607).¹³ The *Tribuna* demonstrated the Medici's high social status, and *vita activa* was fully manifested in its openness.

2. John Tradescant and Sir Robert Cotton's Cabinet

The term "cabinet of curiosity" had tendency to reflect the 17th century. The 'cabinet' originally denoted a 'room' in French, and its signification was enlarged to include the furniture 'cabinet' and the group of senior ministers 'cabinet' around this period¹⁴. The word 'curiosity' was frequently used in the 17th century, because it no longer implied 'vice' but 'virtue'.¹⁵ Peter Burke, in this sense, noted the 17th century as an age of curiosity.¹⁶ The increasing curiosity is also related to the increase of interest on science and expedition. The best way to satisfy their growing curiosity was to collect objects from new places. In this context, it is claimed that collecting practices were the principal manifestation of the age of curiosity.¹⁷ As a result, in the 17th century, the cabinet of curiosities could be found in almost every country in Europe.¹⁸ In what follows, the representative cabinet of curiosity of Tradescant and Cotton will be reconstructed after a brief discussion of the background to these collectors.

Tradescant the elder has left little record on his early life, but historians presume that he was born in 1570s. He was a gardener who worked for the rich and famous. Since the sixteenth century, there was a boom in building houses both in London and in the countryside, and the management and decoration of house gardens became a necessity. Tradescant began to gain fame while working under the house owners, Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury (1563-1612), Edward Wotton (1548-1628), George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628), and finally for the King Charles (1600-1649).¹⁹ In the course of working service, he obtained a number

Desire of a Renaissance Prince: Federico da Montefeltro's Studiolo of Urbino"); Cecil H. Clough, "Art as Power in the Decoration of the Study of an Italian Renaissance Prince: The Case of Federico Da Montefeltro," *Artibus et Historiae*, Vol. 16, No. 31(1995), pp. 19-50.

¹³ 이은기, 『르네상스 미술과 후원자』, (서울: 시공사, 2002); Adriana Turpin, "The New World Collections of Duke Cosimo I de Medici and their role in the creation of a Kunst-and Wunderkammer in the Pallazzo Vecchio" in R. J. W. Evans and Alexander Marr, eds., *Curiosity and Wonder from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 63-85.

¹⁴ "cabinet" Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins by Julia Cresswell Oxford Reference Online. OxfordUP, [http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&Entry=t292.e769>](http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&Entry=t292.e769)

¹⁵ Neil Kenny, *Curiosity in Early Modern Europe: World Histories* (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1998), pp. 13-14, 44.

¹⁶ 피터 버크, 박광식 옮김, 『지식: 그 탄생과 유통에 대한 모든 지식』 (서울: 현실문화연구, 2006), p. 189. (Peter Burke, *Social History of Knowledge: from Gutenberg to Diderot*).

¹⁷ Kryzstof Pomian, *Collectioneurs, amateurs, et curieux*(1987) recited in R. J. W. Evans and Alexander Marr, *Curiosity and Wonder*; p. 9.

¹⁸ Arthur MacGregor, "Collectors and Collections of Rarities in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *Tradescant Rarities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 70-97.

¹⁹ Arthur MacGregor, "The Tradescant, Gardeners and Botanists," *Tradescant Rarities*, pp.

of opportunities to go abroad and to collect exotic plants and specimens. It seems that the amount of curiosities was also brought to him in these occasions.

Tradescant moved to Lambeth and built a house, named “The Ark.” It was considered as a typical cabinet at that time, and was opened to visitors at 2 pence.²⁰ His collection became famous to visitors from around England. The catalogue published by his son, also a gardener who inherited the Ark and traveled to Virginia, enables us to reconstruct what curiosities and rarities were located there.

Inventories were classified into two broad categories: artificial and natural materials.²¹ They were divided into fourteen subdivisions again.²² Though his collection activities started from vegetal ones, his interest gradually extended to all kinds of curiosities, from birds head to marbled glass. This fact shows that Renaissance people began to regard man-made materials as objects of appreciation.

The other figure, Sir Robert Cotton was born in 1571 in a Huntingdonshire family. In his life, he was significantly influenced by William Camden, his professor at Westminster School. Thanks to him, he could participate in the Society of Antiquities,²³ a group established with the support from Queen Elizabeth to secure English historical legitimacy. When he was seventeen years old, Cotton embarked on a tour of northern England with Camden, to research evidence before writing *Britannia*.²⁴ On this occasion Cotton was given an opportunity to broaden his perspective on curiosity and sharpen his understanding about Roman occupation of North England. It also inspired in him a passion for collecting and he continued to seek such artifacts throughout his life.

Cotton's collecting centered on historical materials, but he also liked natural curiosities. At first, he gathered several inscriptions which depicted the history of Roman Britain. The cabinet included coins of all the Roman emperors from Pompeii to Mauritius, coins of all the kings of England from the time of the Saxons to Charles I, and the seals of monarchs from Edward the Confessor to Richard II as well as medals of Asians and Egyptians. His library secured a considerable quantity of Saxon manuscripts, monastic cartularies, volumes of saints' lives. He also had a zeal

3-16.

²⁰ Arthur MacGregor, “The Tradescant as Collectors of Rarities,” *Tradescant Rarities*, pp. 17-23.

²¹ John Tradescant, *Musaeum Tradescantiaum: or a Collections of Rarities Preserved at South-Lambeth neer London*, (London, 1656), a2-a3.

²² <Fourteen subdivisions>

Natural	Birds, Fourfooted beasts, Fishes, Shells, Insects, Minerals, Fruits.
Artificial	Mechanic and Art works, Rarities, War instruments, Garments, Utensils and Household Stuff, Numismata, Medals.

It appended the “Hortus Tradescantianus” section which contained the enumeration of his plants shrubs and trees both in English and Latin.

²³ About antiquarian movement: 설해심, 『지도 만드는 사람』 (서울: 도서출판 길, 2007), pp 105-148. (Heasim Sul, *The Mapmakers, Territory, History and Identity in Early Modern England*).

²⁴ Kevin Sharpe, *Sir Robert Cotton: 1586-1631: History and Politics in Early Modern England* (New York: Oxford UP., 1979), p. 90; Graham Parry, *The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford UP., 1995), pp.49-69.

for collecting fish fossils.²⁵

Cotton's cabinet was in the summerhouse in Conington. His abundant manuscript library moved several times in his life, from London to Westminster. After Cotton's death, it seems that the collections were neglected and today, the inventories are distributed to many important institutions: manuscripts are in British Library, and inscriptions are now in Cambridge Archaeology and Anthropology Museum, and most antiques and rarities have been transferred to British Museum.

Cotton opened the collections to his circles of people and permitted them to use the library and view his collections. His library was an important source of information for antiquarians in the Society.²⁶ Moreover, Cotton offered part of the collections as gifts, and loaned them.²⁷ In this manner, he could consolidate his network and friendship. It was an effective way to show off his capacity to collect precious materials and expose his knowledge. In certain respects, he was building up a base of power and influenced to distinguish himself from others.

3. Englishness in Cabinet of Curiosity

An observation on the cabinet owners in England shows that middle class individuals were dominating the collecting of rarities in England,²⁸ including Trandescant and Cotton. Although the collecting was popular among the nobility and at court, these groups mainly collected artistic work, not all kinds of rarities.²⁹ The character of owners of the cabinet also differs greatly among countries in Europe. It is found that German cabinets were mostly formed by Habsburg kingship and in case of France, most rarity collectors were nobles.³⁰

The individual collecting practices demonstrate the emergence of self as owner in the early modern England. Possessions started to represent individual identity in this age.³¹ The collecting as a sort of obsessive possessing was an effective way to identify oneself in the 17th century. This is what has been discussed among historians, the 'Possessive Individualism'.

The definition of individualism in each nation differs according to its characteristics. In England, the notion of privacy and private property had been considered as the most important character.³² Within this tradition, Alan Macfalane

²⁵ David Mckitterick, "From Camden to Cambridge: Sir Robert Cotton's Roman inscriptions, and their subsequent treatment"; Glenys Davis, "Sir Robert Cotton's collections of Roman stones: a catalogue with commentary"; Gay Van Der Meer, "An early seventeenth-century inventory of Cotton's Anglo Saxon coins in C.J Wright, ed., *Sir Robert Cotton as Collector: Essays on an Early Stuart Courtier and his Legacy*(London: British Library), pp. 6-7.

²⁶ Kevin Sharpe, pp. 66-67; Colin G.C. Tite, *The Early Records of Sir Robert Cotton's Library: Formation, Cataloging, Use*(London: British Library, 2003).

²⁷ Kevin Sharpe, pp. 58, 67.

²⁸ These characteristics were shared in Holland, due to its cultural similarity.

²⁹ Arthur MacGregor, "Collectors and Collections of Rarities in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," p. 84.

³⁰ Arthur MacGregor, 'Collectors and Collections of Rarities in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' pp.73-77, 81-83.

³¹ Keith Thomas, *The End of Life: Road to Fulfilment in Early Modern England*(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), p. 129.

³² 알랭 로랑, 김용민 옮김,『개인주의의 역사』(서울: 한길사), p. 16, (Alain Laurent, *Histoire de l'individualism*).

found that “the majority of ordinary people in England from at least thirteenth century were rampant individualists” because they could sell their land, without permission from their family.³³ In this respect, the owners who managed cabinet of curiosity titled by their names can be called individualist.

Besides displaying the collections, publishing catalogues of inventories could be a specific way to confirm their ownership. After his father’s death, Tradescant the younger arranged all the curiosities in textual format and published a catalogue in 1656. By displaying their collections in catalogues, the owners reinforced their proprietorship. Against this backdrop, we can better appreciate why John Evelyn recommended medal collectors to publish the catalogue.³⁴

The collectors identified themselves as individuals, and at the same time, presented their social status as owners of cabinet of curiosity. As I mentioned above, the majority of curiosities collectors were drawn from the middle-class. Those who were not born into the upper class used these plenty of valuable inventories to represent their status as well as to distinguish them from other classes.

The social context helps us to understand why the middle-class³⁵ displayed a zeal for this kind of collection. From sixteenth century to seventeenth century, social mobility was increased, because English aristocrats’ dominance progressively declined. Lawrence Stone analyzed this result in *The Crisis of Aristocracy, 1558-1641*³⁶. Despite the methodological limit, it still argues persuasively that the aristocracy started to lose their prestige, land, military force and confidence. It also demonstrates that upwardly mobile classes had the potential to penetrate into the high class's own society.

The social atmosphere which values the role of professionals also helped the advent of middle-class. As New Monarchy "choose their ministers in middle-class families" to make a strong government,³⁷ the Tudor-Stuart Court attracted middle-class people to court such as political advisors. Cotton could enter into court in this circumstance. In society, high-class elites also required middle-class professionals such as gardeners, cooks and artists³⁸ to elaborate their surroundings. As mentioned, Tradescant was a gardener who worked for influential figures.

Most middle-class people started to identify their status by their consumption pattern. The consumption itself was a visualized expression of social hierarchy. Indeed, in seventeenth-century England, there was an explosion in luxury consumption throughout the country.³⁹ Since collecting was different from simply accumulating wealth, it created a better effect. The collection reflected in itself that the owner is furnished with knowledge and insight which enable him to sort out what the collectable items are, and they also implied his broad social relationships. What Tradescant and Cotton possessed were not only the materials themselves but,

³³ Alan Macflane, *The Origin of English Individualism*(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

³⁴ John Evelyn, *A Discourse of Medals, Antient and Modern*(London, 1699), pp. 255-256.

³⁵ About Middle Class in this period, Jonathan Barry, Christopher Brooks, eds., *The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society, and Politics in England, 1550-1800*(London: Macmillan Press).

³⁶ Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of Aristocracy, 1558-1641*(Oxford, Oxford UP, 1967).

³⁷ A. F. Pollard, *Factors in Modern History*(Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 52-78; Steven Gunn, “Politic history, New Monarchy and State Formation: Henry VII in European perspective”, *Historical Research*, Vol. 82, No. 217(2009), pp. 380-392.

³⁸ Keith Thomas, p.131.

³⁹ Linda Levy Peck, *Consuming Splendor*(New York: Cambridge UP, 2005).

in microcosm, the Roman English past itself.

From the Middle age even until today, people collect what the others could not or can not to flaunt and make distinction from others. The seventeenth-century's cabinet of curiosity is not free from such features either. However, the collected items became diversified and the collections began to be appropriated not only by powerful institutions or families but by the middle-class individuals. This reflected an important social change in England, the emergence of possessive individualism and the middle-class. It can be concluded that the cabinet of curiosity serves a prism through which to view, in a somewhat refracted way, the multifaceted cultures of the 17th century England.

***Modernity in International Relations:
British Empire and the Institutional Development of Sovereignty
in the Persian Gulf after the Independence of India¹***

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Introduction

In this paper I would like to reflect our conference theme of ‘modernity’ and examine how it manifested itself in international relations with reference to the British Empire. The case in point is the Persian Gulf.²

Today the water of the Persian Gulf is surrounded by eight sovereign states including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that three of them – Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE – became fully independent states only in 1971. Until that point they only had some degree of autonomy under the informal presence of the British Empire. Currently the idea of sovereignty is accepted almost throughout the world; but this is a distinctively modern phenomenon, and the Gulf region joined it remarkably late.³ This paper examines how the institution of sovereignty developed in this region under the presence and demise of the British Empire.⁴

¹ This paper is written primarily as a note for an oral presentation, and the style is adjusted accordingly. It follows the system of transliteration of Arabic used in Frauke Heard-Bay, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, New ed., London: Longman, 1996, but special fonts have been replaced with the closest standard English alphabet for the convenience of readers.

² The name of the Gulf is subject to a political dispute between those who favour ‘Persian Gulf’ and those who like to use ‘Arabian Gulf’. I adopt the latter as the most commonly used term.

³ The importance of understanding sovereignty and its evolution is frequently understated under the trend of emphasising non-state actors. Despite the cosmopolitan ideal of some authors, it is misleading to contend that sovereignty has become obsolete. In fact sovereignty is so fundamental that it is often unfelt. The institution of sovereignty, or the system of sovereign states, is predicated upon the idea that a state holds exclusive control over a geographically defined territory as the highest form of social organisation, and only those sovereign states that recognise the equal status of each other can conduct diplomacy. This modern form of social organisation and interaction remains the predominant, if not the only, ontological basis of global politics today, and the question of how it became so deserve more attention than it currently enjoys. For example, contrast the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri with that of Edward Keene. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000; Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

⁴ Any historical study of sovereignty has to take into account at least two dimensions. One is the internal dynamics that brought together different societies, both socially and institutionally, into a polity that asserts some degree of coherence. The other is the external process through which a state became recognised by other states as a persona with a geographically defined territory and a corresponding group of people. These two dimensions

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will introduce the historical background and existing literature, thereby highlighting the legal issue of exclusivity which the idea of sovereignty brought to the Persian Gulf. The second section will examine the developments after the independence of India, particularly by looking into the relationship between oil and territoriality. The third section will move on to the final stages and investigate how the end of the British Empire in the region led to the subsequent full independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.

1. International Law and Exclusivity

On 21 November 1903, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, was visiting the Persian Gulf. Meeting the rulers of the southern coast, he stated:

We found strife and we have created order...We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it...The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.⁵

The self-important remark, typical of British imperialists, depicts how they brought the institution of sovereignty to the Persian Gulf as an instrument to impose their version of international law over the region. For centuries, local rulers' legitimacy in the southern Gulf had largely depended on their ability to secure military protection from external powers. Britain provided precisely that, and, by signing treaties with the rulers, it created polities whose legitimacy from the outset was dependent on an outside patron. It was designed to serve the British interest, but it also had the effect of providing military protection to the client rulers and excluding their rivals from coming to power.

In the early 19th century, Britain oppressed the military forces of the southern coast of the Gulf in order to secure a maritime route to India. With its military victory, Britain forced the local forces to enter into a series of 'truces' with what they saw as 'pirates'.

To what extent the British accusation of 'piracy' was justified is highly debatable. At one end of the spectrum, a number of authors agree with the then British official view, whereas the current ruler of Sharjah, one of the emirates of the UAE today, criticises them as apologists of British imperialism.⁶ Between the two extremes, James Onley points out that it was common practice at that time in the Gulf that powerful tribal leaders, or sheikhdom rulers, asked for tribute from the leaders of the weaker tribes in the name of brotherhood fee, fee of free passage, general tax or even Islamic alms. In return, they offered free passage and assumed the responsibility of protecting the protégé in the case of crisis. From the other side, the protégé

are equally important, and they need to be studied in combination to with each other. This paper is primarily concerned with international relations and therefore focuses mainly on the latter dimension, or the external side of sovereignty, but it will also refer to issues such as nationalism and constitutional bargaining whenever necessary.

⁵ John Gordon Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, vol. 1, Calcutta: 1915, pp. 2638-2639.

⁶ Arnold T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928; J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; Sultan ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, *The Myth of Arab piracy in the Gulf*, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1988.

occasionally refused to pay the tribute if an attack from a third actor was thought to be unlikely. It was usually in these instances that the stronger tribes launched raids.⁷

Ignorant of these local traditions, Britain countered the ‘piracy’ by superior gun power and concluded a series of peace treaties with the local leaders. However, by signing those treaties Britain had acknowledged some degree of sovereignty to the local rulers. No matter how unequal and unilateral the substance, the concept of a treaty assumes an agreement between parties with comparable legal personalities. The format of the treaty required Britain to grant, or indeed forced them to receive, certain legal personas into the local societies. Although these treaties fulfilled the purpose of subjugating the local territories under British control via the medium of local cooperative rulers, they also had the side-effect of imposing the facade of elusive sovereignty upon the region. Prior to the British entry in the Gulf, the nature of authority was more fluid than stable and more multilayered than mutually exclusive, but by signing the treaties Britain had effectively appointed some of rulers as the exclusive heads of imaginary sovereign states. This procedure promoted the ‘pirates’ to become the ‘Protected States’ in British eyes. In strict constitutional terms Britain never established a formal colony but nonetheless exercised a significant degree of influence, which could be most suitably understood as an informal empire.⁸ Britain’s informal empire extended to the territories of today’s Kuwait and Oman, but for the purpose of this paper I will hereafter focus on ‘Ajman, Fujairah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Bahrain.

The debate over the issue of ‘piracy’ and its aftermath during this period depicts the fundamental problem of the existing literature, which tends to be divided between overly Eurocentric historiography on the one hand and self-serving nationalistic narratives on the other. The controversy arises partly from the fact that the primary sources available were written by the Europeans, but also because it calls upon the question of the legitimacy of both the local society and the British presence. Essentially both sides tend to reduce the world into the West and the rest, reproducing a dichotomy that is shared by many studies written about most parts of the world in the modern era. This paper aims to overcome this problematic dichotomy by advancing the argument put forward by authors such as Onley.⁹ This

⁷ James Onley, ‘The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century’, *New Arabian Studies*, vol. 6, 2004, pp. 36-37, 42-43.

⁸ From the local rulers’ point of view, their relationship with Britain was a double-edged sword but nonetheless inescapable. On the one hand the imperial tie weakened their legitimacy within their own society but, on the other hand, Britain’s military protection was indispensable if they wanted to hold onto their position. Thus the informal empire of Britain in the Persian Gulf was essentially an asymmetric interdependence enabled by a military presence and an elusive legal framework of sovereignty.

⁹ In writing this paper I have drawn heavily from three groups of studies. The first group is the literature of the history of the Persian Gulf, to name a few, including Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition*, New ed., London: Longman, 1996; Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman*, Revised and updated ed., Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998; James Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. The second group is the literature on the history of the British Empire, particularly those that illuminate the collaboration between the imperial metropole and the dependant territories. The classic work is Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism:

newer generation of literature benefits from the recent opening of British governmental sources as well as local primary sources and interviews.¹⁰

2. Oil and Territoriality

Britain's informal empire in the Gulf originated as an extension of its Indian Empire, but the independence of India did not prompt Britain to leave the Gulf. This was partly due to the importance of the Gulf as a route of transportation, but also because of the strategic value of oil.¹¹ In 1932 oil was discovered in Bahrain, followed by Qatar and Abu Dhabi in 1940 and 1958, respectively. The commencement of the commercial drilling of oil not only helped the local economy, when the pearl industry was hit hard by the Japanese rivals, but also promoted the region to one of global significance.¹² Thus, Britain continued to hold its informal empire in the Gulf by transferring its jurisdiction from the Indian Government to the British Foreign Office.

In addition, the exploitation of oil brought a new idea of territoriality to the

Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London: Longman, 1972. This heritage is succeeded by John Darwin, *The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Even though the term 'collaboration' is often believed to carry a pejorative nuance, its analytical merits supersedes the need to be politically correct, particularly since the aim of this paper is to critically re-examine any narrative that purposefully divide the world into the 'goodies' and the 'baddies'. The third group of studies is the literature of International Relations on sovereignty. They include Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. Hedley Bull, Leicester University Press, 1977; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London: Routledge, 1992; Edward Keene, 'International Law and Diplomacy in the European and Extra-European Worlds during the early Nineteenth Century', unpublished article, 2008; Hendrik Spruyt, 'Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order', *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 4, 1994; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. In particular, this paper rests upon John Ruggie's point that transformation of world politics into the modern system of states changed an 'epochal' time frame. It was the process through which the rule defining the players of the game of international relations had changed. The act of defining who can play the game has a more fundamental and long-lasting effect than the outcome of one of two rounds of the game, because it has ramifications for all the rounds to follow. See John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 1, 1993.

¹⁰ I engage with three different types of primary sources: (1) declassified official documents of the British, American and Arab governments; (2) published official documents of the governments thereof; (3) other contemporary documents, media reports and memoirs, as well as interviews.

¹¹ On sea, the Gulf had been incorporated into the lane of the British India Steam Navigation Company (BI Line, 1862-1972) after 1860. As for the air, the Imperial Airways (1924-39) opened airfields in Bahrain and Sharjah. The Imperial Airways later became the British Overseas Airways Corporation (and eventually to British Airways in 1974), but a British diplomat recalls that the BOAC was locally known as 'Better On A Camel'. Paul Tempest, 'Qatar: A Strong New Bridge, 1967-2007', in Paul Tempest ed., *Envoy to the Arab World: MECAS Memoirs, 1944-2009, Volume II*, London: Stacey International, 2009, p. 133. Also see Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj*, pp. xxvi, 34-218.

¹² Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj*, pp. 35, 217-218.

region. Until this point the boundaries between the Protected States had been only vaguely defined. Oil concessions, and in some cases the hope thereof, prompted the rulers to become more clearly aware of the boarders between their land and water.

In the early 1950s, oil was at the centre of international relations in the Persian Gulf. In the north, Iran nationalised a British oil company but was later reversed by a coup helped by British and American intelligence. In the south, Britain fought against Saudi Arabia on behalf of Oman and Abu Dhabi over a territorial dispute driven by the hope of oil. With the international tension heightening over oil, a young Arabist British diplomat called Julian Walker was asked to tour around the Protected States to make a map clarifying the boundaries between them. With the aid of a compass and the milo meter of his Land Rover, he dotted the information gathered from the local people using the back of the nib of his fountain pen. Interviewing in the field was sometimes difficult since the locals tend to refer to the past as '*ams*' (an Arabic word that stands for both yesterday and the past in general), but he drew boundaries based upon the difference in the types of wells, the oral history of 'tribal clashes and alliances, camel raids and other incidents in the desert'. Consequently he produced a map that was too close to the reality for his senior's liking; it contained a number of enclaves and areas of joint jurisdiction. It was later called 'Mr. Walker's jigsaw puzzle'.¹³

Walker's dilemma essentially arose from the fundamental difficulty of exporting the modern norm of international relations conducted by geographically demarcated sovereign states. Irresponsible drawing of state borders is often depicted as an example of an adverse legacy of imperialism. Indeed some boundaries in the world were drawn more arbitrarily than others, but Walker's episode suggests that drawing the boundaries according to social reality can sometimes be extremely complicated, or even impracticable, if the local traditions are not congenial to the norms of exclusivity and territoriality.

3. End of Empire and Evolution of International Society

After the late 1950s Britain experienced a major setback over the Suez Crisis, and following the 'wind of change' speech it granted independence to many of its former colonies. However, its informal empire in the Persian Gulf remained largely intact. It was only in January 1968 that Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971. Even then, the decision did not come as a response to the local call for self-determination but was actually taken in the face of the local rulers' opposition. The rulers had been witnessing turmoil in Aden and were wary of losing Britain's military support in countering domestic opposition, and in fact secretly offered to pay for the maintenance of the British troops if they were to stay. However, the Wilson government was determined to continue with the retreat in order to politically justify social cuts, such as restoring prescription charges for the National Health Service, which had become inevitable

¹³ Julian Walker, *Tyro on the Trucial Coast*, Durham: The Memoir Club, 1999, pp. 109-121. Julian Walker, 'Personal Recollections of the Rapid Growth of Archives in the Emirates', *The Historical Documents on Arab History in the Archives of the World*, Abu Dhabi: Centre for Documentation and Research, 2002, p. 40; Walker, *Tyro on the Trucial Coast*, p. 121. Dubai and the Northern Trucial States Review of the Year 1969', Bullard to Crawford, 30 December 1970, FCO 8/1509, The National Archives, Kew (TNA).

due to Britain's long-term economic retrenchment.¹⁴

Wilson's announcement meant that Britain would withdraw its informal empire in the Gulf within less than four years, and therefore the nine Protected States of 'Ajman, Fujairah, Ra's al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Bahrain would need to become fully independent sovereign states, or be swallowed up by existing ones. The local rulers were quick to respond. In less than a week, Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi, the ruler of the most powerful Protected State, met his rival Shaikh Rashid bin Said of Dubai, who was once described by a British diplomat as 'the merchant prince with the happy knack of picking the right horses, briskly disposing of business with a wave of his little pipe in one hand and a lighted match in the other, reading my thoughts far in advance and barking out his instant decisions'.¹⁵ They set up a regional initiative to form a union of nine states aiming to achieve full independence collectively.¹⁶

However, this plan turned out to be little more than lip service and the situation remained stalled for three years. In the meantime the Conservatives came to power in Britain and made an unnecessary and unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Labour decision, only to realise that the momentum towards the end of empire was irreversible. In this climate, Julian Walker, who had been deployed out of the Gulf, came back to the Protected States in July 1971. He convened the rulers, who were otherwise believed to have disappeared for the summer holiday, and prompted them to negotiate for independence. Encouraged by Walker and also their own advisors, Shaikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid of Dubai agreed to come together to achieve collective independence, provided that the other states would accept their leadership. It took Walker another couple of days' travelling between their palaces on the coast before he managed to convince the rulers of 'Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain to accept inferior constitutional status to become part of the United Arab Emirates under the leadership of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.¹⁷ In contrast, Bahrain and Qatar opted out and declared their independence separately, which was agreed by Britain and the United States. Ra's al-Khaimah also tried to go solo, but was refused by the international community and grudgingly joined the UAE later in February 1972. Thus the independence of the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain was

¹⁴ For details of the analysis concerning Wilson's decision, see Shohei Sato, 'Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-68: A Pattern and a Puzzle', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 37, no. 1, 2009.

¹⁵ 'Dubai and the Northern Trucial States: Annual Review for 1970', by Bullard, 10 December 1970, FCO 8/1510.

¹⁶ Riyad Nahib al-Rayyis, *Watha īq al-Khalij al-'Arabi, 1968-1971: Tamuhat al-Wahdah wa Humum al-Istiqlal* (Arabian Gulf Documents, 1968-1971: Attempts at Federation and Independence), London: Riyad El Rayyes, 1987, p. 25-29; Agreement between Zayid and Rashid, 'Union of Arab Emirates. Resolutions, Decisions, Joint Communiqués & Documents', file 1 (January 1968-November 1970), Sir Geoffrey Arthur Collection, Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony's College, Oxford; From Dahrana to Washington, 21 February 1968, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Box 2418, POL 33, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, ML.

¹⁷ Oil companies did not play any direct role in dictating the outcome of the independence of the three states and only observing warily from outside. From P. S. Hyem to K. McKern, 'Expected Cost to BP of the R.A.F. Withdrawal from Bahrain and Sharjah', 16 August 1971, in 'Eastern Agencies Cost and Profitability – Airfield Cost Reports', archival reference 5726, papers of the British Petroleum Co Ltd and BP Trading Ltd, available at the BP Archive, University of Warwick, Coventry.

characterised by disjointed incrementalism, driven by compromise and collaboration.¹⁸

Conclusion

Against all odds, the British retreat and the emergence of new states were conducted surprisingly peacefully. One of the very final orders delivered from the British Foreign Service in the end of 1971, so a British diplomat recalls, was ‘to ensure that all the official pianos in the Gulf were regularly tuned’.¹⁹ However, the process leading to this end was much more contingent, contested and fraught. If British imperialism had brought the shadow of sovereignty to the region in the 19th century, it was only finalised by a haphazard compromise and collaboration between all the actors involved, including both Britain and the local rulers, which took place in the last moment of decolonisation.

The findings of this paper call for an expansion and re-examination of the idea of ‘decolonisation’. Although the application of the terminology here is disputable, given that the Protected States were arguably never colonised, the narratives of the literature essentially correspond with the paradigm supported by the same idea. The studies on the Persian Gulf tend to either overemphasise the agency of Britain or heroicise the Gulf rulers’ initiative. Conversely, the works on decolonisation, possibly inhibited by some sense of guilt or insecurity, tend to portray the emergence of new states as a teleological process propelled by the ideal for self-determination. However, the Gulf episode suggests we could advance our understanding by overcoming the dichotomy between overly Eurocentric historiography on the one hand, and self-serving nationalistic narratives on the other, whilst avoiding the pitfall of overlooking the experiences of the marginalised peoples or obscuring the inequality and power balance underlying the *co-construction* of modernity.²⁰

¹⁸ al-Rayyis, *Watha iq al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, pp. 647-655; Telephone interviews with Julian Walker, 18, 19, 21 October 2009; Walker to London, 13 July 1971; Walker to London 15 July 1971, FCO 8/1761, TNA.

¹⁹ Patrick Wright, ‘The Run-up to Independence, 1971’, in Paul Tempest ed., *Envoy to the Arab World: MECAS Memoirs, 1944-2009, Volume II*, London: Stacey International, 2009, p. 121.

²⁰ I am heavily indebted to Joydeep Sen, who articulated the issue of the *co-construction* of modernity to me. To my knowledge the phrase is his original, but it is my responsibility if I have misused it.

British Labour Government's(1964-70) Immigration-Race Policy

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Britain is multi-racial, multi-cultural society in which slightly less than 10% of its residents have their family history that immigrated to Britain from regions scattered over the British empire and New Commonwealth after 1945. In other words, Britain as a multi-racial, multi-cultural society as today has been formed within less than half a century. Since 1950s, many dark-skinned British subjects with various cultural backgrounds have immigrated to Britain from India, Caribbean Islands, and Africa. It was a radical, sudden process that Britain has become a multi-racial society.

Facing unexpected, massive inflow of British subjects with darker skin and unfamiliar cultural background from the empire and New Commonwealth, British governments have introduced various legislative and administrative methods to stem the flow of these people and to integrate already-settled immigrants to the host society. The origin of "externally exclusive and internally inclusive"¹ nature of British immigration-race policies is traced back to Harold Wilson's Labour government period in mid-1960s. Labour government from 1964 to 1970 established two policies of 'restrictive immigration policy' and 'integrative immigrant/race policy' as two aspects of a single, coherent immigration-race policy. In 1965 and 1968, Labour government tightened Commonwealth Immigrants Act established by the previous Conservative government, and introduced two Race Relations Acts to integrate coloured immigrants to British society.

Scholars in general agree that 1964-70 Labour government's period was critical in the development of British immigration-race policy, but the appraisal of this period among scholars has significantly diverged. The difference among scholarly opinions is due to varying emphasis on either immigration policy or immigrant/race policy. Scholars who emphasize on restrictive immigration policy tend to criticize that Labour government clearly intended to keep coloured immigrants out. On the other hand, other scholars who notice that legislative measures to integrate immigrants first appeared in 1964-70 advocated the liberal feature of Labour government's years.

What is important, however, is not to place immigration policy and immigrant/race policy separately. The two policies have been developed in the context of responding to a single phenomenon of 'coloured immigration', although the two were designed to deal with different aspects of that phenomenon. In this respect, we should bear in mind that restriction and integration intrinsically composed two parts of the British immigration-race policy as a whole. In establishing the dual strategy of restricting immigration in one hand and integrating already-settled immigrants on the other, Wilson's Labour government sought to achieve its main purpose of taking the issue of 'immigration' or 'race' out of the party politics.

¹ Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 223.

This essay aims to briefly examine the development and characteristic of British immigration-race policy established by 1964-70 Labour government. For this purpose, Labour party's changing attitude and a series of measures it adopted will be considered in chronological order, (i) from 1945 to 1964 during which Labour party maintained pro-immigration stance and resisted any proposed possibility to restrict immigration, (ii) from 1964 to 1965 when Labour government holding the office abandoned its previous opposition to immigration control and devised the dual policy of restriction and integration, and finally, (iii) from 1966 when the dual policy introduced in the previous stage became firm base of British immigration-race policy.

From right after World War II to 1964 when holding the office, Labour Party showed a pro-immigrants tendency. Elected in 1945, Clement Atlee's Labour government was determined to preserve the British Empire and Commonwealth in peace and to tie it closely with firmer bond. This determination derived not just from a desire to retain imperial glory but also from the perception that the empire/commonwealth provided concrete political and economic advantages for Britain. As a result of this determination, Atlee's Labour government enacted in 1948 British Nationality Act that granted unlimited right to freely enter and immigrate to Britain to all people residing in empire/commonwealth territory. British Nationality Act 1948 also gave the same legal status of 'Citizenship of United Kingdom and Colonies' to all colonial subjects with UK citizens. Beyond this ideal and bold designing of a single combined citizenship, however, most politicians as well as major Cabinet members did not think that dark-skinned British subjects in the colonies and New Commonwealth would actually exercise their rights to enter and settle in UK. The core of the 1948 act was to formally declare and confirm the unity of the British empire and Commonwealth in which Britain exercising the leading role at the center, while not damaging Commonwealth nations' national sentiments rapidly burgeoning ever since 1945.

During 13 years in Opposition from 1951 to 1964, Labour Party retained its pro-immigrants stance as well. In this time when the issue of 'coloured immigration' began to frequently appear in cabinet meetings, Labour Party continuously resisted against Conservative government's attempts to restrict coloured immigration from the empire/New Commonwealth. The party also officially pledged that it would take a measure to tackle the racial discrimination against settled immigrants. However, in late 1950s when the net intake of commonwealth immigration suddenly rose to about 100,000, Macmillan's Conservative government decided to introduce legislative measure to stem the inflow of coloured British subjects. Finally, Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, which divided prospective immigrants into 3 categories according to their skill and job availability, was tabled in the Parliament. This method naturally made for coloured immigrants from the colonies and New Commonwealth to acquire labour vouchers needed for entering UK, without using any language suggesting 'colour' or 'race'. In the Parliament, Labour Party furiously berated the bill as an open, bear-faced racism. Despite Labour's attack on the bill and the government, however, the bill was passed through the Parliament, and Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 was enacted, defining different rights to enter and settle in UK between British subjects holding the same citizenship.

Labour's principled objection to Conservative's attempt to limit commonwealth immigration, however, did not last. Labour Party gradually began to accept 1962

system of control established through Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. Furthermore, Labour tightened immigration control, adopting two measures during its office 1964-70. Three factors can be considered for explaining Labour's changed attitude. First of all, the change of inner-party leadership from Hugh Gaitskell who died in January 1963 to Harold Wilson who was said to have practical inclination clearly had some impact on party's stance. Second factor was the fact that effectiveness of Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 was under doubt, so the point of discussion was moving to whether to introduce new controlling system rather than to control immigration or not. Last factor was that Labour Party was forced to perceive that public hostility toward coloured immigration in general was much deeper than the party had thought. Particularly in Smethwick campaign in 1964 general election, the incumbent of Smethwick, Patrick Gordon Walker, was taken his seat by Conservative rival Peter Griffith, who had used explicit racist slogans. A party holding power with a tiny majority must have interpreted the result as a clear evidence of race's effect on politics.

This shift in Labour's position reflects realist concern that controls on the numbers of immigrants were political necessity. At the same time, however, this realist volte-face caused great disappointment for the liberal opinions in and out of Labour Party who advocated the party's uncompromising opposition to immigration control. Confronting these contradicting voices, Labour government devised a dual strategy by which would make the maintenance and extension of immigration controls more acceptable by linking these with positive measures for integrating already-settled migrants. The enactment of anti-discriminatory legislation refracted the liberal thrust of government policy, which had supported open borders before 1962, towards race/immigrant policy. As a result, by 1965 Labour government succeeded in establishing 'package deal' consisting of immigration-restriction on one hand and immigrant-integration on the other.

However, these two sides of package deal were not balanced at all. Race Relations Act 1965, which had been devised as a concrete form of integration-side of package deal, despite its declaratory importance as the first legislative measure to tackle racial discrimination and to promote integration of coloured immigrants to the society, hardly had practical power to impose any effect on racial discrimination in UK. On the other hand, government White Paper *<Immigration from the Commonwealth>* tightened provisions in Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, making entry of coloured people even more difficult. Despite this unbalance between restriction and integration, by the time of 1966 general election, package deal marked clear success with voters and the Opposition. Conservative Party agreed with Labour's framework on the immigration issue, and more than half of voters supported Labour government's immigration control policy.

In 1966, British immigration-race policy seemed to enter another phase. If 1965 Race Relations Act was passed in part because of political concerns over contested immigration issues, now the issue of immigrant-integration gradually began to appear as a separate agenda. It was new Home Secretary Roy Jenkins and many liberalists who have tried to broaden 1965 act's scope and strengthen its power that led this change in race policy. This 'liberalists' coalition', including Jenkins, CARD(Campaing Against Racial Discrimination), a group of Labour lawyers, and liberal opinions outside the party, advocated and promoted liberal principles in race

relations, illuminating difficulties immigrants were facing in every sphere of British society. They clearly recognized the 1965 Race Relations Act's limit both in its scope and its weakness in enforcement, and grasped the importance of including employment and housing into the scope of the law because these two areas were thought to be the main areas in which discriminations were occurring most frequently. After PEP(Political and Economic Planning) reports which had revealed existence of substantial discrimination in areas excluded from the 1965 act's scope was published, liberalists' coalition could succeed in persuading major opponents such as Trade Union Congress, Secretary of Labour, Conservative opposition to enact more advanced law. Finally, in July 1967, legislation of the second Race Relations Act was decided.

However, liberalists' effort met sudden obstacles. 1967 devaluation crisis forced Jenkins to the Treasury and James Callaghan who showed little interest in immigration issues to Jenkins' place at the Home Office. In addition to the loss of leadership of Jenkins, exodus of Kenyan Asians to Britain from late 1967 stimulated loud voices requiring a strong barrier on the border against these Kenyan Asians. Kenyan Asians were mainly descendants of Indian-origin Asians who had come to East Africa as traders and labourers after the expansion of British hegemony over these regions from the mid-nineteenth century. Due to the strict Africanization policy pursued by newly independent Kenyan Government, these Kenyan Asians were driven to the periphery of Kenyan society. Without a future in Africa, they started to migrate to their 'mother country', UK, for they had the legal status of Citizenship of United Kingdom and Colonies. During two weeks of late February 1968, about 10,000 Kenyan Asians arrived in Britain. Stories of their massive arrival soon dominated domestic news, and aroused public fear.

Labour government responded swiftly and hurried to the second immigration bill through Parliament. Home Secretary Callaghan claimed that Kenyan Asians' arrival would worsen the race relations in Britain, and on 22 February, Cabinet pronounced that the immigration bill restricting Kenyan Asians' entering rights would soon be introduced. Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 1968, which had been advocated as an emergency call and a mean to help achieve harmonious race relations in Britain, quickly passed through Parliament in only 3 days. The party that had bitterly attacked the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 willingly passed legislation denying entry to British subjects because of the colour of their skin. Though labeled as the most shameful law that British Parliament had ever passed by liberal opinions in and out of the party, Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 received a lot of support from the public as well as in the Parliament.

Kenyan Asians' exodus and the enactment of Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 further stimulated anti-immigrants feeling of the public. In addition, Enoch Powell's infamous "River of Blood" speech and the granting sound of civil rights movement heard from America made Labour government try to mollify explosive danger of the immigration issue. Therefore, intent of Race Relations Act 1968 also grew quite apart from the original purpose that had been intended by the liberalists' coalition. The prime object of Race Relations Act 1968 was not at its actual enforcement. Rather, the law was expected to be functioning as a mean to prohibit the race and immigration issues from being controversial both in political and social area and to show government's opposition to racial discrimination.

In conclusion, the two sets of package deal created in 1965 and 1968 proved to be severely biased toward restriction sides. This patent unbalance between restriction and integration came from contradicting demands implicit in the package deals, and demands for the immigration control sat right next to the attempt for integration during the whole Labour years. Wilson's Labour government continuously described coloured immigration as a 'problem' or 'threat', thus the least number of immigrants was required as a prerequisite for 'good' race relations in the country. Moreover, combination of restricting immigration policy and integrating race policy established by Labour government in 1960s remained without any considerable changes to this day. Thus, understanding development and character of the British immigration-race policies of 1960s is important, particularly in the long-term regards. Restrictive immigration policies continued to narrow the door to Britain to 21th century, and in this course, tendency to describe immigrants as threats have maintained. Given that the tension between restriction and integration originated in 1964-70 Labour years, the record of Labour government needs to be examined from a critical point of view.

Keynote Plenary

Historiography of British History in Asia

How was ‘British history’ written in Korea and Japan? This plenary will trace the historiography in both countries. This project will make clear the image of British history and culture constructed by the Asians. In this research the perception of ‘Britain’ is dual; reality and construction. The historiographies culturally represented the contemporary situations of both countries. Britain was commonly depicted as ‘modern’ culture by historians, but the difference of historical reality between Korea and Japan created the nuance of modernity in history-writing. Two prominent historians trace the characteristic feature of historiography of each country

*"Moral Economy' Again:
E. P. Thompson Retried in Digital Archive'*

Professor Kazuhiko Kondo
(University of Tokyo)

A Mapping of the Ideological British Historiography in Korea: A Story

Seungrae Cho
(Chongju University)

I. Forging the Liberal Nation: The Birth of Liberal Orthodox

The first generation of Korean British historians were of the same faith that Britain was the best model for Korean people to follow both politically and socio-economically. Their Britain was 'the immortal commonwealth' which accomplished through her history the most stable representative democracy and the well-developed capitalism with social welfare system. They not only influenced strongly Korean historians in general but also had an intellectual authority as opinion leaders among the enlightened citizenry during the period of democratization and industrialization (c.a. 1960's to 1970's). Those were the days for Korean British historians.

Although they depicted (England)/Britain as they thought of respectively according to their subjects, their 'forging the nation' was grounded upon the same belief in modernization. A Tudor political historian estimated England as the first modern state which overcame the private system of government and established the principle of rule by statute by introducing G.R.Elton's thesis of 'Tudor revolution in administration'. For an socio-economic historian, R.H.Tawney's thesis of the rising gentry was much more meaningful because it was able to provide Korean historians searching desperately for the germs of self-modernization and capitalism in Korean history with a useful frame of interpretation. Influenced by this, a famous Korean agricultural historian proudly proclaimed that he at last *discovered* Korean rising gentry in seventeenth century Chosun dynasty to name it 'rich farmers of managerial type' or just 'large-scale farmers'.

Simultaneously Stuart historians did agree with Christopher Hill that the great upheaval was not a rebellion but a revolution that changed English society into a new kind one to necessarily come. However, they did reject Hill's Marxist interpretation. They read the revolution only in bourgeois version which firmly asserted that capitalist liberal democracy was the end of history and the revolution was necessary to overthrow both feudal privilege system and one man rule. In this context Levelers were discussed and narrated as extraordinary heroes of liberty and equality. This reflected Korean situation at that time when April revolution in 1960 which had expelled Seungman Rhee did not bear fruit and Junghee Park's severe military rule since 1961 coup forced Korean people to be obedient in the name of patriotic modernization.

One of the founding fathers of British historiography in Korea, originally Stuart and socio-economic historian Hyunmo Ghil, eventually appeared on the stage of

resistance as an influential disputant arguing that industrialization without democratization was not genuine modernization achieved by Western countries such as Britain. Here it is important to remember that he himself, as his colleagues, was not a radical or left-wing intellectual but just a liberal who believed firmly in capitalist liberal democracy. In his paper about the debate of population problem in industrial revolution era, the premise was his sympathy with F.Hayek who criticized vehemently the anti-capitalist inclination of Western intellectuals. In this background Ghil's generation despised 68 and Tokyo University affair as an indiscreet riot and advised their students to struggle with discipline only to achieve an ordered liberal democracy. They affirmed that those European and Japanese students were just aberrant 'reds' with whom Korean students should never align themselves. This reflected their mental trauma experienced during the Korean War which they believed the satanic ambition of North Korean communists had incurred.

Thus it was very ironical that Ghil translated pro-soviet historian E.H.Carr's *What is History?* into Korean which came to be the first best seller in the sector of history books. While this book made a position as a must book for students, Crane Brinton's *A History of Civilization* warning students of Carr's pro-soviet interpretation was the standard text book with which Ghil taught my generation. I am sure Ghil (mis)took Carr's conception of progress for what was like Fukuyama's that of end of history. Anyway the book came to be a certain marker by which Korean C.I.A and police distinguished the anti-government students. Of course my generation was almost all the anti-government.

II. Liberalism Moralized: The Case for Gladstone

This liberal orthodox was to be looked away by the later generation of Korean British historians in 1980's when Thatcherite liberalism exposed a cruel face and E.P. Thompson appeared as a torchbearer of 'moral' history. The 'great' things belonging to Britain shaded away except for some good old songs of Beatles among Korean people as well. Especially for the newly emerging combatant labor movement sector and anti-American left-wing students and intellectuals Tory's Britain was no longer attractive as Reagan's country was. In this situation it was inevitable that British history became unpopular among history students and intellectuals as well. At the same time French history came rapidly to substitute for the position British history had held.

However, a different kind of liberal interpretation survived. Kisoon Kim, a political historian of Victorian Britain, was eager to make a hero of Gladstone who he believed deserved to be a clear mirror in which Korean politicians had to reflect themselves. Let me speak of him, because E.H.Carr indoctrinated me that we had to know of historians themselves before reading their works. Kim, as his colleagues of the second generation Korean British historians, started his study with anger and despair with Korean situation in early 1980's when the military junta of Park's successors committed a crime of massacre in Kwangju, his native home town, and captured the whole country. But he did not align himself with the newly emerging movement of left wings. He was by nature a liberal who did not give his heart to any

communitarian or collectivist social imaginations. His first paper was about J.S. Mill's mild program of reform. All he expected was probably that a great politician of good calibre might emancipate country. When he got down to his job of writing papers on Gladstone in the last decade of last century, a critic once remarked somewhat sarcastically that what Kim was really talking about was the very politician Daejoong Kim, a democratic opposition leader at that time.

Let me talk about Kim's Gladstone. It is very simple. Gladstone was a saint. Gladstone was not an opportunist politician of high politics who pursued power after power by using the party organization and compromising with rivals strategically. He was a champion of people who appealed only to people's moral power without which he believed firmly his political ideals and visions were not to be realized. Here Kim's originality appeared. He suggested an extraordinary concept of 'rational charisma' to understand Gladstone's peculiar charismatic leadership. According to him, Gladstone's charisma was formed during the Middleloadian campaign in 1880 not by people's irrational and blind trust of him but through the rational communication between him and people. It was possible because he was capable to argue logically with strong grounds for his policy and there were fully politicized rational electors who had ears to listen to him. And the electors were working class whom Gladstone thought of as the valuable members of citizenry. His charismatic leadership was that of *Tribunus* who could restore the community of equal citizens damaged by Tory's pro-landlord policy.

Therefore Kim rejected the blasphemy that Gladstone was responsible for the demise of Liberal Party because he adhered to the ideal policy such as Irish home rule without sober attempts to reform the socio-economic situations. At that time, he asserted, for working class (political) community was prior to (socio-economic) class. It was only the first World War that killed Liberal Party. Gladstone's policy for Irish home rule was another example of his moral politics. His 'fatal courage' against public petitions of anti-Home Rule Bill was based on his conviction that his home rule policy could assimilate Irish politics to liberal parliamentary democracy and reestablish British identity as multi-national state morally superior to the oppressive Empire ruled by one nation. Kim concluded that Gladstone's struggle had 'true and profound' meanings the petitioners could not see. He also despised the intellectuals who strongly opposed Gladstone's home rule policy as myopic and shortsighted ones who could not be free from the prejudice of the Establishment to betray the good cause. He used to advise younger generation not to be such intellectuals without insight. Although Kim published two books of Gladstone's political leadership and Irish home rule policy respectively, he is now busy writing a biography (we call it an *Acta Sanctorum*) of Gladstone.

Here it is important to note that Kim's liberalism is deeply different from that of the first generation. As mentioned above, while the first generation did believe in bourgeois liberalism, Kim preferred liberalism in more broad sense without class interest which deserves not to be called a reactionary one. For him liberalism means the universal moral code according to which free and equal individuals should live their own lives as Gladstone did. Kim emphasized that Gladstone asked us to be independent individuals with respectability who are able to consider at once

economic interests and moral goods. Thus Kim affirms that Gladstone's definite distrust of paternal reform was not an expression of class-biased false consciousness. He was sure that Gladstonean and his liberalism was not a bourgeois ideology.

The discrepancy of Kim's liberalism appeared clearer when he agreed on Quentin Skinner's neo-Roman or republican conception of liberty as absence of arbitrary domination in reviewing Korean version of *Liberty before Liberalism* translated by me. It means he does not agree on arch-neoliberal Berlinean and Hayekean conception of liberty as an absence of actual interferences by others, which the first generation bore in their minds as only true liberty. A mere absence of interference is not sufficient for individuals to be free. Individuals are free only when they are valued as equal members of citizenry as Gladstone did believe. However, he does disagree on the dichotomy of liberalism versus republicanism. Gladstonean liberalism shows that they are two faces of the same token, on which Eugenio Biagini recently discoursed positively. Liberalism alone is good enough for Kim. But my thesis is that republicanism has some communitarian elements antagonistic with individual liberalism.

III. Liberalism Collectivized: The Case for 'Liberal Socialisms'

At the nearly same time when Kim made a saint of that noble Gladstone, a historian appeared for whom Gladstonean liberalism was not good enough at all. Myunghwan Kim, a political historian of Edwardian Britain, asserted that such a liberalism based on lofty moral individualism was just an ideology of immoral ruling class imputing the social problems such as general poverty for which they had to answer to the responsibility of poor individuals of lower class. Therefore he argued that in Britain democracy had never been pursued truly until collectivism such as Fabian socialism and Guild socialism appeared to solve the social problems in other way than individual liberalism did. In this context he tolerated even conservative collectivist reform programs such as that of the Unionist Social Reform Committee initiated by F.E.Smith and Oswald Mosley's fascism with qualifications. The so called British liberal representative democracy was only a myth to be deconstructed.

This reflected the changing situation in the end of last century when the fanatic illusion of incessant high speed economic growth shattered to result in the disastrous IMF's control of Korean economy and for the first time Korean light wing ruling party lost power for the middle-left wing opposition party to come into office only to pursue neo-liberal policy unavoidably. In this situation progressive intellectuals like Kim searched for some alternatives which they estimated could cure the pathological crisis of Korean capitalism. Kim made eagerly his job of reviving the good old cause of Fabian socialism and Guild socialism, through which he ardently insisted that democratic control of capitalism was vital for individuals to really be free.

Here we have to note that Kim was of extraordinary opinion that liberalism and collectivism was not antagonistic each other in that both of them were principally for individual's freedom. He argued that collective intervention of state for majority did not defame the spirit of liberalism to secure individual's freedom. The laissez-faire liberalism should be rejected because of it's class-biased illusion. He asked us to

liberate liberalism from the monopolistic use of it by the monopolistic capitalists and their allies exclusively. (There are some progressive Korean intellectuals adhering to the term of liberalism which they lament was robbed by reactionaries such as neo-liberals.) In my opinion in this point liberalism might mean what was like New Liberalism, but I am not sure because Kim did not remark about it at all. Anyway for Kim that noble British socialisms were 'liberal socialisms' for democratic reform of society.

Although Kim used to compare two 'liberal socialism', his preference was on Guild socialism. He deserves to be the first researcher of Guild socialism in Korea. He asserted that Guild socialism could see what Fabian socialism failed to notice. The problem of democratization of economy could not be solved only by shouting that the present economic power was arbitrary one and it should be controlled by democratic political power. Guild socialism was exactly right to attend to the fact that economic power was making not in civil society but in industrial sector of which members were not political citizens but producers. Therefore to democratize this sector it was necessary that economic power should be made by producers. Political power originated from the different space could not democratize the industrial sector. It was participation and consent of producers to the decision making process in industrial sector that could do it. Thus we could be free only when we are autonomous being in both sector of politics and economy.

Kim was right to see that it was the then combatant laborer's syndicalism that stimulated Guild socialists to search for the workshop democracy ordinary Fabian socialists could not imagine. However, he distanced himself from the ultra radical combatant movement of British laborers in the era of 'labor unrest'. He posed a critical stance against syndicalism because it overweighed laborer's position exclusively without considering consumer's one. He estimated that Guild socialism was worth being reminded because it aimed at neutralizing this unbalance for consumers who was as important elements of society as laborers.

It means that he did regard Guild socialism as more of a program for cooperation than an ideology for struggle which he believed was necessary for community to survive in crisis. It is needless to say that he affirmed that cooperation was possible only through mutual understanding and accommodating interests democratically between producers and consumers, employers and laborers, and among citizens. This reflected his deep concern about the critical situation of Korea when social dissension grew sharper and sharper. His firm conviction that socialism without democracy and liberal values such as soviet socialism could never emancipate us made his voice for the British 'liberal socialisms' louder and louder.

IV. Beyond Liberalism: The Case for Republicanism

Let me start my own humble story. I am an intellectual historian of long eighteenth-century Britain with strong ideological inclination as two Kims above mentioned. I was sure that studying history was an act of faith for progress. My generation's hard experience of the arbitrary rule of the right wing military regime required most of us at first to be at least critical intellectuals with drastic social

consciousness before being technical historians. As social conflicts which resulted from economic unbalance grew deeper and deeper, I, let alone my colleagues here, was always depressed by the voice from inside asking myself where I was and what I was doing at that time when poor laborers were imprisoned, tortured and even killed.

In this background I have made up my mind to be a Marxist and tried eagerly to search for a John the Baptist of Marxism. I was very much delighted to find out ultra radical agrarian land reformers such as Thomas Spence and Charles Hall through reading that inspirational saint E.P.Thompson. (How lucky I was to meet professor Harry T. Dickinson in 1987 who kindly gave me his edition of Thomas Spence's writings!) Simultaneously I was reading an Arendtian republican historian J.G.A Pocock, who gave me invaluable knowledge that before Marx there did 'the universe of discourse' exist in which the emerging capitalist liberalism was defined and criticized as inhuman mode of thought destroying the community of equals. And this reading made me imagine that it was possible to interpret the precursors not yet discussed by Pocock and his allies as republicans of this kind. I was very proud of my job of baptizing them as virtuous republicans who had tried to establish *res publica* of equal citizens institutionalized to prevent unbalance of property owning. As real socialism in Eastern Europe collapsed, civic republicanism was automatically to be more attractive to me.

However, I failed to persuade my glittering liberal teachers and their loyal disciples only to be ostracized as a smattering outsider who was doubtful enough to be suspected to be a totalitarian. Of course this could never discourage me. I entered into the job of hunting the monster of neo-liberalism by criticizing both Isaiah Berlin's theory of negative liberty and F.A.Hayek's theory of spontaneous order which I ascertained backed up the market logic of limitless free competition incurring the devilish polarization. I, as a trained technical historian, evidenced my thesis by quoting really glittering eighteenth-century British authors such as Richard Price and Adam Ferguson who desperately appealed and designed to restore republican values such as civic virtue in danger of perishing by overwhelming wave of commercialization. Especially for the case of criticizing Berlin, I owed it very much to Quentin Skinner that I was able to be sure that I was not a lonely hunter.

Briefing shortly, while Berlin, as Hobbes and Bentham before him, asserted that liberty meant just the absence of actual interference of others, Richard Price questioned whether a subject was free only because his benevolent despot did not interfere him at all. Berlin replied yes by insisting that liberty could be enjoyed regardless of the personal status and the constitutional character of state. He affirmed that even under the despotic rule people could be free in so far as the despot had no mind of interfering or hindering them not to live their own lives. However, as Skinner argued rightly, republicans from Roman republic to early modern Britain have been insisting that a slave who was not interfered by his master was still a slave because he had always to censor himself to invoke his master's good will which could be precarious. People could be free only when they got the status of equal citizen without discretionary power above them. Thus people could be free only in a

free and popular state, namely in republic in its genuine meaning, where any arbitrary power could not exist even potentially. So to be free people should not forget their civic duty to be vigilant always against their potential superiors. Richard Price suggested to institutionalize this by enacting agrarian law and organizing citizen militia.

But liberals and neo-liberals such as Berlin, Hayek and my teachers suspect that such laws and institutions only interfere and hinder individuals not to plan their own lives. Once Skinner criticized John Rawls by insisting that civic duty to keep vigilant to any power which was capable to dominate us anytime they like to should precede individual right to hide in private shelter to pursue private interest. As Poccok affirmed earlier, we are free only when we are ardent participants to civic and public sphere to realize common good at first. This mode of thought, I am sure, has nothing to do with totalitarianism. Rather it is liberal hegemony which does not hesitate to keep taming us to be obedient subjects that deserves to be called totalitarian. I have heard recently that Frankfurt Allgemine Zeitung asked Skinner a scornful question if he thought we were slaves according to his logic to be answered yes. Are a retired republican regius professor who rejected to receive the title of sir waiting for a Spartacus ? This is the same kind of question that I am asked from time to time. Questioners scorn me that I am waiting for just a Godot.

V. Coda

Youngsuk Lee, the captain of my generation, once advised to me that this sort of ideologically biased story seemed to be the story we had better not tell anymore because it had only few audience. I wish I were the last teller. What I hope is only that this story should not be forgotten. What makes me pleasant is that among younger generation of Korean British historians are competent treasure hunters who are able to tell more interesting stories such as those of pseudo-science, physiognomy, leisure, hobbies, sexuality, religion, education, commerce, Britishness, empire etc. without losing social consciousness. They are now enlarging the horizon of British historiography. This is progress I think we have to ride on.

Session 1

Memory and Communication in Medieval and Early Modern Britain

Recently memory or memorization in British history has attracted academic attention from scholars. This session is going to examine the relationship between continuity and discontinuity in the history of Medieval and Early Modern Britain, considering what people did attempt to record and memorize as their own history or public memory in many facts. The second point we would like to make clear is that to construct the public memory was also the important means to keep the identity in the community or justify the king's government and his dynasty.

The first paper will make clear the memorization of the history of the conquered people in the Middle Ages. The second paper will consider the political communications and memories of the kings of Man and the Isles, whose kingdom was (semi-)independent in the Irish Sea world, and who came to use charters and to have their historiography in the course of the 12th and 13th centuries under the English influence. This paper will refer to the possibility to compare the case of the Irish Sea world with that in the East China Sea, especially around the kingdom of Ryukyu. The third paper will deal with the Britishness of the Westminster Assembly.

English National Identity in the middle Ages

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England is unusual in that it has a football team but not an army. The lack of an English army dates back to 1707, when the Act of Union specified that “the two kingdoms of England and Scotland” were to be “united into one kingdom by the name of Great Britain”, with consequent alterations to the national flag, the official name of parliament, etc.. The state then became Great Britain, even if loyalties and identities did not immediately and universally fall into line with the legislation. For, of course, for hundreds of years before 1707 England had been England.

It is generally recognized that England attained an unusually early and deep-rooted national unity. This was a product of its medieval development, and can be explored by historians in many different ways, for instance, by studying the establishment of unitary succession to the throne, the emergence of a kingdom-wide tax system or the birth of a national Parliament. The purpose of the present paper, however, is to look at English national identity in the Middle Ages not through such analysis of politics or institutions but from the point of view of culture. Benedict Anderson famously identified nations as “imagined communities”, and those communities are given their psychological reality by such things as names, self-image, language, and patron saints, which are the four topics explored here.

The name England

One of the first and most essential components of identity is a name. And England’s name was not the starting point for its sense of unity but a slow and, in some ways, surprising development.

Any discussion of the origins of England and Englishness has to begin with the work of the great founding father of English historical writing, Bede. Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History* was completed in 731. It both provides explicit evidence for the diversity of the Germanic settlers in Britain and also offers a unifying concept that transcends the differences. In a classic passage Bede describes how, in the year 449, the “race of the Angles or Saxons (*Anglorum sive Saxonum gens*)” came to Britain in three longships. The Germanic newcomers, he says, were from three “peoples”, Saxons, Angles and Jutes. These ethnic divisions were still recognizable in Bede’s own day: the Saxons of Britain were divided into South, East and West Saxons (giving the territorial names Sussex, Essex and Wessex, still in use today), the Angles into East Angles (giving the name East Anglia), Middle Angles, Mercians and Northumbrians, these last two being geographical designations, meaning “those living along the border” and “those living north of the river Humber” respectively. And some of these divisions were reflected in the political geography. There were kings of the West Saxons, kings of the Mercians, and so on. So the Germanic inhabitants of Britain, who had migrated there from the continent from the fifth century on, neither originated from one place or people nor formed one political unit in their new country.

It might be thought there was little ground here for common group identity. Yet

Bede entitled his great history “The Ecclesiastical History of the English (or Anglian) people (*gens Anglorum*)” and listed the language of the Angles as one of the five languages used in Britain. Hence it seems that, although the Angles are one branch of the Germanic settlers, their name can be used to refer to the whole.

This use of “Angles” for the entire body of Germanic settlers occurs not only in Bede’s own writing but also in the letters of Pope Gregory I, some of which Bede cites in his *History*. Gregory, who sent Christian missionaries to England in 597, consistently refers to the English (or Anglian) people (*gens Anglorum*) and the “church of the Angles”, while Augustine, leader of the mission, is “bishop of the Angles”. Pope Gregory never once mentions Saxons. For him, whatever the source of his information, the Germanic settlers of Britain formed one people and were to be organized into one church.

Modern historians have emphasized the importance of this early unifying vocabulary and the subsequent influence of Bede’s views. They point out how early a sense of “Englishness” developed and how little it had to do with political unification, which came only much later. It is an important point that there was available, from the early eighth century, a generic term for all Germanic inhabitants of Britain and that this term pre-dated and was not a consequence of political unification. Given the number of cases where ethnogenesis – the creation of a people - follows the creation of a political unit, the reverse situation in England is worth noting.

When one turns to the period after Bede, the picture is a complex one. Of the three names that Bede applied to the Germanic inhabitants of Britain, that of the Jutes never attained lasting significance but both “Angles” and “Saxons” were in widespread use, both as a self-designation and as a designation by others.

Amongst the native inhabitants of Britain, the Celtic peoples, the terminology applied to their Germanic neighbours and enemies was fairly consistent. Gildas, one of the earliest sources, writing in the sixth century, calls the Germanic newcomers Saxons. The *Historia Brittonum*, a compilation made in Wales in the early ninth century, does likewise. Asser, who wrote a contemporary Life of king Alfred (871-99) and was himself a Welshman, consistently calls the English language the “Saxon tongue”. Modern Welsh “*Saesneg*” descends from this tradition and the Gaelic “*Sasunnach*” likewise shows how persistent the “Saxon” identity of the English has been, at least among their enemies and victims.

Self-designation in the eighth and ninth centuries showed no simple pattern. Kings, when not describing themselves simply as “king”, used a title referring to the people they ruled over. Charters of these kings refer to them as “king of the people of Kent”, “king of the Mercians”, “king of the West Saxons”, etc. Occasionally there are grandiose experiments in the royal style. One powerful king of Mercia, Æthelbald, in a charter of 736, even termed himself “king of Britain”. All this shows quite clearly that the adoption of the term “English” from “Angle” was not the only historical possibility. England might today be called “Saxony”.

A very important development with fundamental consequences for ethnic naming was the destruction of all except one of the English kingdoms by the Vikings. In the 860s and 870s Danish armies established their authority in the English kingdoms of the north and east, leaving only the West Saxon dynasty representing the old English regal lines. In 886, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, Alfred, the West Saxon king, was recognized as ruler of “all English people (*all Angel cym*) not under subjection to the Danes”. *Cyn* or *cynn* is the origin of modern English “kin”, meaning family, blood-stock or race, and hence *Angelycynn* is the vernacular

equivalent of *gens Anglorum*.

There was now only one native dynasty ruling “all English people” not under Scandinavian rule and these people included many Anglian Mercians as well as Alfred’s West Saxons. The new situation is reflected in experiments that Alfred and his advisors made with the royal style in the 880s and 890s. Alongside the old title, “King of the West Saxons”, we find “King of the Angles and Saxons” and the composite “King of the Anglo-Saxons (*rex Angul-Saxonum*)”. This composite term, “Anglo-Saxon”, which has come to be a standard modern usage both scholarly and popular, obviously met the needs of a king whose subjects included both the West Saxons and the unconquered half of the (Anglian) Mercians. For Alfred and his dynasty it was an umbrella term, covering both new and old subjects.

Over the course of the tenth century, the Wessex kings slowly conquered the territory that had come under Viking control. The political unit that emerged was, in its extent and in its administrative uniformity, something new. The rulers of this new unit had to choose what to call themselves and one can see a range of titles with which they experimented. But the eventual general choice was simple: *rex Anglorum* – “king of the English”. The first king to style himself “king of the English” systematically was Athelstan, the title being first recorded in 928. Thereafter this was the most common regal title. It had the advantage not only of simplicity but also of conformity with the usage in Bede. And now, for the first time, there was a political unit that more or less corresponded in extent with the “English people”.

If it was the case that the rulers of Alfred’s dynasty were kings of the Anglian or English people and that the language the Angles spoke was English, when did these ethnic and linguistic terms generate a territorial designation? At what point did the land take its name from its people?

The first territorialization of the name in its wider sense, “land of the English” was in the form “*Angel cynnes land*” – “land of the English race or stock”, which occurs in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle in entries from 787. It was clearly thus possible to label the land where the English lived, even if this involved a phrase rather than a single word. The emergence of single labels for the land, that is, proper names properly so called, *Anglia* in Latin and *Englaland* in the vernacular, occurs in the late tenth century. The first use of *Anglia* appears to be in the *Chronicle* of Æthelweard, a Latin version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, produced, unusually enough, by an English lay magnate, Æthelweard, in the years 978-988. The author was fond of new terms and *Anglia* seems to have been one of them. In precisely those same years, the 980s, there is mention of *Anglaland* in letter of archbishop Dunstan. *Englaland* occurs for the first time in that form soon afterwards in the treaty between Æthelred II and the Vikings concluded in 994. It is remarkable that the new terminology arose in such a narrowly dateable period.

This new usage survived and spread. Beginning in 1014, references to “England” in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* are common and the seizure of power by the Danish dynasty of Swein and Cnut in 1014-16 reinforced rather than disrupted this development. While the Danish conquests of the ninth century resulted in a division of the country, those of the eleventh century did not. Cnut declared himself “king of all England (*ealles Englalandes cyning*)”, the first king to do so.

So by the eleventh century “England” and “English” were both in use with much the same referents as today.

The process by which England came to be the name of England extended over a long period. With the strong impetus of Bede’s *History*, but also perhaps through

early general vernacular usage, the name of one of the constituent Germanic peoples (Angles) was generalized as a name for them all. With the extinction of all English dynasties except one, members of this dynasty, after various experiments, came to call themselves “kings of the English”, even though they were originally kings of the West Saxons. Its speakers called the Germanic language spoken in Britain “English”. If the people were “English”, the kings “kings of the English” and the language “English”, it became natural to call the country “the land of the English” – England.

Self-image: the English and the barbaric Celts

A sense of identity involves a sense of others. Who we are is defined by who we are not (and, often, whom we hate). One of the important developments of the period 1050-1200 was England's colonial expansion into other parts of the British Isles. As a consequence, the English faced the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish in a new way: they were now in continual and close contact, but often as rulers and ruled, conquerors and conquered. In this environment, the English created a self-image of cultural and moral superiority.

One of the earliest writers to express this sense of the superiority of the English over their Celtic neighbours was the monastic historian William of Malmesbury (himself of mixed English and Norman descent). Writing in the 1120s, he claims that

The soil of Ireland produces nothing good, because of the poverty or rather the ignorance of the cultivators, but engenders a rural, dirty crowd of Irishmen outside the cities; the English and the French, on the other hand, inhabit commercial cities and have a more civilized way of life.

Turning to Scotland, William makes a condescending exception to his generally negative characterization when he discusses King David I, who had intermarried with the Norman aristocracy and spent much time in England: ‘He had from boyhood been polished by contact and fellowship with our people, so that he rubbed off all the rust of Scottish barbarism’.

This is only the beginning of a wave of powerful negative characterizations of the Welsh, Scots and Irish as poor, rural, backward, brutal and irreligious. In part these comments are to be explained by the simple fact that England is richer agriculturally than the other parts of the British Isles, and the English observers were noting a real economic difference, but they also had a clear political function. The colonial expansion could be justified as part of a “civilizing process”. When Henry II obtained papal support for his expansion into Ireland, the pope explained that he was giving his approval to the venture “so that that barbarous nation may by your efforts become endowed with a more pleasing way of life”.

This colonization process meant that, from the late eleventh century, there were English who left the kingdom of England to settle in Wales or Ireland. They and their descendants were not part of the kingdom of England, because the very important decision was made, or assumed, that this colonization was not to involve an extension of the boundaries of the kingdom of the English. Although the king of England claimed overlordship of Wales and, from 1171, of Ireland, he did not claim that Wales and Ireland were part of the same political territory as England. This only occurred in the Acts of Union of 1536, in the case of Wales, and 1801, in the case of Ireland. But the settlers who went from England to Wales and Ireland in the Middle Ages, and their descendants, even if they were not inhabitants of the

kingdom of England, certainly saw themselves as English. Both in Wales and Ireland harsh racial divisions existed. The new lordships established by Anglo-Norman aristocrats and settled by immigrant English farmers and townsmen, erected social and legal barriers between themselves and the native population. Many lordships in Wales were divided into “Englishries” and “Welshries”, occupied by the two different groups and with different legal systems, while in Ireland “the English born in Ireland” were to be a vocal political group down the centuries.

In a sense there is nobody more conscious of their identity than the traveller, expatriate or exile. They are outside their own community of birth and upbringing and nothing is more likely to make them sensitive to the differences between themselves and the people around them. In Ireland and Wales the English settler populations tried to hedge themselves around with legal protections designed to maintain and secure their cultural identity. The legislation of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which prescribed that the English born in Ireland should have English names, speak English and have haircuts in the English style, provides a useful list of the main cultural markers of ethnicity in the Middle Ages (name, language, hair-style, etc.) but also points to a deep anxiety about loss of identity.

Language

Language was widely recognized in the Middle Ages as an important badge or marker of ethnic identity. Lists of the defining features of a people usually included it, alongside such things as dress, legal customs, and methods of waging war. This assumption, that a people could be identified by its language, sat somewhat awkwardly with the fact that most of medieval Europe was, in one sense or another, multi-lingual.

Like most of the rest of Europe, Anglo-Saxon England was familiar with more than one language, since Latin was employed for ecclesiastical and some official purposes. However, one of the distinctive things about Anglo-Saxon England was the extent to which the vernacular was used: for poetry, history, sermons, law-codes, will and charters. This came to a dramatic end after the Norman Conquest of 1066. For several centuries English, while still the native tongue of the vast majority of the population, was in a period of shadow.

The language of the ruling class was French. Henry II, who ruled England for 45 years (1154-89), spoke only French and Latin. Around 1200 an educated cleric could refer to French and Latin as “languages which, for us, surpass all others”. Some authors writing in Latin were even unwilling to mention English place-names, lest it give a barbarous taste to their prose. Yet, despite this, English survived and re-emerged as a language of literature and, eventually, of power.

The tension between the high cultural status of French and Latin, on the one hand, and the fact that English was the almost universal mother tongue, on the other, can be seen reflected in a ruling from the General Chapter of the Benedictines of northern England in 1290. The monastic leaders were worried that “those who are accustomed to chatter in English, and often are sent to the great men on the business of their monastery” might be shamed by “their lack of good language” and instructed all the monks to use French or Latin in public. They obviously felt that those who represented them to the aristocracy should be conversant with the high-class languages, not with “English chatter”, although they assumed that the latter would be common.

In one sense the Middle Ages was the great period of English internationalism. England was more multi-lingual in the period 1100-1400 than in any other period of its history. Latin, French and English were all spoken and written, in their differing social and cultural contexts. The royal court looked to its French lands, and to French ladies - most of the queens of England in the medieval period were French. For a period of 398 years (1066-1464) there was in fact not a single queen who had been born in England. But this did not seem to suffocate a sense of English national identity.

Sometimes there were curiously paradoxical results. In the 1250s opposition to the king and some of his policies was led by Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester. One of his main avowed motives was hostility to the “aliens” who seemed to dominate the court. His supporters praised him as a champion of the English comparable to Moses, the champion of the oppressed Israelites. His army fought “for England”. Like the heroes of the Old Testament, “Simon de Montfort raised himself up for England”. Yet Simon de Montfort was born in France and was about 25 when he first visited England. He himself was sometimes disillusioned with his English supporters. “I have been in many countries”, he is reported to have said, “but among no people have I found such disloyalty and deception as I have experienced in England”. This champion of England was not himself English. One of his outspoken advocates saw the curious paradox:

He was no traitor but a most devout servant and a most faithful protector of the church in England, the shield and defender of the kingdom of England, the enemy and expeller of aliens, although he was one of them by birth.

“An expeller of aliens, although one of them by birth” – a French-speaker who was regarded at the time, and by many in subsequent generations, as a patriot and champion of English liberty.

Saints and national identity

Dynastic or community identity could be expressed through the adoption of a particular saint. England provides an interesting example of how national saints could change over the course of time. In the Anglo-Saxon period there were saints whose cults transcended regional boundaries, or who came to transcend them. The Church tried hard to promote the cults of pope Gregory the Great and Augustine of Canterbury, who had initiated the Christian mission to the Anglo-Saxons, and in 747 a council headed by the archbishop of Canterbury ruled that “the feast-day of the blessed pope Gregory and also the day of burial of St Augustine the archbishop should be celebrated with honour by all, as is fitting”. These ecclesiastical saints, however, did not win a wide popular following. Gregory’s cult remained “primarily a liturgical cult fostered by a clerical elite”.

The saints who gained the most prominent following in later Anglo-Saxon England included several of those murdered kings who made up a distinctive feature of the sanctity of eastern and northern Europe: Edmund, King of the East Angles, killed by Vikings in 869, and Edward “the Martyr”, King of England, murdered, probably as a result of a dynastic dispute, in 978. Their cults received official backing. Early in the eleventh century the royal council decided that the feast of Edward, king and Martyr, should be celebrated on 18 March “over all England”. After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the last ruler of the house of Wessex, Edward

“the Confessor”, joined this list of national saints. His reign was romanticized as a time of good rule – in 1100 Henry I promised his subjects “the law of King Edward” – and in 1161 Edward became the first English saint to be canonized.

Throughout the years 1100-1400 these English royal saints continued to be an expression of both royal and national identity. When English crusaders helped to capture the city of Damietta in Egypt in 1219, a mosque in the town was converted, in their honour, into a church dedicated to St Edmund the Martyr. Depictions of Edward and Edmund in paintings, illuminated manuscripts and other media were common. Their Englishness was no bar to their veneration by Norman and Angevin rulers whose horizons and ancestry were largely French. Henry III of England (1216-72), whose four grandparents had all been born in France, nevertheless had a deep devotion to St Edward the Confessor, rebuilding the abbey church of Westminster around his shrine, translating his bones to a grand new shrine and naming his eldest son Edward (and his second son Edmund). In this way these Anglo-Saxon personal names, which had been eclipsed after the Norman Conquest, re-entered the lexicon of high-status names.

England thus had revered and long-established native saints. What is rather remarkable is that a new and definitely non-native saint eclipsed them in the later Middle Ages and early modern period. St George began as an entirely fictional martyr saint in the eastern Mediterranean region in the fifth century, the account of whose sufferings was so fantastical (he is executed and miraculously resurrected three times) that it was included in the earliest papal condemnation of apocryphal literature. Yet by the later Middle Ages he was widely regarded as “special protector and advocate of the kingdom of England”. Unlike many things attributed to the influence of the crusades, the rise of the cult of St George really does seem to be explained by western crusaders encountering this very popular eastern saint and making him their own patron. It was Edward I, the last English king to go on crusade, who decreed that his troops should wear the red cross of St George as their uniform.

The fourteenth century was a transitional period in the history of the national saints, symbolized by the fact that when Edward III of England repulsed a French attack on Calais in 1349, he enheartened his men with the calls “Ha Saint Edward! Ha Saint George!”, invoking both the older and the newer heavenly patron. When he founded the Order of the Garter, its patrons included both Edward the Confessor and George, although the latter grew to overshadow the former. There is still some parity between the old saints and the new in the reign of Edward III’s grandson, Richard II. The most famous artistic product from Richard’s reign, the Wilton Diptych, shows the young king kneeling before the Virgin Mary, with his saintly sponsors behind him. They are Edmund, King and Martyr, Edward the Confessor, and John the Baptist. Yet the Ordinances of War that were drawn up for Richard’s Scottish campaign of 1385 prescribe that every soldier in his army “should bear a large badge of arms of St George, before and behind” and that any of the enemy wearing such a badge, presumably to disguise themselves, were to be killed.

Eventually St George’s position became undisputed. The great English victory of Agincourt in 1415 was won under the invocation of the names of Jesus, Mary and George. In January 1416 the Archbishop of Canterbury decreed that the feast of St George, who is described as “special patron and protector of the English nation”, be celebrated at a higher level of solemnity throughout the province of Canterbury. Thereafter George’s position as the national saint of England was assured, even

beyond the great chasm of the Reformation. Elizabethan playgoers could thrill to the war-cry in Shakespeare's *Henry V*: "God for Harry, England and St George!"

The earlier national saints, Edmund, King and Martyr, and Edward, King and Martyr, were rulers who had suffered an innocent death, while Edward the Confessor was revered for his perpetual virginity. None had a reputation as a winner in war. This is perhaps what St George provided. Although technically a martyr, George was uniformly portrayed as a knight, fighting dragons and saving maidens. That is what the martial classes of later medieval England seem to have wanted.

So these are my four perhaps paradoxical conclusions:

- "Englishness" pre-dated "England"; national identity helped shape the political unit rather than being simply a consequence of it.
- A sense of English superiority was created during the colonial expansion of the English in the British Isles, even though this was after the English themselves had been subjected to a foreign aristocracy.
- English national identity developed strongly in the very period when the English language was at its lowest ebb in terms of social prestige and literary production.
- The English replaced their own native patron saints with an imported and originally exotic patron saint, largely because of his martial reputation.

Memory and Communication in the 12th and 13th Century Irish Sea World

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Under this title I would like to consider the political communications and memories of the kings of Man and the Isles, whose kingdom was (semi-)independent in the Irish Sea world, and who came to use charters and to have their historiography in the course of the 12th and 13th centuries under the English influence. I would like also to compare the case of the Irish Sea world with that in the East China Sea, especially around the kingdom of Ryukyu.

First of all, I would like to make sure on the geographical settings. The isle of Man situates in the middle of the Irish Sea, in the nearly equal distance from England, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. On the other hand, the Isles are called the Hebrides today, and situate in the western part of modern Scotland.

Next, we turn to the history of these islands. We have more informations from about the ninth century onwards. It was the age of the so-called Vikings, and there appears the title 'lord of the Isles' in an Irish chronicle in 853. Whose bearer, Godfrey, seems to have had lands also in the northern Ireland and Scotland. Afterwards, a son and a grandson of the Norwegean king Bearn seemed to be the lord of the Isles. Latter was also the king of Dublin.

In 914, there was a sea battle off the shore of the Isle of Man, and its winner, Ranald seem to have been the ruler of the isle of Man. He was the king of the Danes and Norwegeans in Ireland, and became the king of York in 919.

In 973, an Irish chronicle told Maccus, the ruler of Limerick, was the 'lord of the Isles'. An English chronicle describes him as 'the king of the many islands'. He was succeeded by his brother Godfrey. His title in an Irish chronicle is 'the king of the isles of the foreigners 'Insi Gall''. For the Irish people, he was a foreigner. We would like to note that he sent his army to Anglesey, an island n north-western Wales. He was succeeded by his son Reginald, 'the king of the Isles'.

From these facts, we can see that the later kingdom of the Man and the Isles already had cohesion to some extent in these years. And it had political connections with Ireland, Britain, and Scandinavia.

Until the later 11th century, the history of the Isles becomes somewhat obscure. It seems that the power of the earls of Orkney extended southwards, at least to the Hebrides. But isle of Man probably was under the kings of Dublin.

From 1079, we have a rather different, more detailed picture of this area. It is largely due to the fact that we have a historical narrative called *The chronicle of the kings of the Man and the Isles*. It was written in the middle of the 13th century, and concerns mainly the deeds of the kings after 1079. In this year Godfrey Crovan came to the isle of Man and became its king. Afterwards he also subjected Dublin and much of Leinster in eastern Ireland. He was dead in an island of the Hebrides in 1095. Other chronicle told of him as the king of the isles of the foreigners, and it seems certain that he was a ruler of the maritime kingdom include Man, Hebrides and a part of Ireland. On the other hand, his original power base before 1079, the

reason he came to Man, and the ruling system in his kingdom—all remain obscure.

In 1098, King Magnus Barefoot of Norway came through the Orkneys and the Hebrides, to the isle of Man, and became its ruler. Afterwards he also made successful expedition to Wales, Ireland and Galloway, which was not yet ruled by the Scottish crown. This episode reminds us again of the strong Scandinavian connections that might be established with the Irish sea world.

Ten years after King Magnus died, Olaf the first, the youngest son of Godfrey Crovan, became the king of Man and the Isles. Before returning to this island in 1103, he was a member of the court of Henry the first, King of England. He established friendly and peaceful connections with the neighbouring rulers. He founded Rushen Abbey in the isle of Man, and later, the above mentioned *The chronicle of the kings of the Man and the Isles* seems to have written there. We may see religious influence from England in this foundation.

Peaceful Olaf was ironically slaughtered by his nephews who came from Dublin. And returning from Norway, Godfrey son of Olaf became king and killed them in turn. We can see again Manx connection with Dublin and Scandinavia. On the other hand, on the reason why Godfrey went to Norway, Ian Beuermann made a hypothesis. According to that, Godfrey went to Norway because he attended the meeting which put the bishopric of Sodor, that is, the bishopric of Man and the isles, under the archbishop of Nideros in Norway, in order not to be affected politically from Dublin which recently had established its own archbishopric. Certainly the connection with Dublin might become dangerous for Manx kingship as the above episode between the uncle and his nephews suggests, but the religious ties with Nideros was not so strong, for the bishops of Sodor sought consecration from the archbishop of York in the latter half of the 12th century.

The reign of Godfrey was in one sense the turning point in the history of Man and the Isles, for he fought with his stepbrother, Somered of Argyll, and lost the half of the Hebrides for ever. And in this rivalry with Somered, Godfrey had to ask for help and protection both from English and Norwegian kings.

The last episode concerning Godfrey. He was married to a kinswoman of an Irish king by the papal legate from Rome. We can see this area was more and more deeply in the influence of Roman Catholic Church.

Godfrey's son Ranald succeeded his father. Ranald had John de Courcy as his half brother, who had once been a powerful ruler in Ireland but afterwards lost his power there. King Ranald supported John de Courcy but in vain. Later this Ranald became a vassal of King John, doing homage and having a land in Ireland from him. On the other hand, King of Norway also forced Ranald to do homage. The overlordship over the king(s) of Man and the Isles thus became accurately and ritually expressed. It is interesting that we know these facts on the subjugations from English administrative records and there is no indication of them in *the Chronicle of the kings of Man and the Isles*.

Ranald was an illegitimate son of his parents, and this may be one of the reasons why he did homage to these powerful kings, in the face of his brother Olaf, a legitimate successor of King Godfrey. Ranald died in the struggle with his brother Olaf, who became a king in turn.

King Henry the third of England knighted Olaf and made him defend the Irish Sea and provide ships for English crown if necessary.

Next king was Harold son of Olaf. But refusing the overlordship of Haakon, the king of Norway, he was deposed. After the reconciliation with the Norwegian king,

he again ascended to the throne and was married to a princess of Haakon. But soon he was dead in 1248.

In 1252 Magnus son of Olaf became king. With Haakon he fought Alexander the third, king of the Scots, who tried to expand his power westward. Haakon defeated and dead, Magnus reconciled with Alexander with doing homage and accepting to rule the isle of Man only. He died without a legitimate heir, and Man and the Isles came to be ruled by Alexander. Magnus was the last king of these islands, until 1265.

Thus we can trace the history of the kingdom of Man and the Isles, which had strong connections with neighbouring regions, especially with Dublin, and later with England, Norway, and Scotland. Its rulers were themselves kings, but at the same time were in the stronger influences and overlordships of the English kings and the Norwegian kings, doing homages and being knighted by them.

In the Eastern Asia, we can see some resemblances with the kingdom of Man and the Isles in the case of Ryukyu kingdom, that extended nearly equal to Okinawa Prefecture of Japan today.

Around the eleventh and the twelfth century, there appeared fortifications or castles called Gusuku, and after the three-cornered contest in the fourteenth century, there appeared the kingdom under the unified rule in the fifteenth century, of the first and second Sho dynasty. This state-formation process had deep connections with the tributary trades begun in the fourteenth century with Ming dynasty in China. The kings in Ryukyu sent tributes to China and showed loyalties to the emperors, while the emperors acknowledged them as kings and rewarded abundantly. On the other hand, under the Edo shogunate the army of the feudal lord (daimyo) Shimazu attacked Ryukyu early in the seventeenth century, capturing its king and ministers. From that time onwards Ryukyu was also under the Japanese rule, and this regime of Ryukyu having two overlords in China and Japan lasted until it was completely absorbed into modern Japan in the nineteenth century.

The Kingdom of Ryukyu prospered from the trades with surrounding regions. The reasons why China and Japan tried to put Ryukyu under their rule were that they sought the profits, both in terms of the goods and the informations, for there were not always stable diplomatic and commercial connections between China and Japan. On the other hand, these two countries influenced Ryukyu not only politically as indicated above, but also culturally. For example, from the thirteenth century, many Japanese monks went to Ryukyu and Shinto shrines also were begun to be built there. And after in the sixteenth century, the establishment of the powerful dynasty of Ching in China, its influences on Ryukyu became stronger. Ryukyu's state rituals were changed in the Chinese styles, and its main palace, the Shuri-jo Castle was built in the Chinese fashion. But the Japanese authorities also ordered that the ambassadors from Ryukyu should wear the Chinese clothes in Japan, to show that the state having the exotic Chinese culture was under the Shogunate of Japan.

This brief look at Ryukyu leads us to the comparisons with the Kingdom of Man and Isles. First we see communications, especially those with commerce. Geographical position in the East China Sea gave Ryukyu its importance as a centre of international trades, and in turn its political (semi-)independence. The isle of Man also situated at the centre of the Irish Sea, and there remain some evidences to show its commercial importance. They are hoards of coins from the eleventh century, and

include many coins from the surrounding regions. Also coins were minted in the isle of Man itself sometime from about ten twenty-five to ten sixty-five, under the influence of Dublin. But the kings of the Crovan dynasty seem not to have minted coins themselves, and there are no coin hoards from their reigns. So there remain some obscure relationships between economic prosperities and political stabilities. And in England, the ability to mint coins was one of the prerogatives of the crown. There may be some hints concerning the difference between the English kingship and the Manx here.

Next we turn to the political communications between the kingdoms. In the case of the kingdom of Man and the Isles, those with England and Norway were more and more well-defined, using the rituals of hommages and knightings, and also through written words in the writs and letters. Interestingly, the Manx kings themselves issued writs from King Olaf the first of the twelfth century. He must have learnt the use of the writs in the court of Henry the first of England. Along with his foundation of the Rushen abbey under the order of Savigny and then of the Cistercians, and his giving of the right to elect the bishop of Sodor to the Furness abbey in England, he put his kingdom to have strong political and religious communications with England.

Lastly, we see the topic of commemoration. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Chuzanseikann, the official historiography of the Ryukyu dynasty, was composed in Japanese. Within a hundred years, it was translated and revised in Chinese. There appeared another historiography in Chinese style in those days. Chinese official historiographies have had a long tradition themselves, and we can trace the ever increasing influences of the Chinese culture above-mentioned in the sphere of the historiography. On the other hand, we have seen that the kingdom of Man and the Isles also had a semi-official historiography called *the chronicle of the kings of Man and the Isles*. It was written at the Rushen abbey, founded by the Manx crown in the twelfth century under the English influence. The chronicle seems to have been composed on the occasion of founding the church there, commissioned by King Magnus. In the thirteenth century, Manx kings were in the increasing pressures from both the kings of England and Norway. Also there was a period of instabilities arising from the struggle for the crown. After that, king Magnus was acknowledged and welcomed both by English and Norwegian kings and succeeded in establishing the peaceful times. We may be able to think that he intended to justify his lineage and regime by making the historiography of his dynasty. Interestingly, the submission of king Magnus to the English and Norwegian crown was omitted in the chronicle. On the other hand, about sixty years beforehand, the then king Ranald was praised by a poem composed in Gaelic. We suppose that Gaelic culture was influential in his court. *The chronicle of the kings of Man and the Isles* was composed in Latin, the universal language of the intellectuals in the Middle Ages. Why this chronicle tells mainly the deeds of Godred Crovan and his descendants? I think the royal line descends from Crovan to Magnus resembles like those of other European royal lines, succeeded mainly from fathers to elder sons and omitting the bastards as far as possible. It is rather contrasting to the royal lines before Crovan, rather complicated and reminding us of the Gaelic tanistry system. So King Magnus seemed to insist that his kingship was legitimate and met the European standard at that time.





Table I. The Scandinavian Connection: Kings of Man and the Isles

From W. D. H. Sellar 'Hezildam Sea Kings' in *Aiba*, F. J. Gowran & R. A. Mc Dowell (eds.)
2016



10. The Kingdom of Men and the Isles.

from R. H. King, *The Isle of Man*, 3rd ed., 1973.

The Britishness of the Westminster Assembly

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Recent historiography on the subject of the English Civil War does not neglect the role played by Scottish elements. Demand for a British history, not an enriched English one, has never been stronger than in the last 15 years. Many works on the Wars of Three Kingdoms have been written in terms of the British dimension. In particular, the causes of the Wars have been much discussed with due consideration given to their British dimension. However, many phases or individual events in the British Revolutions still fail to attract a British perspective. The Assembly of the Divines at Westminster is one of them.

The Westminster Assembly has been studied largely in terms of theological perspectives, as it produced the immortal basis for worldwide Presbyterianism: the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Westminster Larger and Shorter Catechism, the Directory of Public Worship and the Presbyterian Church Government. However, the historical issue of how these led to the general Presbyterian standards has never been properly analyzed. This paper attempts to find the answer in the Britishness of the Westminster Assembly.

Robert Baillie, one of the Scottish commissioners to the Assembly of Divines in 1643, defined the assembly in his reply to John Bramhall as “*an English assembly convocat by the King and Parliament of England*”. In a strict sense, the words of Baillie were not far wrong. It was an assembly of English divines summoned by the Long Parliament, to which it was answerable. Its procedures were dependent upon the orders of the English parliament, and all of its decisions were to be submitted to the parliament to be formalized. In this assembly Baillie and his fellow Scottish commissioners were asked to attend as individual members.

However, neither the Scottish commissioners nor the majority of the divines in the assembly regarded it as an exclusively English body. In practice, its summoning was initiated by the Scots, the idea for its agendas was furnished by the Scots, and any decision made would be made with the assistance of the Scottish Commissioners in London. Above all, the Kirk was bound to accept any result of the assembly as it entered into a covenant with England. For many, the assembly was doubtless a British body.

When they the Scottish Commissioners arrived in London in September 1643, they were asked to sit in the Assembly as individual members, like any other of the English divines. They declined this offer, expressing their willingness to sit ‘as private men’ to give their advice in the debates. What they meant by ‘private men’, was obvious. It does not mean they declined to sit as official members of the assembly. What they declined was the idea that each commissioner would be counted as an individual member. Since they came to England as representatives of their own national church and nation ‘to treat for uniformity’, they wanted to be treated ‘in that capacity’. Even though they only numbered eight (5 ministers, 3 lay elders),¹

¹ The commissioners to the assembly from Scotland were Alexander Henderson, Robert

they thought they had an equal power with the sum of all English members, since they were representing their national Kirk. The Scottish Commissioners had this idea in mind when they requested that their English counterparts be appointed from the assembly and the parliament to form the Grand Committee with them in the early stages of the assembly.

Baillie's statement above was a description of technical (or legal) aspect of the assembly. To the Scottish Commissioners' disappointment, the Assembly of Divines was totally subordinate to the English parliament. Apart from the fact that any decision of the assembly was counted as mere advice to the parliament, the very order of the debates in the assembly depended upon parliamentary instructions. The Assembly of Divines was not even allowed to produce an official letter without the permission and examination of Parliament. When the assembly asked the parliamentary permission to write a letter to the General Assembly in May 1644, it was the English Parliament that gave guidelines as to what to put into the letter. Baillie thus wrote, 'this is no proper Assembly, but a meeting called by the Parliament to advise them in what things they are asked, ... if they essayed it, they would soon be taken up by the Parliament'.

This was quite a shock to the Scottish commissioners who believed in the independence of the Kirk from either the king or parliament. Certainly they were recalling how James VI was rebuked as "God's silly vassal" by the Scottish minister, Andrew Melville when he tried to interfere with the proceedings of the General Assembly in 1582. It was the total subordination of the Westminster Assembly to the English Parliament they did not want find acceptable. In a letter to the General Assembly in May 1644, the Scottish Commissioners reported that 'your wisidome will consider that they are not a Generall Assembly, but some select Persons, called by Authority to give their advice in matters of Religion'.

A historian of the Westminster Assembly, Robert Paul argued that "the Scots alliance was the most important single factor in bringing the Westminster Assembly into existence". This assertion was only partly true, if he meant the Solemn League and Covenant by 'alliance'. Although the parliamentary bid for Scottish military assistance in the early summer of 1643 advanced the call of the assembly, an idea of a British assembly existed as early as March 1641. Since the Second Bishop's war in 1640, ecclesiastical uniformity between the Church of Scotland and the Church of England became a Scottish national priority, for which vast resources of Scotland was mobilized. No doubt, the British uniformity they meant was the Scotticization of the Church of England. Three of the Scottish Commissioners to the Westminster Assembly - Alexander Henderson, Robert Baille and George Gillespie - were in London in the very early stage of the Long Parliament as part of the Scottish Commissioners to the London Peace Treaty. On 10 March 1641 the Scottish Commissioners presented their demand for uniformity in a paper titled *Arguments given in by the Commissioners of Scotland unto the Lords of the Treaty perswading Conformatie of Church Government* (hereafter referred to as *Arguments*) to the Lords and Commons. This was done at the instruction of the Scottish Committees of Estates at Edinburgh and at Newcastle. This document alluded to the necessity of a

Baillie, Samuel Rutherford, Goerge Gillespie, Robert Douglas(ministers), the Earl of Casillis, Lord Maitland, and Johnston of Wariston(elders). Neither , Robert Douglas nor the Earl of Casillis attended.

British assembly for British uniformity in religion. Seeing the debate of the root and branch centered in the parliament, the Scottish Commissioners suggested that “the Church shall be peaceably governed, by common consent of Churchmen , in Assemblies”, while “the State and all civil matters” governed by civil men in Parliament. It was an indirect suggestion that England needed a religious assembly to bring reformation to their church. The commissioners in 1641 were, as in 1643, concerned about the Erastian character in the church-state relationship in England.

It seems the Scottish move for a religious assembly was bought by the Scottish party before the English Civil War broke out. One article of the Grand Remonstrance in December 1641 suggested that “a general synod of the most grave, pious, learned, and judicious divines of this island, assisted with some from foreign parts professing the same religion with, who may consider of all things necessary for the peace and good government of the Church. It is note-worthy that the article used the words ‘this island’, not ‘England’. Even in the early stages of the Long Parliament, the idea of a British assembly was highly popular among the Presbyterians of both kingdoms.

This was confirmed again in the Nineteen Propositions proposed to the king Charles I by the parliament on 2 June 1642. The parliament expressed their intention “to have Consultations with Divines” for the reformation of church government in the eighth proposition. Although this proposition is too brief to discover what the parliamentarians meant by “Consultations with Divines”, the idea of a British assembly for the British uniformity was clearly present in the mind of John Pym, the leader of the Scottish party in the Lower House. In 30 September 1642 Pym suggested in a conference between the Lords and the Commons a need for an assembly of divines including representatives of other countries committed to the Reformed faith. Obviously he had the idea of a joint assembly of English and Scottish divines.

Of course the assembly of divines which the Grand Remonstrance and the Nineteen Propositions proposed was a consultative body of divines, not a self-determining one, as both used the word “consultations”. Even though the pro-Scottish party in the Long Parliament was under the strong influence of the Scots, most of them were not ready to abandon their Erastian stance. They had an idea of a British assembly, but was not willing to allow it to be an independent body like the Scottish General Assembly.

The final step toward the creation of a British assembly was the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in September 1643. Although the ordinance for calling the Westminster Assembly was passed on 12 June 1643 in the English parliament, this was done in expectation of Scottish military help. The English parliament had implemented in advance the condition which would be expected to be forwarded by the Scots in near future. In the ordinance, the proposal for a “nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland” was resolved upon. All these explain that the Westminster Assembly was a British one initiated by the Scots in order to achieve British uniformity in religion.

The opening day of the Westminster Assembly of Divines was 1 July 1643. It was, however, not until the arrival of the Scottish Commissioners that the discussion of important matters began. In between the assembly spent more than ten weeks discussing, by the order of the English parliament, the general regulation and the Thirty Nine Articles, which never emerged as a subject of discussion again in the Westminster Assembly. This indicates that even the Long Parliament had to accept the British character of the assembly.

The worldwide Presbyterian standards produced by the Westminster Assembly are four documents: the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Westminster Larger and Shorter Catechism, Directory of Public Worship and the Presbyterian Church Government. These four particulars are exactly the same as those demanded by the Scots in the *Arguments* of 1641. *Arguments* suggested that there should be “one Confession, one form of Catechism, one Directory for all the parts of public worship of God, and for prayer, preaching, administration of sacraments, & c., and one form of Church government, in all the Churches”. Since then, these four particulars had been companion words to ‘uniformity’ and became an idiomatic phrase. Every time when the Scots demanded uniformity between the Kirk and the Church of England, they explained that uniformity meant subscribing to the same as the four particulars. It is not too exaggerating to say the aim and agendas of the Westminster Assembly had been set up by the Scots long before it was summoned.

In 3 August 1643, just before the Solemn League and Covenant was concluded between the two nations, the General Assembly of Edinburgh addressed the Long Parliament in a letter that reiterated the argument of the *Arguments* of 1641: “That they “in all his majesty’s dominions there might be one Confession of Faith, one Directory of Worship, one public Catechism, and one form of Church government.” Whilst there were some alterations in the phrasing was presented but nothing had in fact changed. Some English divines in a letter of to the General Assembly dates 3 August 1643 expressed their wish that they, according to the Scottish ‘intimation’, “may agree in one Confession of Faith, one Directory of Worship, one public Catechism, and form of Church government”. These previous references to the four particulars suggest that it was not an accident that the Westminster Assembly produced only these four, and nothing more. The four particulars were demanded by the Scots, and produced as a means of achieving the British uniformity.

It was with the form of church government that the Scots were most concerned with. The Scottish priority in the four particulars was clearly expressed in their *Arguments* of 1641. The matter of full uniformity in the four particulars, it argued, “is of great weight, and of a large extent, and therefore will require a large time, our desire for the present some course may be taken for an uniformity in government.” The fact that the making of the Presbyterian Church Government attracted the hottest debates and was the most time-consuming business in the Westminster Assembly had already been anticipated in 1641, and explains that the weightiness of each agenda was decided by the Scots.

The Assembly of Divines was summoned before the Solemn League and Covenant was signed, and there was not a single word in the Solemn League and Covenant that indicated that the assembly would be a British one. However, it was generally accepted that the assembly was a condition for Scottish military assistance which was formalized in the Solemn League and Covenant. In that sense, most of Scots and the English Presbyterians regarded the assembly as constituting an integral part of their covenant. On 23 September the English Parliament declared that it was ready for a ‘punctual’ and ‘exact’ uniformity in the four religious particulars, and an assembly of divines in England had already been summoned for the reformation of the English Church, and the Scottish General Assembly was asked to send to the assembly ‘such number of godly and learned divines’ for ‘a nearer conjunction betwixt both Churches’. Surely for them the assembly was a

British tool to establish the covenanted uniformity.

The most illuminating fact that supports the assertion for the Britishness of the Westminster Assembly is that the Scots were ready to accept any production of the assembly for use in the Kirk. They felt obliged to take whatever the Westminster Assembly produced, as it, they thought, was a covenanted assembly for a covenanted uniformity. However, it does not mean they took the four documents without any alteration. The Directory for the Publick Worship of God designed by the Westminster Assembly was approved by the English Parliament on 3 January 1645. When it was sent up to Scotland a month later, the Scottish General Assembly and the Scottish Parliament passed it with minor adjustments. Nevertheless, the Britishness of the Westminster Assembly at the moment was prevailing in both kingdoms. The original draft of the directory for worship was titled “The Directory for the Publique Worship of God throughout the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland”. This fact indicates that it was produced in a British assembly for British uniformity.

Although not without fierce controversy, the General Assembly ratified the Confession of Faith without any alteration by in early 1647. The English Parliament, however, later in June 1648 amended the confession, and eventually set it aside until March 1660. It was the commitment of the Kirk to covenanted uniformity which made the Westminster Confession of Faith the most fundamental basis for Presbyterianism and spurred its transmission to other reformed churches throughout the world.

The form of church government adopted permanently by the Kirk was the initial draft titled “Propositions concerning Church Government” on 10 February 1645. It was titled ‘The Form of Presbyterial Church-Government agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, with the assistance of commissioners from the Church of Scotland as a part of covenanted uniformity in religion betwixt the churches of Christ in the kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland’.

The Scottish commitment to British uniformity by means of the Westminster Assembly was not stable even in the end of 1647. In the letter to the Westminster Assembly and ‘the ministers of London and all other affected brethren of the Ministrie in England’ at the end of 1647, the General Assembly of Scotland informed that they had already approved the “Directory for worship” and the “Doctrinal Part of Church Government”, and the “Confession of Faith” as “a part of the Uniformity in the three kingdoms”. They also expressed that they had a plan to approve the “Directory of the Church Government” and the “Catechism” at the next General Assembly to be convened in 1648. All these procedure shows us how deeply the Scots were committed to the notion of covenanted uniformity, at least by the end of 1647.

However, the covenanters could not accept the final form of church government ratified by the English Parliament on 29 August 1648 as a part of British university. It had gone too far away from the Scottish standard of church government, as Baillie referred to it as “lame Erastian presbytery”. Besides, the covenant between England and Scotland had been broken by the end of 1647. The Scots believed that English parliament was the covenant breaker, and that they no longer had an obligation to observe its terms.

Apart from the Scottish commissioners playing a leading role in it, the Westminster

Assembly was also a British body in that some of its productions were clearly presented as coming from both churches. On 13 March 1644 the assembly produced a letter to the Belgick, French, Helvetian, and other Reformed Churches in the names of the Assembly of Divines in England and the Commissioners of the Church of Scotland. Even though they signed the letter with two separate names, it was obvious that the letter was sent by the British assembly.

However, for the many English, the assembly was obviously an *English* assembly summoned by the English Parliament to settle the reformation of the English church. What they wanted from the Kirk were some Scottish 'learned divines' to 'assist' the Assembly of Divines. But this was no more than a diplomatic gesture extended at a time when Scottish military help was needed desperately. For the English, without question, it was an English assembly which was responsible solely to the English Parliament. The English Parliament never had any intention of making the assembly British, as they showed during the Erastian debate in 1646.

The basis of the covenanted uniformity, they thought, was "*according to the Word of God*", and not conformity to the Church of Scotland, as it was set down in the Solemn League and Covenant. Nothing was wrong with this in the literal terms. It was, however, a technical and clumsy interpretation of the Westminster Assembly, far from telling the truth. For the Independents, 'uniformity' was the very opposite to the 'toleration' which they had been crying for. They did look for an alternative word for 'uniformity', one that would allow the covenant to be interpreted differently. 'Unity' was the word they settled on. The Independents argued that the word 'uniformity' in the covenant meant 'unity', because uniformity was neither possible nor good for liberty of conscience. '*Unity* is Christian', said Henry Burton, '*Uniformity* Antichristian'. All these alternative interpretations only indicate that the English were driven into a corner in their denial of the genuine meaning of the Solemn League and Covenant.

The year 1646 and 1647 saw any warnings issued by ministers against the breaking of the Solemn League and Covenant. The English Presbyterian minister, Edmund Calamy, in a sermon on 14 January 1646 warned that covenant-breaking was 'a land destroying and soul destroying abomination' and 'an act of the highest Sacrilege that can be committed'. However, this and other similar warnings failed to bear the fruit of the British uniformity. 'The Scotch grand Divines in the Synod' may have secured uniformity in the Assembly of Divines. But neither uniformity nor unity was achieved outside the Assembly.

Baillie's deep despair was made obvious on 18 August 1646, as he wrote, 'this nation is also in a temper to fall in a worse warr than the former. God help us, we need to pray: never people nearer to a bottomless pitt of horrible evills'. Then he added, 'I am exceeding weary of this life'. Baillie and his fellow commissioners failed to realize their vision of British uniformity in religion. However, it was the Scottish unwavering commitment to the idea of the Britishness of the Westminster Assembly that placed the four particulars of the Westminster Assembly in the most valued position among the standards of the protestant church throughout the world, which is far greater achievement than the never realized British uniformity.

Session 2

Tradition and Modernity in Welfare History

This session is intended to make clear the relationship between tradition and modernity in British welfare history. *Meaning of Modernity: Britain from the Late-Victorian Era to World War II* (2001), edited by Martin Daunton and Bernhard Rieger, examined the unique sense of modernity in those years. It stressed that Britain had its own concept of modernity as ‘gradual evolution’, or ‘continuous development’ rather than rupture or revolution. That was the contrast with the other European countries. This session tries to analyze this meaning of modernity in the field of welfare history.

Welfare has been an essential part of human life. No one could keep his life in a good condition without the help from the others. Welfare is also a structural complex composed of different agencies and principles. The principles of self-help, mutual help, and philanthropy had continuity throughout history, although the agencies in charge of these principles changed and expanded. Certainly the role of the state as a welfare provider became bigger in the twentieth century than the previous centuries. However, the other agencies, such as charitable bodies, mutual-aid associations, and voluntary associations, continued to be very active even under the welfare state system. Tradition of non-state sector is mixed with modernity of state welfare in a unique way in Britain.

The existing interpretation tended to be a linear progress model: from welfare society to welfare state. The contrast between tradition and modernity has been stressed too much. Yet, the historical reality was rather an unparalleled mixture. This session would examine the ‘gradual development’ of welfare in Britain.

Crime, Poverty and the Public Welfare in a Revolutionary Age: The Influence of Patrick Colquhoun

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The major aim of this paper is to make a preliminary attempt to lay out a conceptual and historiographical framework that seeks to tackle interpretive issues that should be of interest, hopefully, not only to British historians but members of a wider audience. Discussion of this conceptual and historiographical framework will lead on to a more specific consideration of poverty and the crucially significant problem of the management of the poor in British historical development. We shall focus particularly on the era of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which saw the shift, in E.P. Thompson's famous phrasing, from an older (or 'traditional') framework of 'moral economy' to the world of 'political economy' and the 'modern' relations of market capitalism, with all the social dislocations and profound challenges for government and welfare policy that this produced.¹

The first crucial conceptual term to consider, as this conference is explicitly seeking to debate, is the notion of 'modernity.' As the influential anthropologist Jack Goody remarks in his compelling book *Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate*, 'Throughout the world historians and social scientists are involved in the debate about modernization, industrialization and capitalism.'² In order to understand the framework and utility of that debate, of course, as Goody insists, we need to examine these vigorously contested (both by historical actors and contemporary academic commentators) 'large-scale processes'.³ That is, we need to focus on defining and evaluating the matrix of capitalism, modernization and industrialization in both the historical and contemporary worlds. In the humanistic disciplines, of course, perhaps most notably in Literature and Cultural Studies, modernity is at the heart of critical analysis and debate, as Goody notes. For Goody and many other leading social scientists and historians also, modernity has been deployed as a tool of considerable analytical weight. It should be noted, however, that Goody is careful to acknowledge and discuss explicitly the problematic nature of this very broad concept, particularly in so far as it has been a central component of a Eurocentric account of global historical development focused on the narrative of the 'rise of the West.'

Perhaps the single most important conceptualisation of Modernity in Western social scientific theory has been that formulated by the German historical sociologist Max Weber. Indeed, Goody emphasizes how 'Modernity has also been identified with the rise of capitalism, and connected with the growth of rationality and of

¹ See the superb essay 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century' by E.P. Thompson, first published in *Past and Present* in 1971 and then reprinted in *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture* (New York: The New Press, 1993). Thompson's essay 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism' is also crucially important for approaching this topic.

² Jack Goody, *Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 1.

³ Ibid., 1.

secularization, [and] more recently with urbanization and industrialization.⁴ For Max Weber in particular, following in the wake of many eighteenth-century European Enlightenment thinkers, as the prominent German-American political theorist Carl J. Friedrich emphasized, modernity should be contrasted with tradition, as a set of both ideas and practices.⁵ These interlinked phenomena, urbanization and industrialization, were the crucial context for the contributions of Patrick Colquhoun to the debate about crime, poverty and public welfare, in fact: ‘Human ingenuity has been exerted perhaps more on the subject of devising means to ameliorate the condition of the poor than any other branch of political economy,’ wrote Colquhoun in 1815. Comprehending the structure of the British population was crucial to Colquhoun’s arguments, and thus he highlighted that ‘the population of the cities and towns, instead of comprising (as had been conjectured) about one third of the nation, now approaches nearly to one half.’⁶ Colquhoun, in fact, addressed explicitly and influentially the debate about population associated most famously with Thomas Malthus.

Interestingly, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the very time period when Europe (and its post-colonial off-shoot the United States) came to exert an unprecedented (and, prior to the second half of the eighteenth century, perhaps rather improbable) global dominance through the emergence of industrial capitalism and its pivotal role in a new phase of Western overseas imperial expansionism in Asia and Africa, there was a crucial shift in European conceptions of non-European societies. This is highlighted compellingly by the historian Robert B. Marks in his book *The Origins of the Modern World: Fate and Fortune in the Rise of the West*. Leading thinkers who examined the birth of an industrial society that they witnessed in later eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britain, such as the philosophical historians and political economists Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, analyzed the emergence of a new world order that contrasted supposed Western dynamism to the backwardness of Asia and the East. Ironically, as Robert Marks notes, even Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their 1848 tract *The Communist Manifesto* viewed the ‘modern’ industrial capitalism of the West as a necessary (and indeed desirable, at least as a stage of historical development) agent of progress in re-shaping the global order.⁷

As a genuine world historian, Robert Marks focuses, though, on the tremendous influence of Weber’s central explanatory concept of a claimed Western ‘rationality’ that allegedly accounts for the birth of the modern (capitalist) world order (in contrast to the belief systems of the pre-modern or pre-capitalist West and the broader non-European world). ‘Of more importance for Western conceptualizations of their own history, though, has been Max Weber, a German sociologist who wrote

⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁵ See Carl J. Friedrich, *Tradition and Authority* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 13: ‘Tradition and authority are so closely linked in writings on political theory and philosophy that it is very difficult to discuss one without taking up the other. Max Weber made tradition one of the sources and hence one of the types of authority and of legitimacy as well, contrasting it with charismatic and rational-legal sources. In doing so, he remained in the well-known habit of the Enlightenment which contrasted reason and authority.’

⁶ Patrick Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire* (London, 1815), 27.

⁷ See Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: Fate and Fortune in the Rise of the West* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 4-5.

around the turn of the twentieth century,’ Robert Marks argues, ‘Where Weber shared with [Karl] Marx a fascination with explaining how and why capitalism developed in Europe – and only Europe – Weber parted with Marx in his explanation.’ Robert Marks explains that, ‘Instead of focusing as Marx had on “materialist” explanations, Weber looked to those aspects of Western values and culture, in particular the rationalism and work ethic that he associated with Protestantism, as being crucial to the rise of capitalism.⁸ In other words, as Robert Marks seeks to examine critically and re-evaluate in his work, there is a crucial paradigm of Exceptionalism operating at the core of Western social science theory and historiography. In fact, these seminal European thinkers, such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Karl Marx and Max Weber, were all proponents of a Eurocentric notion of Western exceptionalism. These men were the founders of modern social science theory, and in the twentieth century virtually all of the social sciences, in particular sociology and economics, have incorporated the idea of European exceptionalism into their basic assumptions,’ Robert Marks contends, ‘As historians sought to become more “scientific” in the twentieth century by adopting and adapting the insights of this social science [theory] to historical inquiry, they too became captivated by the search for the origins and causes of European exceptionalism.⁹

At the heart of this paper’s conceptual and historiographical focus is a particular variant of this conceptual paradigm of Western/European *exceptionalism*: the allegedly unique pattern of Britain’s mixture of tradition and modernity in the basic evolution of its historical development. The word *British* is important because Britain is often conceived of by British historians (and indeed many other theorists and commentators) as the first ‘modern’ country in the dual senses that it was, in the view of many, the birthplace of both industrial capitalism and nationalism. The link between these two important historical developments is, in fact, key – both for this paper and for many influential social scientists and historians. Robert Marks argues, following leading commentators such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, that the ideas and practices of nations and nationalism ‘arose only after modern states and industrial society had emerged.’¹⁰ Nations and nationalism, in other words, had to be manufactured to ensure loyalty to the governing regimes that came to define the world system that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars that ended in the early nineteenth century. As Colquhoun conceived of this period, ‘A new aera [sic] may be said to be commencing in the world, arising out of the disorganized state produced by the unexampled mischiefs of the French Revolution.’ Colquhoun, like many modern historians, viewed the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a critical period for the reshaping of the world order: ‘In the various oscillations of states and empires, which the present extraordinary period exhibits, happily for the British Empire it has weathered the storm.’¹¹ Indeed, this new era had allowed Great Britain to emerge as a global hegemon with the economic and military power to project its ideas and institutions of a newly emerging industrial capitalist ‘modernity’ across the world.

This project of nationalism was often constructed and inculcated, crucially,

⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ Ibid., 140.

¹¹ Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire*, 116.

through the medium of public education. This is particularly relevant for this paper. Patrick Colquhoun, reflecting his intellectual (and indeed social) connections to the Scottish Enlightenment and the emergent discipline of political economy, was actually one of the very first and most influential advocates of public education in Britain.¹² Although his detailed proposals, contained in widely read works such as his 1806 tract *A New and Appropriate System of Education for the Labouring People*, were not implemented immediately, they provided a very important legacy that shaped the state's eventual role in supporting public education as a key tool of social policy.¹³ Central to Colquhoun's educational goals, which he sought to implement directly as founding Vice-President of the Westminster Free School in London, was the inculcation of work discipline and loyalty to the British state and nation during a quarter century of global warfare and rapid socio-economic change embodied in urbanization and industrialization. Although he engaged in exercises in private philanthropy, such as this school for the poor in London, Colquhoun believed that there had to be a new conception of public welfare and social policy administered under the auspices of the central government. Public education as a tool of social welfare and management of the poor was at the heart of Colquhoun's elaborate vision. 'Looking, however, to the nation at large, it appears to be too gigantic for the efforts of private benevolence,' he argued, 'The aid of the legislature will be necessary to give full effect to the design.'¹⁴

Let us move on to consider more explicitly the issue of British state formation and its central importance in defining and evaluating the key processes that have come to be characterized as constituting modernity (that is, the emergence of globalized industrial capitalism and its pivotal role in shaping the international state system and historical world order). This was a historical process, or rather a series of interlinked conjunctures of contingent events and forces (as elucidated persuasively by Robert Marks), that might be dated to roughly the last two

¹² Public education was actually crucial to the wider intellectual projects of both Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, of course, as highlighted in the excellent monograph by Donald Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See pages 118-120 for a characteristically insightful discussion of Smith's rationale for public education and page 278 especially on Malthus's crucial focus on education: 'For reasons that were identical to those given by Smith, education of the populace at large at public expense became a major public responsibility, with a knowledge of the basic principles of political economy being added to a curriculum aimed at spreading literacy and numeracy.'

¹³ The importance of Colquhoun's contribution – and the breadth of his vision – is communicated by the full title of this pamphlet: *A New and Appropriate System of Education for the Labouring People: elucidated and explained, according to the plan which has been established for the religious and moral instruction of male and female children, admitted into the free school, no. 19, Orchard Street, in the City of Westminster; containing an exposition of the nature and importance of the design, as it respects the general interest of the community: with details, explanatory of the particular economy of the institution, and the methods prescribed for the purpose of securing and preserving a greater degree of moral rectitude, as a means of preventing criminal offences by habits of temperance, industry, subordination, and loyalty, among that useful class of the community, comprising the Labouring People of England. To which are added, concluding observations, on the importance of extending the system generally, under the aid of sanction of the Legislature* (London, 1806: republished, Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971).

¹⁴ Colquhoun, *A New and Appropriate System of Education for the Labouring Poor*, 71.

centuries.¹⁵ ‘The Great Transformation’, to use the terminology of one of the twentieth century’s most profound thinkers, the Austro-Hungarian/British social theorist and economic historian Karl Polanyi, still provides in many valuable regards a crucial explanation of the ‘Political and Economic Origins of Our Time’ (the sub-title to his classic book first published in 1944). Polanyi was concerned with the unprecedented global impact of the distinctly modern notion of the self-regulating market and the accompanying rise of the liberal state, a set of ideas and institutions that began to emerge and be intellectually articulated in Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and which then came to exert a profound impact across the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – leaving a powerful historical legacy that is still with us today. In this sense, then, Britain indeed played a particularly important part in shaping global modernity, defined as the range of economic, political, social and cultural relations associated with the historical development of globalizing industrial capitalism. This importance was the result of the central fact that Britain came to play a leading role in shaping the modern world system through its pre-eminence in the second half of the eighteenth century and the long nineteenth century (especially in the period from the Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914).

For the purposes of this brief paper, it is perhaps enough to note that British history, and specifically the modern British history of the new set of socio-economic and political relations created by the Industrial Revolution, which he conceived of as producing a dangerous disembedding of economy and society, was central to Karl Polanyi’s seminal account of the development of the world order across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Polanyi, however, ‘the liberal state was itself a creation of the self-regulating market’.¹⁶ The competitive international state system and global order were shaped, in the view of Polanyi, by the ideas and institutions that came into existence in Britain in the nineteenth century. The central problem for British welfare policy was the management of poverty or rather, as explored by the influential English Marxist historian E.P. Thompson, the management and disciplining of the poor themselves, who constituted the essential labour force of capitalism in a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing country. ‘Without a large proportion of poverty there could be no riches in any country,’ Patrick Colquhoun argued in the early nineteenth century, ‘since riches are the offspring of labour, while labour can only result from a state of poverty.’ ‘It is indigence, therefore, and not poverty, which constitutes the chief burthen to which civil society is exposed,’ Colquhoun contended.¹⁷ Just as he had argued in his 1806 *Treatise on Indigence*, as part of concerted efforts to alter British welfare policy, and

¹⁵ Marks, *Origins of the Modern World*, 10: ‘Although we will also have to deal with the political, economic, and military dominance of Europe and its offshoots (e.g., the United States) for the past 200 years, there is no reason to think that that dominance was inevitable or, for that matter, that its dominance will continue. Indeed, it appears inevitable only because that storyline was centered on Europe. But once a broader, global perspective is adopted, the dominance of the West not only happens later in time, probably as late as 1750-1800 and perhaps not until the early nineteenth century, but it also becomes clearer that it was contingent on other developments that happened independently elsewhere in the world.’

¹⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 edition), 3.

¹⁷ Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire*, 110.

particularly the (old) Poor Law, Colquhoun reiterated in 1815 that, ‘As far as it is practicable, by means of *legislative regulations* and appropriate encouragements, the greatest possible proportion of the people should be placed in the class of productive labourers.’¹⁸ In a profound sense, then, for Colquhoun (and other ‘reformers,’ such as his friend Jeremy Bentham), poverty was actually a beneficial and even necessary condition of British industrial capitalist modernity.

In his superb study *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, C. A. Bayly, one of the leading scholars of British imperialism and its complex impact upon and interaction with global historical forces, highlights the notable interpretive development in recent years of the growing attention given by scholars, particularly historians and anthropologists, to the ‘institutions, ideologies, and economic changes which, according to contemporaries and many modern historians, reshaped the world of the nineteenth century’.¹⁹ ‘What, then, is meant by the “modern state,” and how did it differ from the great eighteenth-century polities,’ asks Bayly. ‘By the late nineteenth century, most regimes throughout the world were attempting to control closely defined territories by means of uniform administrative, legal, and educational structures,’ Bayly answers, ‘They wished to mark out with maps and surveys the extent of their resources and tax and utilize them in a coherent way.’²⁰ Again, we should note here that Colquhoun fits squarely within such a state-building project.²¹ This is pointed towards also by the prominent economic historian Angus Maddison, who depicts Colquhoun’s important contributions in historical demography and statistical analysis as those of the last of the great practitioners of political arithmetic.²²

A crucial implication of Bayly’s nuanced analysis, particularly for the central argument of this paper that there are major problems in adopting a historiographical perspective based primarily on the notion of British exceptionalism, is that Britain’s historical development can only be understood fully within a genuinely comparative framework. We can agree that British historical development, including in the crucial sphere of welfare policy, may have had distinctive features in terms of timing, for example. Clearly its precocious development of industrialization based upon the intensive employment of technology and other specific characteristics of socio-economic change and modernization was tremendously important.²³ This is best understood, however, within a comparative, and indeed *global*, framework. Ironically, at the heart of the long enduring exceptionalist paradigm of British (or perhaps, more often, specifically *English*) history is a lack of attention to the important transformations in the role and impact of the *state* as a historical actor. As Bayly notes, here we should identify a clear link between this mainstream

¹⁸ Ibid., 113. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁹ C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 247.

²⁰ Ibid., 247.

²¹ See my chapter ‘Leviathan’s Defenders: Scottish Historical Discourse and the Political Economy of Progress’ in Daniel Carey & Christopher Finlay, eds., *The Empire of Credit: The Financial Revolution in the British Atlantic World, 1700-1800* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, forthcoming).

²² See Angus Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 282-284.

²³ This is analyzed very usefully in Robert C. Allen, *The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

interpretive tradition in British historiography and its close cousin of American exceptionalism: ‘Fifty years ago, historical writing on the English-speaking world and its empires had little to say about the state as such.’ ‘On both sides of the Atlantic, the liberal tradition in political thought . . . was suspicious [of] or hostile to the growth of the state,’ Bayly notes, ‘It was thought to be something slightly sinister, which “continental” Europeans had invented.’²⁴

It is the contention of this paper that state formation must be a crucial heuristic theme in analyzing British historical development. Whilst, as Bayly warns, we should not emphasize the role of the state to the exclusion of other key historical actors and interpretive themes, it must receive significant and sustained treatment in order for us to understand adequately how British historical development can be usefully compared with and linked to (and in some regards even contrasted with, of course) the broader contours of historical development in Continental Europe and across the globe. One very important topic that we need to look at in this regard, of course, is the complex and controversial historical evolution of the role of the state as an agent in the management of poverty and public welfare in Britain, as this session reflects.

We noted earlier the major importance of Max Weber’s historical theorizing about the central characteristics of modernity. Especially relevant for us here is Weber’s explicit attention to the role of the liberal state as a historical actor. ‘For Max Weber, the state was on the whole a benign, impersonal entity which guaranteed civil order and progress,’ Bayly explains, ‘Its rise signaled the decline of mystical obsessions and dangerous forms of political charisma.’²⁵ C.A. Bayly discusses also the growing interest in the colonial-imperial state by both historians and anthropologists.²⁶ This is of particular relevance to British history and the problem of state formation and welfare policy in that most scholars would probably agree that the British colonial state was more authoritative (or indeed authoritarian) and centralized than that of metropolitan Britain itself. Although, one might caution that there may well have been rather more close links and parallels between the development of British imperial governance in the so-called colonial periphery and the domestic metropole than has been traditionally paid attention to, in fact. We should note in passing here that Colquhoun paid very significant attention to Empire and imperial policy throughout his career (having in fact begun his business life as an agent in Virginia for a Scottish transatlantic tobacco firm, and subsequently being a leading supporter of the Westminster government’s war with the American colonial rebels).

We should note also that Bayly draws valuable attention – although not altogether uncritically – to the powerful influence of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. ‘It is clear, though, that “statishness” could take a variety of forms in the nineteenth-century world,’ Bayly emphasizes, ‘This is the reason why some historians and social theorists, following the lead of Michel Foucault, now speak of governmentality in preference to state regulation.’²⁷ Governmentality is an important conceptual tool that has great relevance to an analysis of British state formation and the lessons of British (and broader global) historical development, in my opinion. In particular, it helps us to situate British historical development within

²⁴ Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 279.

²⁵ Ibid., 250.

²⁶ Ibid., 251.

²⁷ Ibid., 253.

a broader comparative framework that allows us to rethink major difficulties in the narrative of the evolution of the ideas, practices and institutions of modernity. By this comparative framework, it allows us also to draw attention to the myriad and striking ways in which British patterns link to and parallel Continental European historical development, especially in the specific area of the management of poverty and public welfare.

What does Foucault mean, though, when he conceptualizes this process of the historical development of governmentality? Foucault first articulated this notion of governmentality in his 1977-1978 lectures on 'Security, Territory and Population' at the College de France in Paris. Foucault defines governmentality chiefly in terms of 'The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.'²⁸ Foucault is concerned here chiefly with the genealogy of power and analyzes its dependence on particular forms of knowledge, or 'savoirs.' He traces this historically from the Renaissance discourses of governance and authority, beginning with thinkers such as Machiavelli, through the eighteenth-century conception of 'reason of state,' through to the historical emergence of the modern administrative state that developed in the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment world and then grew in striking ways during the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution – in which Britain was a crucial leading actor, of course. Foucault recognizes very explicitly, however, the complexity of this historical genealogy of state power.

We should perhaps turn very briefly here to the reception and adaptation of Foucault's conception of governmentality in the English-speaking world, and particularly how it came to exert a significant influence on historical and social scientific analysis of the constituent relations of modernity. Foucault's seminal lecture introducing the concept of governmentality was first published in English in 1979 in the journal *Ideology and Consciousness*. Along with other leading thinkers at the College de France, such as the Italian theorist Pasquale Pasquino in his essay 'Theatrum politicum: The genealogy of capital – police and the state of prosperity,' the methodology of Foucault focused, as Nikolas Rose, Pat O'Malley and Mariana Valverde explain in a very useful review article, on the 'new insights on political power that could be generated by a focus not on grand texts of political philosophy but on the more minor texts of political thinkers, polemicists, programmers, and administrators.'²⁹

Let us move on to focus more directly on an author whom some historians might regard as one of those 'political thinkers, polemicists, programmers, and administrators' noted above as significant to the historical development of the ideas and practices of governmentality. Many scholars might consider the magistrate and author Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820) a relatively minor figure. It is certainly the case that his contributions to the crucial historical topic of the management of poverty and the poor, and thus the broader issue of the evolution of the British state and public welfare, have not received great attention from British historians. The

²⁸ Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102.

²⁹ Nikolas Rose, Pat O'Malley & Mariana Valverde, 'Governmentality', *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* (2006), 2: 86.

contention of this paper is that Colquhoun was, in fact, a figure whose influential career is worthy of serious examination. Indeed, it is worth noting that, whilst he is a relatively neglected figure in much of mainstream British historiography, he has been the subject of valuable attention by criminologists, and especially specialists in the development of ‘modern’ policing.

The influence of Colquhoun is explained clearly by Mark Neocleous, writing in the *British Journal of Criminology* in 2000: ‘Colquhoun has long been a key figure for British “police studies”, in which he is frequently cited as one of the key thinkers behind the emergence of the New Police in 1829, or at least a thinker who put police and policing on the political agenda by writing about it at great length.’³⁰ Neocleous’s focus is rather different than this traditional concern with Patrick Colquhoun as a guiding light behind the development of ‘modern’ British policing, especially in the metropolis of London and for the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force by Sir Robert Peel in 1829. Neocleous stresses that we need to examine ‘the importance of poverty, indigence and political economy to Colquhoun’s understanding of police’.³¹ His central argument, with which I agree, is that Colquhoun’s many contributions across his long public career allow us to draw insights into broader issues that illuminate ‘the historical, political, and conceptual links between police and social policy as mechanisms for the fashioning of the market’.³² Another crucial facet of Colquhoun’s understanding of *police* is that it ties his thought on social policy and public welfare in to a wider European discourse of government and society, as Foucault also points us towards, which thus allows us to reflect further on the limitations of explanatory frameworks centred upon British exceptionalism. Neocleous comments that, ‘it is of course widely claimed that the idea of “police” was for centuries alien to British yet common to Continental political discourse, and that this is why Britain had no “organized” police to speak of’.³³ In fact, Neocleous makes the convincing point that there are strong links between Continental European discourses and what might best be termed public ‘policy’ in Britain. Moreover, a reading of Colquhoun’s major contributions to this area of social thought and the formulation of programmes for the prevention of crime and the management of the poor reveals that they often drew explicitly on Continental models such as the police force in eighteenth-century Paris.

Who was Patrick Colquhoun, then, and why should we consider him as a figure worthy of fuller study in order to illuminate the important topic of crime, poverty and public welfare in a revolutionary age? Colquhoun was born in Dumbarton, Scotland during the very significant year 1745, the date of the outbreak of the last major Jacobite rebellion against the Hanoverian British state. A date that has often been seen since as marking symbolically the decisive overthrow and defeat of the traditional clan-based society of the Gaelic-speaking population in the Highlands of Scotland and its replacement by a new, ‘modern’ order of commercial capitalism cemented and guaranteed by the extension of the authority of the Westminster Parliament in London. Colquhoun achieved considerable prominence and renown in his homeland of Scotland, in fact, most notably in the city that another famous Scottish political economist and theorist of the new order of commercial modernity,

³⁰ Mark Neocleous, ‘Social Police and the Mechanisms of Prevention: Patrick Colquhoun and the Condition of Poverty’, *British Journal of Criminology* (2000), Volume 40, pg.710.

³¹ Ibid., 710.

³² Ibid., 710.

³³ Ibid., 722.

Adam Smith, resided in during the key period of his intellectual development: Glasgow.

Scotland's centre of business and overseas trade, Glasgow, was important in the 18th Century, however, not merely as site of the University at which Adam Smith formulated the ideas that he would distil into his classic book *The Wealth of Nations* (published in 1776). It was also home to one of the earliest professional urban police forces in Britain, founded in 1779 (although it went through various trials and tribulations before being officially licensed by an Act of Parliament in 1800). Moreover, Patrick Colquhoun played a leading role in public life in the city, where he was the founding chairman of the Chamber of Commerce (one of the oldest in the world) and Lord Provost (the Scottish equivalent of mayor) between 1782 and 1784. He became increasingly drawn to the centre of British political and economic power in London, though, having travelled there on many occasions to carry out lobbying and to play a role in the setting up of the House of Commons standing committee on trade. Eventually, in 1792, he was appointed by the government as a stipendiary magistrate in the East End of London.³⁴

Colquhoun's career as a magistrate in London's commercial heartland of the East End, where a new urban working class presented to concerned men like him an enormous challenge in terms of work discipline, crime and public welfare, spurred him to make a significant contribution to the theory and practice of policing the problems of poverty during the early historical development of 'modern' market capitalism. His ideas contributed to the crucial debates about welfare policy in the decades before the decisive turning point of the New Poor Law in 1834, which resulted in the overthrow of the Speenhamland regulations and thus the crucial development of a 'free' market in labour in Britain (a hugely significant development emphasized in the work of Karl Polanyi).

The new problems of poverty created by wage labour capitalism in both the countryside and, especially, the rapidly growing urban centres that developed in later eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britain, and the challenges that these created for government at both a local and central level were the vital context for Colquhoun's important impact on British welfare history. 'Colquhoun has been badly served by the intellectual poverty induced by the excessive specialization within the social sciences: he should be read for his influence on the new poor law [of 1834] and the history of social policy as much as he is for his influence on the new police,' argues Mark Neocleous.³⁵ It was Colquhoun who first developed "police as a science" in England and formulated a precise panoply of preventive security measures,' the Canadian sociologist John L. McMullan notes, 'And it was Colquhoun who refigured police into a distinct *techne* of State social control.'³⁶ Like Mark Neocleous, John McMullan emphasizes, correctly, that, 'Colquhoun wrote extensively on political economy, education, law, poverty and poor relief.'³⁷ Indeed, not only did Colquhoun write a series of tracts that helped him to achieve a

³⁴ There is an article on Colquhoun by Ruth Paley in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). This gives a good summary of his thought and career, although her overall assessment of Colquhoun's influence is rather different to my own view.

³⁵ Neocleous, 'Social Police and the Mechanisms of Prevention', 724.

³⁶ John L. McMullan, 'Social surveillance and the rise of the "police machine"', *Theoretical Criminology* (1998), vol.2 (1), 104.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

considerable degree of public acclaim, and the bestowal of an honorary doctorate by the University of Glasgow, he played a key role (along with another magistrate, John Harriott, and the English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham) in the foundation of the Thames river police. This police force was set up with private support, from the West India merchants, in 1798, and it subsequently received statutory backing from Parliament in 1800. In other words, this institution of the Thames River Police might be interpreted as embodying the crucial and complex historical evolution of the relationship between private and public roles in welfare and broader socio-economic policy.

To conclude, then, perhaps it is best to try to draw together some very brief reflections on the broad themes outlined in this paper. The central contention of this presentation has been that we need to do our best to treat very seriously the limitations of an exceptionalist paradigm in British historiography. This is vital to comprehend more fully the historical development of the characteristic economic, political, social and cultural relations of modernity, and their complex and contested relationship to the processes of British state formation. This becomes even more apparent when we begin to re-consider the larger exceptionalist interpretive framework of Western modernity and global historical development. Attention to the notion of governmentality is especially helpful for British historians, particularly for those examining how the British state in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sought to address the challenges constituted by the conditions of the new wage labour class that was created by industrialization and urbanization. The problems of poverty, or management of the poor, addressed by figures such as the influential author and magistrate Patrick Colquhoun in his elaborate schemes of policing and education, represent a particularly fruitful area in order to re-frame our broader understanding of the lessons of British historical development in the key sphere of welfare and social policy.

Charity and Poor Law: a Comparison between Britain and Japan
---*The Charity of Meiji Japan under the Western Impact,*
*1868-1912*¹

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Introduction

Since 1990s it has been increasingly a matter of course to argue that the simple linear model of the history of the welfare state, from the irrational and exclusive charity/poor laws to the rational and inclusive state provision, is no longer valid, and that welfare has in fact always consisted of the variety of sources such as families, neighbours, kins, communities, charities, mutual aid institutions, government and law, and market (the mixed economy of welfare). There were, in fact, a number of different patterns of welfare².

In this historiographical context, this paper tries to show some aspects of 'JIZEN', or charitable activities³ in Meiji Japan (1868-1912) from a comparative point of view. The aim here is to sketch the building process of 'jizen' or Japanese charities under Western/Christian influence, and then evaluate their uniqueness by comparing them with the British charities, which were known even for the contemporary Japanese to be one of the world's largest.

There are several weighty historical studies on the development of the Japanese social welfare system, and this paper owes a great deal to these books and articles⁴. Nevertheless, I might still be able to claim certain merits of my argument here. First, it is free from either the Whiggish or the Marxist perspective, which permeates most of the historiography of welfare in Japan⁵. Second, it focuses upon the charity, which has been undervalued. Thirdly, it takes into consideration the ways of Western Impact and attempts some Anglo-Japanese comparison.

¹ The full version of this paper ('Wohltätigkeit und westlicher Einfluss im Japan der Meiji-Zeit, 1868-1912') is in in the following collected essays. R. Liedtke / K. Weber (Hg.), *Religion und Philanthropie in den europäischen Zivilgesellschaften: Entwicklungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Paderborn 2009, pp. 174-200.

² Christoph Sachsse/Michael B. Katz (eds.), *The mixed economy of social welfare: public/private relations in England, Germany and the United States, the 1870's to the 1930's*, Baden-Baden 1996. Hugh Cunningham/Joanna Innes (eds.), *Charity, Philanthropy and Reform: From the 1690s to 1850*, London 1998. Martin Daunton (ed.), *Charity, Self-Interest and Welfare in the English Past*, London 1996. Peter Mandler (ed.), *The Uses of Charity: The Poor on Relief in Nineteenth-Century Metropolis*, Philadelphia 1990.

³The term 'charity' as a translation of 'jizen' is used here to mean the benevolent deeds of helping those in need motivated by the religious or moral conviction.

⁴Especially, see Ikeda Yoshimasa, *Nihon Shakai-Fukushi-Shi*, Kyoto 1986.

⁵Not to speak of Ikeda, the other leading scholar also view the history of welfare as a process of progress. Yoshida Kyuichi, *Shin Nihon Shakajigyo No Rekishi*, Kyoto 2004.

1. Japan and its relationship with the West

The Tokugawa Shogunate reigned Japan from 1603 through the close surveillance and the subjugation of provincial half-independent territories of daimyo, or feudal lords. It limited the foreign communications and trades to less than a handful of countries such as China, Korea, and Holland so that it might not be over-influenced by the West and the outer world. Consequently, for as long as more than two hundred and fifty years, Tokugawa Japan achieved a relative stability⁶.

Things began to change in 1853 when the American fleet appeared off the coast of Uraga and forced the Tokugawa government to open the ports. Since then various political interests first argued and struggled over whether they should keep the traditional isolation policy or not. They finally divided the country roughly into the Pro-Tokugawa and Pro-Emperor factions. After the 'return' of political power to the Emperor by the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867, tensions and disagreements between them in the end crossed the critical threshold to erupt into a civil war the next year, which the Pro-Emperor side finally won. Newly established imperial government, in the name of the Meiji Emperor, declared the Restoration in 1867-8.

The relatively young politicians leading this country at that time found the model states to be followed among such highly industrialized and militarily strong Western countries like Britain, Germany, France and the U.S.A. A lot of able and promising Japanese were dispatched to Europe and America to study the 'advanced' social, educational, and political systems and institutions as well as sciences and humanities, while engineers, architects, scholars, and teachers were invited from those countries.

Soon after Japan opened the door to the western countries and its polity was drastically transformed, it had to face the serious problem of poverty especially in urban areas: slums were growing, crime rate soared, vagrants and beggars swarmed the streets, juvenile delinquency was prevalent, orphans increased, and so on. It was just the same situation experienced by many European and American 'advanced' industrialized countries. Quite naturally for the contemporary Japanese leaders, the prescription to tackle this social problem was also sought after in Western countries. And the answer was the practice of poor relief composed of poor laws and private charities.

Meiji Japan did not provide as much of a safety net as the English Poor Laws, which, though condemned as cruel and cold, legally gave every pauper the right to be relieved either in his/her residence or workhouse. Instead, the Japanese imperial government established '*Jutsukyu-Kisoku*', or The Regulation of Poor Relief in 1874, which allowed the very paltry sum to be given only to the destitute single person⁷. Since the chronically money-short central government adamantly kept refusing to disburse any significant amount of money towards the maintenance of the poor, so the other recourse, that is, the private charity, was looked after. Although, from well before the Tokugawa period, there had been some practices which could be taken as charities, yet, as is explained later, it was keenly felt that Japan had no active charitable work equal to the Western ones⁸. So they turned their eyes outside Japan.

⁶For an overview of the Edo period, see *Taikei Nihon No Rekishi*, vols. 9, 10 and 11, Tokyo 1993.

⁷For the full text of this statute and its evaluation, see Kimura Takeo, *Nihon Kindai Shakaijigyo Shi*, Kyoto 1964, pp.14-21.

⁸The early history of Japanese welfare is finely explained in Ikeda, *op.cit.*, pp.43-130. Or, although combined with the ancient myth and tainted by the self-advertisement, the

While some missionaries from France, Britain, the U.S.A., and Canada had already established several charitable orphanages and hospitals in Japan to exhibit the example of the western charities, and books and articles on poor relief were imported, studied, and translated, several Japanese dared to cross the ocean to visit America and Europe in order to acquire the up-to-date information and the first-hand experience of the western relief activities. With his 1908 voyage across Britain and continental Europe, Tanaka Taro shows us an example of a Japanese ‘philanthropic tour⁹. In the spring of that year, this statistician and ex-employee of the Home Department was staying in London and studying various practices of British philanthropy and its poor law administration. He then travelled around several continental countries to observe many public and private relief institutions¹⁰. The itinerary during this journey testifies to his impressive energy and extensive curiosity. The places he visited include the famous Elberfeld, Bethel in Bielefeld, Munich, Montesson, and Paris. In this way, the Japanese in the Meiji period always diligently observed and learned various relief systems in America and Europe, which were for them so alien but so desirable.

2. Charities in Meiji Japan and Britain

Then, what was the actual situation of charitable activities in Japan in the Meiji period? Here we examine several statistics from Japan and Britain, so as to ascertain the Japanese charities in both absolute and relative terms.

In Japan, we have a fine statistical table, originally compiled from a Report of the Government Investigation and published to a learned journal by Nunokawa Magoichi in 1915. It probably provides the most accurate statistical information on Japanese charities in 1911¹¹.

Next, in Britain, we have two statistics on the subscription charities at the turn of the century: the one was the private compilation¹², the other was predicated upon the governmental investigation, quite exceptional in Britain¹³. One caution is that

following rare book written in English may be a good introduction to the subject during the long period from the imaginary founding date of a nation to the eve of the World War I. *The Relief Work of Japan*, published by Bureau for Local Affairs, Home Department, Japan, 1914.

⁹The aspect of the Britons traveling around and communicating with other Western countries in order to study certain famous or useful charitable practices is a relatively new field of research. Two pioneering works are included in Cunningham/Innes (eds.), *op.cit.*: Katherine Lloyd/Cindy Burgoine, ‘The evolution of a transatlantic debate on penal reform, 1780-1830’, pp.208-27, and David Turley, ‘The Anglo-American Unitarian connection and urban poverty’, pp.228-42.

¹⁰‘Tairiku Shakaijigyo Shisatsu Nikki’ (A Observation Diary of the Continental Social Work), in: Tanaka Taro, *Taisei Shakaijigyo Shisatsu-Ki*, Tokyo 1911, pp.349-436. For Tanaka’s brief biography and his historical significance, see Katoda Keiko, ‘Tanaka Taro Cho “Taisei Shakaijigyo Sisatsu-Ki” Kaisetsu’, in: *Senzenki Shakaijigyo Kihon Bunken Shu*, 21 (which includes a facsimile edition of the book), Tokyo 1995, pp.1-14.

¹¹Nunokawa, Magoichi, ‘Toukeijo Yori Mitaru Kanka-Kyusai-Jigyo’ (A Statistical Analysis of Reformatories and other Relief Works), in: *Kyusai Kenkyu*, 3-6 (1915), pp. 62-75, and 3-7(1915), pp. 51-71.

¹²*Burdett's Hospitals and Charities*, London 1909, pp.80-1, and 1912, pp.80-85.

¹³Probably, this is the first official computation of subscription charities. Parliamentary Papers 1910 LIV, *Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. Appendix Volume XXVI. Documents relating more especially to the Administration of Charities*, pp.74-6.

these tables do not include the endowed charities, which, as early as the late 19th century, already had numbered upwards of 37,000 with the total annual income of 2.2 million pounds in England and Wales alone¹⁴.

It would be helpful to provide some basic data. First, the population of Japan in 1910 was 49.8 million while that of the United Kingdom in 1911 was 45.3 million. Secondly, the ratio of the rural population in Japan was still 67.2% in 1888, while, in the U.K., it diminished to only 22% in 1901. And thirdly, the Pound-Yen exchange rate was about 1 to 10 in 1911.

According to these statistics, the development of the Japanese charity had accelerated since the end of the 19th century. However, the total number of 550 in 1911 is dwarfed when contrasted with the British relief works; the enormous 2,500 or so subscription charities, as well as tens of thousands of endowed charities and the comprehensive poor law administration.

As for the actual situation of Japanese charities, there are several distinctive characteristics. In terms of both the number and the financial size, 'Orphanage', 'Special Education', 'Medical Treatment', and 'Reformatory' stand out, contrasted with the scarcity of institutions for 'Women' and 'the Aged'. It is probably because the latter two categories were believed at that time to be protected and maintained within the family, whereas the former ones were regarded as beyond reach of the family. Also different is the educational charities, which were, in Japan, mostly confined to the basic instruction and training for the disabled children, while, in Britain, especially endowed charities had a very long tradition of providing the public in general with not only elementary but also secondary and higher education.

And, 272 out of 550 institutions were operated by less than 5 people. Therefore the aggregate annual scale of finances were as small as 2.5 million yen, or 0.25 million pounds, while, in the U.K., subscription charities alone could manage well over 12 million pounds.

Thus, although Japan increased the amount of charities and extended the area covered by them after the Meiji Restoration, it did not flourish as in the West.

3. Ideologies of Charity

How did the Japanese perceive the reality of charities outlined above? In this section, we focus upon the texts of four important writers of the day on charity and public relief in order to shed light on this aspect. Firstly, ***The Charity Problem*** (1898) by **Tomeoka Kosuke** (1864-1934)¹⁵, the pioneer of the charity studies and of the reformative work. Secondly, ***An Observation on the Social Works in Europe*** (1911) by **Tanaka Taro** (1870-1932)¹⁶, the philanthropic tourist mentioned above. Thirdly, '***A Statistical Analysis of Reformatories and other Relief Works***' (1915) by **Nunokawa Magoichi** (1870-1944)¹⁷, one of the earliest leading sociologists. And fourthly, ***The***

¹⁴Parliamentary Papers 1877 LXVI, *General Digest of Endowed Charities in England and Wales*, pp.13-5. Parliamentary Papers 1878 XXIV, *25th Report of The Charity Commissioners for England and Wales*, p.3.

¹⁵Tomeoka Kosuke, *Jizen Mondai*, Tokyo 1898. For his brief biography, see Doi Youichi, 'Tomeoka Kousuke, "Jizen Mondai" Kaisetsu', in: *Senzenki Shakaijigyo Kihon Bunken Shu 16* (which includes a facsimile edition of the book), Tokyo 1995, pp.1-8.

¹⁶Taisei Shakaijigyo Shisatsu-Ki.

¹⁷Nunokawa, *op.cit.*

Elements of Social Work (1924) by **Namae Takayuki** (1867-1957)¹⁸, ‘the father of social work’.

All these four texts share the unique understanding on charities and public relief in Japan and the West, while, at the same time, seen in order of publication, they show the changing notions about poor relief in general, and indicate the course Japan would take for the development of the relief work.

(a) Religion

These writers observed that the difference of religious background affected the stagnant situation of charities in Japan.

During his stay in the U.S.A., Tomeoka had been deeply impressed by the liveliness of its charities based on ‘the deep Christian faith’, so that he believed, ‘if we want to increase charities more and make them more effective we cannot help turning to the power of Christianity for assistance’¹⁹. For him, as a Christian, the indigenous Buddhism and Shintoism seemed quite worthless in this field. Rather, their charities, if any, were harmful because they gave wrongly²⁰. The same was felt by Tanaka, who, exclaiming ‘what on earth are the adherents of Buddhism doing now’, urged the ‘awakening’ of the seemingly dormant Buddhist bodies²¹.

Actually, as Nunokawa remarked in 1915, ‘so far, any one of the famous well-known charitable enterprises in our country has had a Christian tinge, and it is observed that the Buddhists rather have lagged behind the Christians in establishing such institutions’²². However, he was also aware of the danger of a kind of cultural/political imperialism disguised as a pure religion. He condemned the Catholic priests coming to Japan in the late 16th century as having had ‘the ulterior political motives’ which caused the subsequent total ban of Christianity under the long Tokugawa Shogunate regime. Even now, contrary to their beneficial existence in Japan, ‘in the present China and Korea, there are some missionaries with political and economic intentions in mind’²³.

Such ambivalence toward Christianity is also found in Namae’s discourse in 1924. He attributed the relative absence of charities for the aged to another Japanese half-indigenous moral and value system, Confucianism. As ‘the breach of filial devotion brings about the severest social sanction and offends our moral perception most deeply, and, at the same time, the spirit of respect for old age has been nurtured’, Japan, he thought, did not have to rely on such relief works for the aged as practiced by Christian countries²⁴.

As time went by, therefore, we can discern, among those four persons’ views, the shift from the uncritical approbation to the cautious reservation, if not rejection, of Christianity as a driving force for charities²⁵.

¹⁸Shakaijigyo Koyo, Tokyo. For his brief biography, see Ichibangase Yasuko, ‘Namae Takayuki, “Shakaijigyo Koyo” Ni Tsuite’, in: *Senzenki Shakaijigyo Kihonbunkenshū 28* (which includes a facsimile edition of the book), Tokyo 1996, pp.1-9.

¹⁹Tomeoka, *op.cit.*, p.39.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p.48.

²¹Tanaka, *op.cit.*, p.447.

²²Nunokawa, *op.cit.*, p.705.

²³*Ibid.*, p.835.

²⁴Namae, *op.cit.*, p.103.

²⁵Furthermore, Buddhists were gradually beginning to set up various charitable works from the mid Meiji era. See Nawa Tsukinosuke, ‘Meiji Chuki Ni Okeru Bukkyo Jizenjigyo No

(b) Family

These four writers also found in Japan the ambivalent ‘good’ custom of familism or communalism, which seemed to lessen the financial burden of public relief but at the same time prevent the growth of private voluntary charities.

In 1898, Tomeoka noticed a difference between the Japanese and ‘the people in western countries’, who were ‘so highly advanced and developed that they themselves voluntarily do their duty without any supervision nor direction from the government’. He thought the Japanese behaved, on the contrary, ‘at the government’s beck and call’²⁶. The lack of the independent spirit necessary for the active charitable works was taken for granted, and slightly regretted.

However, Tanaka went further away from a naïve adoration of the West to find out a more fundamental root of difference in the system of the family. In England, ‘every parent, child, and brother is taken as an independent individual.... Even if a parent is about to be chargeable to the public, the child is not necessarily forced to relieve and maintain him/her’. But, in Japan, he described satirically,

‘when a man works hard and earns some money, not only his wife, children and parents, but also his brothers and sisters as well as his relatives all gather around him and gnaw off his shank [i.e. depend upon him].... As a natural consequence of such customs and manners of the nation, we have very few paupers who receive public relief. In short, those who cannot support themselves are, in our country, relieved by the united efforts of their traditional kinsfolk lest they become chargeable to society.... In other words, every family has its own workhouse in it.’²⁷

He doubted the endurance of this habit. ‘We might be greatly proud of it against the foreign countries’, but ‘we cannot rely exclusively upon this beautiful custom’.²⁸ He thought it inevitable for the out-of-date ‘family system’ to be replaced with the more up-to-date individualism, though it does not mean that he was pleased with the tendency.

Namae also pointed out ‘the family system’, along with ‘the customary system of the cordial mutual aid among the neighbourhood’, as the main cause of ‘the demand for charitable works having been held in check naturally’²⁹.

Thus four authors all realized the difference of the social structure between Japan and Western countries, while the emphasis has shifted gradually from the advantage of Western individualism to that of Japanese familism/communalism. Even though they shared the hope that relief works took root in Japan, a sense of rivalry against the West played a part to seek to identify some unique national virtues³⁰.

(c) Organization

Four writers knew very well that the charities and their supporters in Japan

²⁶Keisei Ni Tsuite, in: *Shitennoji Kokusai Bukkyo Daigaku Kiyo, Daigakuin*, 4(2005), pp. 29-44.

²⁷Tomeoka, *op.cit.*, pp.89-90.

²⁸Tanaka, *op.cit.*, pp. 324-5.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p.450.

³⁰Namae, *op.cit.*, p.15.

³⁰For more thorough discussion, Oguri Katsuya, ‘Meiji Makki Fukushi-Ron Ni Miru Oubeirekkyo Eno Taikoishiki—Chuo-Jizen-Kyokai “Jizen” Wo Chusin Ni’, in: *Hogaku Kenkyu* (Keio Univ.), 74-10(2001), pp.27-64.

were not many enough compared with those in Europe and America, which is statistically proven in the foregoing analysis. As was shown above, some of the reasons were spotted in either religious or social background, and the fact of the relative stasis/stagnation of Japanese charities was recognized and basically regretted, regardless of the increasing insistence on their unique, or superior, way of dealing with the social problem.

'Our charities seem to be quite few compared with western countries', lamented Tomeoka, 'looking into the present state of our charities, it is surprising that they are still dispirited and at a low ebb.'³¹ Tanaka saw 'quite numerous private charitable institutions' in Britain. Many private charitable hospitals' made him 'envious'³². Nunokawa recalled the pre-Sino-Japanese War period to describe the relief work at that time as 'very primitive' and the benevolent persons as 'few', 'odd', and 'strange'³³. And, as late as in 1924, Namae observed,

In the European countries, there had already been multitudes of charitable institutions well before the establishment of the present industrial organizations, while in Japan, to say nothing of the situation in the feudal age, we have even now quite a small number of them compared with those in Europe.³⁴

One of the main driving forces for the charity organization movement in England and the United States since the late 1860s was the awareness of the problem of 'too many' redundant charities. As one article in *The Times* put it:

...the one thing needful was organization, in the sense of union, concert, and economical combination. How is it possible, or even conceivable, that as many as one thousand separate and distinct Societies should be required in a single city [i.e. London], however populous, for the one work of Charity?...[the number of societies required for all charitable works in London] will not reach one-third of the institutions or associations actually maintained. ...³⁵

But these four Japanese writers, all conscious of the smallness of Japanese charities, sought to introduce the very idea of 'organization', learned mainly from the American charity organization societies which were, in turn, patterned after the original London C.O.S., into Japanese society where charities are rather wanting.

Tomeoka, for example, desired to introduce 'the scientific charitable work'³⁶ to Japan. He witnessed the up-to-date charity organization in the 1890s' America, and must have understood clearly the main target of this movement, that is, too many indiscriminate and redundant charities. Probably for this reason, he once made a statement about the present situation of charities in Japan inconsistent with his understanding as mentioned above: 'charities in our country. ...are too numerous to enumerate'.³⁷ He was so eager to carry out the charity organization movement in Japan that he might have, unconsciously or knowingly, misrepresented the quantity

³¹Tomeoka, *op.cit.*, pp. 39, 89.

³²Tanaka, *op.cit.*, pp.329, 335.

³³Nunokawa, *op.cit.*, p.699.

³⁴Namae, *op.cit.*, p.15.

³⁵*The Times*, 13/2/1869.

³⁶Tomeoka, *op.cit.*,pp.xxi-xxii.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p.26.

of Japanese charities. This longing for organization can be found in the discourse of Tanaka as well³⁸.

These consistent desires for organization bore fruit. Japan more or less ‘succeeded’ from 1900s onward in organizing charities as *Shakai-Jigyo* [it literally means ‘social work’] from above. The first National Conference of Charitable Works was organized by some private individuals and the Home Department’s bureaucrats, and held in Osaka in 1903. Five years later, *Chuo-Jizen-Kyokai*, a kind of Charity Organisation Society, was established again under the initiative of the Home Department and some political and industrial heavyweights. And, based on the Meiji Emperor’s grant of 1.5 million yen, an imperial foundation ‘*Saiseikai*’ was established to provide the medical treatment with the poor. This grand institution was presided by the incumbent prime minister and managed by the Home Department and local authorities. It collected among the people a huge sum of 25.85 million yen, or 2.5 million pounds in 1912³⁹. Compared with the total expenditure of 550 charities in 1911 (0.25 million pounds), it is evident that the initiative of Emperor and the Government was much preferred or taken seriously by the Japanese giving public.

Moreover, as Namae wrote in retrospect, the private charities dominant in Japanese relief works until the breakout of the World War I gave ground to the public ‘social work’ after the great Rice Riot in 1918. Then he observed, ‘looking at the present private charitable works [in 1924], their spirit has almost dried up. ...the public social works are daily becoming more active.’⁴⁰ In this way, since the early 20th century on, the growth of Japanese relief works was to be achieved through organization, not among themselves, but from the authority.

Conclusion

This situation was fundamentally different from the one in Britain. There, the C.O.S. was always surrounded by hatred, distrust, and suspicion from the existing charitable institutions⁴¹. And private charities continued to flourish individually and randomly despite of the wish of the C.O.S. for organizing and downsizing, which nevertheless, to some extent, contributed to the later development of the welfare state. It is a historical irony that the charity organization was realized in Japan where there were relatively small amount of charities.

In conclusion, what can we see from this brief history of charity and public relief in the Meiji period? Simply stated, it was a dynamic process of acculturation and alienation of the Western idea and practice of poor relief. Japan had had the tradition of her own charities, but the philanthropy practiced in the Western societies seemed superior and advanced. The Japanese then made a great effort to transplant it into their soil. In that process, some took root, some failed, and certain Japanese characteristics such as Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism and familism/communalism were (re-) discovered. These in turn caused various

³⁸Tanaka, *op.cit.*, pp.438-9.

³⁹As for these historical facts, see Ikeda (1986), *op.cit.*, pp.374-87.

⁴⁰Namae, *op.cit.*, pp.39, 53-55.

⁴¹There are many references to the adversity towards the London C.O.S. For example, see *Charity, A Record of Philanthropic Enterprise*, 1-1(1886), pp.2-3, and 1-2(1886), p.30. *The Charity Organisation Review*, 4-71(1890), p.413. *Charity Organisation Review, new ser.* 20-115(1906), p.10.

responses to the Western philanthropy, ranging from the direct reception in condemnation of the Japanese way, through the eclectic adaptation, to the outright rejection in favour of Buddhist charities, for instance. The result was the development after the 1900s. The Japanese were, quite ironically, encouraged by the government to ‘voluntarily’ ‘serve’ the family, community, country, and emperor⁴². This would foster the Japanese propensity to rely on the authority on the one hand and the family on the other⁴³. After the World War II, there emerged the third institution to be relied upon, that is, the company. In the twentieth-first century, however, it seems that neither the government, the family, nor the company can provide us with the necessary security.

⁴²From about 1908, the Japanese government started the so-called ‘local improvement movement’, which inculcated the ordinary people with the importance of the ‘public spirit’ and the rich ones with the moral duty to use their resources and powers for the benefit of the others. Tomeoka himself was deeply engaged in this movement as a temporary of the Home Department. See Kaneda Reiko, *Fukushi-Jissen Ni Kaketa Senkusha-Tachi*, Tokyo 2003, pp.57-94.

⁴³ In Britain, charity was generally seen as ‘the social duty of every man of wealth and leisure’. The influential T. H. Green’s Idealism further ‘incorporated philanthropy as one of the obligations of the ‘active’ citizen’. Keir Waddington, *Charity and the London Hospitals 1850-1898*, Woodbridge 2000, pp.29-30.

Two Kinds of Collectivism in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century Britain: Conservative Collectivism and Socialist Collectivism

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Introduction

The general impression of 19th century Britain is that Britain was at the zenith of its prosperity in its entire history. Britain emerged as a world factory being a forerunner after Industrial Revolution with the empire expanding continuously.

But as time approaches the end of the century the fact was revealed that Britain was riddled with various problems. The social research conducted by Charles Booth about the state of poverty in London in 1889 and the other research conducted by Seeböhm Rowntree on York's social state in 1899 showed that almost 1/3 of the city population were suffering from chronic poverty. The London dock strike of 1889 which was led by unskilled workers disclosed that the labour problem has reached a serious stage. The land problem was also exposed in *Progress and Poverty* by Henry George that criticized the land system of Britain.

Some people armed with laissez-faire doctrine kept the opinion that everything would be attributed to the individual responsibility and all the problems could be resolved spontaneously when they are let loose. Lord Wemyss who represented the Liberty and Property Defense League insisted on this kind of argument.

But actually various opinions which endorse intervention were suggested from major political factions.¹ The political parties like the Conservatives, the Liberal-Unionists, the Liberals and the multifarious socialist groups all came up with such ideas. These opinions were sometimes generalized all as socialist ideas. But such a generalization would dismiss the differences of the political background of the parties as well as the differences in the theoretical dimensions. Thus it would be more proper to encompass these opinions as collectivism that embraces socialism.

Although collectivistic alternatives were suggested the concrete proposals were all different on the questions like "who is to intervene?" and "how to intervene?" In spite of such differences these alternatives became to be gradually related to the diverse institutions and policies that would be regarded as social welfare. In this article the collectivism based on conservatism and the other collectivism based on socialism would be examined in relation to the public intervention and social reform. And the elements of the historical continuity in these ideas would be also taken into consideration.

1. Conservative Collectivism

1) Unionism of F. E. Smith

It was F. E. Smith, who led the Unionist Social Reform Committee, that has come up with the conservative collectivism. His perspective was very decisive as to create the

¹ The suggestion for state intervention is related to the growth of political democracy in Britain.

argument that the Unionist Social Reform Committee was more socialistic than Lloyd George.² F. E. Smith was even suspected to be a social democrat.³

His collectivism was rooted on the so-called Unionism. He argued that Conservative Party should adopt Unionism as its ideology as Labour Party is championed by socialism.⁴ He contrasted Unionism with other ideologies. Firstly he refuted individualism.⁵ The logic of individualists was regarded as a queer mixture of Rousseau, Bentham and Darwin. Natural man was perfect. And established church and central government should be abolished according to individualists' logic. The restriction on free competition should be removed while the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people is increasing. Governmental support should not be allowed to the losers in free competition.⁶

F. E. Smith dismissed this kind of logic as unreasonable assumption. He didn't regard human being as the existence that only struggle each other rejecting the concept of natural man. He argued that human being is equipped with the capability of combination and sacrifice as well as the disposition of self-help. The social instinct of combination and association functioned as a strong force organizing church and state in the historical process.⁷

Secondly F. E. Smith refuted the logic of laissez-faire which was the economic base of individualism. Although the doctrine of laissez-faire was maintaining that the unfit would be eliminated through the process of struggle for survival, he argued, it was vulnerable to contradiction. Because the existence of the unfit itself shouldn't be negated. In this context laissez-faire was just aggravating social problems with heavy burdens on penitentiary, hospitals, asylum, police, outdoor relief etc.⁸

F. E. Smith suggested that intervention would be better than the heavy costs these bodies would incur.⁹ The proper and reasonable intervention was desirable even in the aspect of competitiveness and efficiency. The individuals could be recovered by wise assistance while absolute poverty would just destroy all motivations for labour. He juxtaposed savoir-faire against laissez-faire. He defined the policy of savoir-faire as a policy of cultivating civilian creativity and granting a chance to civilians for contributing to national finance.¹⁰

Thirdly he compared unionism with socialism and radicalism. He argued that his idea was in opposition to socialism and radicalism rather than being synchronizing with them.¹¹ The reasons were enumerated. Those ideologies demanded the intervention of nation in every matter and attempted to intervene in the improper method¹² and intended to break the continuity and security of nation

² Jane Ridley, "The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914: Wets before the Deluge," *The Historical Journal*, vol. 30, no. 2(1987)

³ John Campbell, "F. E. Smith: Tory Democrat or Social Democrat?" *History Today*, vol.32(May 1982)

⁴ John Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*(London, 1983), p.348.

⁵ Ibid, p.357.

⁶ F. E. Smith, *Unionist Policy and Other Essays*(London, 1913), p.26.

⁷ Ibid., p.28.

⁸ Ibid., p.35.

⁹ The attitude of the people for state intervention itself is an interesting subject. At first, state intervention was unpopular as it was involved in compulsory education and temperance. Martin Pugh, "Popular Conservatism in Britain: Continuity and Change, 1880-1987," *Journal of British Studies* 27(July 1988), p.278.

¹⁰ Smith, *Unionist Policy*, pp..38-39.

¹¹ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, p.357.

¹² Smith, *Unionist Policy*, p.25.

and pursued the policy of class hostility and confrontation.¹³ The most serious mistake of socialism and radicalism was the class-based intervention of nation and the attempt of demolishing the national continuity although they are stressing the role of nation.

Unionism existed between individualism that ignored cooperation and sacrifice and socialism that ignored the desire for competition.¹⁴ The peculiarities of unionism were suggested as standing in the middle ground.

2) Collectivistic Policy and the Unionist Social Reform Committee

The collectivism of F. E. Smith was opposed to the internal policy of laissez-faire and the overseas policy of free trade. The opposition to free trade was materialized into the concrete proposal of tariff reform. Tariff reform was advocated as a measure of securing and protecting the British market. Furthermore it was regarded as constituting a part of broad policy that is solidifying the empire and promoting the imperial unity.

Tariff reform would grant direct benefits to labourers. F. E. Smith's logic is like this. If import were restricted by tariff, the British manufacturers would be equipped with more security. This would attract the capital which would have been invested overseas otherwise. The increase of internal investment would lead to low price and more production in the nation. Thus Britain could compete in the overseas market with more favorable conditions. As a result the demand for labour would increase and the workers would get better wages.¹⁵

F. E. Smith thought that the principle of laissez-faire also should be revised. This principle was applied to the competing individuals while the principle of free trade was applied to the competing industries.¹⁶ The protection of trade and the protection of society were complementary expression of same principle. He was in a position that peasants and workers shouldn't be exploited. Government should intervene in this kind of matters recognizing the importance of their works for the preservation of state.¹⁷

The proposal of the Unionist Social Reform Committee showed more concrete policy of conservative collectivism towards the social problems. The Unionist Social Reform Committee drew up reports on 6 fields of social policy responding to the incidents during Labour Unrest. It comprised the poor law, agriculture, industrial unrest, housing, education and health.¹⁸ The reforms suggested by the Unionist Social Reform Committee show that F. E. Smith demanded further social reform beyond the tariff reform. His support for the program of the health and unemployment insurance proposed by Lloyd George didn't come from the tactical opportunism.¹⁹ The Unionist Social Reform Committee was in a position that tariff reform would result in a failure if the Unionist Party would not take a positive stance in the matter of social problems.²⁰

¹³ Ibid., pp.12,31,32,242.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.30.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.203.

¹⁶ Campbell, *F E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, p.357.

¹⁷ Smith, *Unionist Policy*, p.246.

¹⁸ Ridley, "The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914," p.395.

¹⁹ Campbell, *F E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, p.362.

²⁰ José Harris, "The Transition to High Politics in English Social Policy, 1880-1914," in Micheal Bentley and John Stevenson(eds.), *High and Low Politics in Modern Britain*(Oxford, 1983), p.65.

Hills report on poor law was similar to the Minority Report on poverty problems. It suggested that the patients would be delivered to the public health authority of county council with poor law being abolished. Health service based on present poor law will be replaced by new public health service system. That meant patients would get the medical services according to their necessities.²¹

Turnor's report on agriculture imposed the compensation for the wage increase of agrarian labourers on the landlord as well as on the industrial bourgeoisie. The freedom of contract was reinterpreted in this process. The freedom of contract could be protected in so far as it is desirable on the part of national viewpoint. Government could intervene in the matter of agricultural wages when the policy of laissez-faire produced the harmful results.²² In other words the freedom of contract could be restricted when it causes an undesirable consequence to state.

The report on labour problem regarded the interference of government on labour disputes as a responsibility and obligation of the state for the protection of the social interest.²³ Largely two ways of intervention were suggested. One was compulsory arbitration and the other was to intensify the present arbitration procedure. It was suggested that minimum wage would be set on particular industries by the wage board as the principle of minimum wage was adopted by the USRC.²⁴ The general tendency of the report was on the side of Labour. Philip Snowden evaluated that this report did not contain contents which would be opposed by the labourers or trade unionists.²⁵

But F. E. Smith expressed the anxiety about labour movement having a tendency of political campaign towards the state. He was against the syndicalist movement. The argument of F. E. Smith converged on one focal point when he opposed the principle of free trade and laissez-faire and demanded the intervention of government on poverty and labour. That was the maintenance of nation and the national interest. The social reform which was led by nation was rather interpreted as an antidote to socialism.²⁶ His collectivism could be viewed as going towards the communitarianism with the nation on its core.

2. Collectivism of Fabian Socialism

The collectivism of Fabians proceeded on the more elaborate theoretical foundation. Fabians had a view that various social problems including poverty were grounded in British capitalism. And at the core of the problem "Rent" existed.²⁷ The concept of Rent constituted the theory of surplus value of Fabianism. It was occurring from the normal structure of capitalist market economy. Fabians posited that the rent could not be eliminated from the process of production. So they urged to find a way to

²¹ J. W. Hills and Maurice Woods, *Poor Law Reform, A Practical Programme* (London, 1912), p.30.

²² *A Unionist agricultural policy* by a group of Unionists (London, 1913), p. 11.

²³ J. W. Hills, W. J. Ashley and Maurice Woods, *Industrial Unrest, A Practical Solution* (London, 1914), p.3.

²⁴ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, p.364.

²⁵ Ridley, "The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914," p.408.

²⁶ E. H. H. Green, "The Conservative Party, the state and social policy, 1880-1914," in Francis, Martin; Zwiniger-Bargielowska, Ina (ed.), *The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), pp.232, 237.

²⁷ The concept of Rent by Fabians includes not only the rent of land but also the rent of capital and labour.

justly redistribute Rent. This process of redistribution demonstrates the unique collectivism of Fabians.

Fabians regarded nation as a vital agent in the process of implementation of collectivist social reform. But the difference between the conservative collectivism and the Fabian collectivism is that the former regarded nation as an integrating entity transcending individuals while the latter regarded nation as only a functional body that plays the role of distributing Rent. Thus the former laid stress on the symbolic institutions like monarchy, church, senate and the military while the latter counted nation just as an instrumental body for the individual welfare.

Fabian collectivism was materialized in the process of searching for the subjects of redistribution. Fabians came up with the fact that people have three different status of producer, consumer and citizen in the industrial society. Among these different positions the status of consumer was accounted as the most important one. So naturally Rent should be redistributed to the people as consumers.

Fabians picked out three institutions as agency of redistributing rent to consumers. Co-operative, municipality and state were expected to redistribute rent to consumers with fairness and equity

1) Co-operative and Collectivism

Co-operative that was characterized as voluntary consumer organization by Fabians was an industrial organization of new type based on the production for use not for exchange.²⁸

Co-operative movement emerged in various forms in 18th century England and the initial experiment of co-operative flour mill and bakery dated back to 1767.²⁹ The Webbs indicated that 400 co-operatives had already appeared between 1815 and 1833.³⁰ Then in 1844 the Flannel weavers of Rochdale have substantially started the co-operative movement.³¹ The precursors of Rochdale unconsciously organized the industry on the side of consumers and produced the merchandise for use not for exchange. The co-operative movement expanded into the wholesale, retail and even manufacturing fields.³²

Co-operative body was different in the process of making capital and distributing profits from the profit-seeking entrepreneur. It started as several hundreds of consumers combined as members. A shop would be arranged by some investments from these members and a manager would be employed.³³ After deducting all the costs, the profits would be returned to the consumers in exact proportion to the amount of purchase. This way of dealing with the profits differentiated co-operative from joint-stock company. Fabians dubbed it as Dividend on Purchase.³⁴

Beatrice Webb argued that the co-operative movement was a real consumer democracy. It realized the customers' democracy by dividing the profits among the customers. It was an open democracy which would accept newcomers regardless of

²⁸ Webbs, "Special Supplement on the cooperative movement", *New Statesman supplement*, 30 May 1914, p.1

²⁹ Webbs, "Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement," p.2.

³⁰ Webbs, "State and Municipal Enterprises", *New Statesman supplement*, 8 May 1915.

³¹ Webbs, "Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement," p.2.

³² Ibid.

³³ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*(London, 1920) , p.6.

³⁴ Webbs, "Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement," p.3.

class and sex.³⁵

The co-operative that Fabians discerned as consumer organization has a trait of being independent from state. While the most of the collectivist policies necessitated the intervention of state, the activities of co-operative movement were performed voluntarily although it took a form of collectivism.

2) Municipality and Collectivism

Fabians regarded municipality and state as compulsory consumer organization.³⁶ The reason for such a generalization was that the citizens that cover these two bodies were utilizing the municipality and state as consumers. Especially in the field of industry where the consumption is universal, citizen was identified almost same as consumer. For example in the case of water, gas and postal service citizens were all consumers for these goods and services. So municipality could become a consumer organization. Fabian collectivism made the municipality and state emerge as subjects for supplying commodities by considering these bodies as consumer organization. The reason for emphasizing nationalization and municipalization lies in this assumption.

Fabians put more emphasis on the role of municipality than state. Beatrice Webb argued that "city council is a better platform from which to bring about collectivism than Parliament."³⁷ Bernard Shaw was also in the same opinion that municipality was far more important than state by pointing the superiority of county council to parliament.

Municipality encompassed various fields of industry from gas and water to all kinds of recreation like cricket, golf, gymnasium, boating, concerts and even dance party.³⁸ Municipality took responsibility not only in the physical environment but also in the entire spiritual realm including music, arts, drama.³⁹ In one chapter of Fabian Essays, the spheres which would be administered by municipality were enumerated over 2 pages.⁴⁰ The fields of municipal activities would be extended without limit.⁴¹ Next phrase shows well that how much role the municipality will take in a society envisioned by Fabians.

The Individualist Town Councilor will walk along the municipal pavement, lit by municipal gas and cleansed by municipal brooms with municipal water, and seeing by the municipal clock in the municipal market, that he is too early meet his children coming from the municipal school hard by the municipal hospital, will use the national telegraph system to tell them not to walk through the municipal park but to come to the municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading room, by the municipal art gallery, museum and library.⁴²

Fabians held central government as another consumer organization. They assumed that the function of contemporary state has changed when compared to the old state. Contemporary state was actually an institution that manages the households in the national scale. State should offer the services like post, railway,

³⁵ B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, p.430.

³⁶ Webbs, *Problems of Modern Industry*(London, 1920), p.200.

³⁷ M. Cole, *The Story of Fabian Socialism*(London, 1961), p.84.

³⁸ Webbs, "State and Municipal Enterprises," p.7.

³⁹ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, p.238.

⁴⁰ S. Webb, *Fabian Essays*(London, 1889), pp.79-80.

⁴¹ Webbs, "State and Municipal Enterprises," p.32.

⁴² S. Webb, *Socialism in England* (London 1890), pp.116-117.

telegraph, telephone, banking, insurance, canal as a consumer organization. In these sections state functioned as an association of consumers.⁴³ State acted with the purpose of helping the consumers as far as possible and in this respect state was regarded as a kind of an extended co-operative.⁴⁴

The necessity of central government came from the fact that some industries possessed advantages when they were managed nationally.⁴⁵ In the case of post in which the services should be nationally identical or in the case of mine in which the resources should be collectivized and distributed nationally, nationalization was more desirable.⁴⁶

After all the collectivism of Fabians intended to offer the necessary factors of modern life through the consumer organizations like co-operative, municipality and state. Each consumer organization respectively corresponded to the different goods and services of the modern world.

3. Collectivism and Continuity

Conservative collectivism and socialist collectivism were all alternatives to deal with the social problems of the later 19th and early 20th century. Although these suggestions should be the modern prescriptions for the modern problems, historical continuity also existed in their arguments to some degree.

The clue to historical continuity in conservative collectivism could be found in the fact that it was grafted to attributes of conservatism. Although the identity of conservatism as an ideology is doubted, it is argued that conservatism has some meaningful characteristics. Traditionalism, disapproval of abstract theory and organic view of society could be extracted as core concepts from conservatism.⁴⁷ Conservative collectivism reveals that it holds these attributes inherently.

The important excuse of conservative collectivism for rejection of laissez-faire doctrine was that the doctrine was grounded in the abstract theory like natural right. Conservatism is continuing in conservative collectivism as the latter denies the political theory of Rousseau and Bentham and refuses the idea of adjusting social structure according to the abstract political theory.

A touch of historical continuity could be found also in the perspective for human beings. Conservative collectivism did not take the assumption of liberalism that human being is rational and calculating existence. The argument that human being is a complicated existence that does not allow easy and simple definition suggests the typical conservative view of human being.

The conservative attribute could be also found in the emphasis on state. State was considered as a transcendental body that stands above the individual and embraces all individuals. State functioned as a focal point of dissimilar individuals and a foundation for the daily lives of the people. Here the trait of social organism is distinct.

Traditionalism is immanent in that the existing institutions like Monarchy, Church, Senate and the military were advocated. Existing institutions and practices should be cherished and respected. Especially the emphasis was put in the context of

⁴³ Fabian Tract 60, p.13.

⁴⁴ Webbs, "What is Socialism ? VIII," *New Statesman*, 31 May 1913, p.236.

⁴⁵ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, p.238.

⁴⁶ Webb, *Towards Social Democracy* (London,1915), p.37.

⁴⁷ E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism* (London, 1995), p.314.

preserving and solidifying the state.

Traditionalism, rejection of abstract theory, social organicism, denial of rational human being all worked on the base of conservative collectivism which is insinuating the historical continuity of the idea in spite of its favour for modern social reform.

Difficulty of finding historical continuity in socialist collectivism is easily assumed as socialism is a production of modern world. But continuity is also alive in this collectivism. Fabians traced the collectivism of municipality to the early period before Industrial Revolution in English history. The Webbs discovered the origins of consumer organizations in the English local history. The roots of local government dated back to the later 17th century.⁴⁸ The Webbs found the origins of English local government were complicated and vague and intermingled with the past. After the end of Stuart age the central government took the hands off the intervention on the local problems.⁴⁹

Then the Webbs discovered that the particular functions that local governments took on were originated from the voluntary consumers' association which was emerging for the purpose of providing new services.⁵⁰ The first case appeared in the form of voluntary association for the purpose of protecting the life and property.⁵¹ When the inhabitants of Tower Hamlets were suffering from the thieves and pick-pocketing, they themselves acted as members for the local organization for reform and indicted 2000 criminals.⁵² In 1777 the farmers at Norfork organized themselves to arrest and indict the robbers of horse.⁵³

From mid 18th century these voluntary associations began to ask parliament that they would be transformed into the compulsory association. As a result all inhabitants who reside in some district became to belong to this association. In addition to this, new services were necessitated in consequence of Industrial Revolution. And consumer organizations developed in accordance with this phenomenon.⁵⁴ Crime prevention, road maintenance, street cleaning were the most conspicuous ones as the residential areas extended with increasing population.⁵⁵

The Webbs argued that the new form of local government gradually developed by consumer organizations by pointing that they could discover the beginning of the most important functions of local government in the hundreds of documents about repairing, cleaning, lighting, observing the street.⁵⁶ The recognition that consumers represented the whole residents while the producers occupy just a minority has emerged and became distinct during this process.⁵⁷

Although the collectivism of municipality was advocated by Fabians in the later 19th century this alternative was actually rooted in the history of English local administration dating hundreds years back. So the idea of organizing industry by municipality showed affinity with British radicalism in the 19th century. So when *London Programme* was announced, *the Speaker* wrote "S. Webb is writing like

⁴⁸ Webb, *Towards Social Democracy*, p.37.

⁴⁹ Webbs, *English Local Government* vol.i (London 1907), p.vi.

⁵⁰ B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, p.442.

⁵¹ Webbs, *English Local Government* vol. iv, p.439.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., p.400.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.441.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Webbs, *English Local Government*, vol.iii : *Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes*, p.vi.

⁵⁷ Webbs, *English Local Government*, vol.iv, p.444.

radicals... all the reforms that he is advocating are included in the programs of radicals and liberals."⁵⁸

Conclusion

Conservative collectivism and socialist collectivism all suggested the prescriptions for the social problems posed by modern age. Two kinds of collectivism were similar in raising an objection to laissez-faire and endorsing the public intervention in social problems. But conservative collectivism shows the traits that it rejects the abstract political theory and adheres to the traditional institutions like church and senate while socialist collectivism reveals the contents that it is equipped with more sophisticated theoretical framework and urges that the existing institutions should be verified by democratic procedure. Although both of them demanded the public intervention in social problems, it must be noted that the backdrop of their ideas were different.

Both of the alternatives are all involved in modern reform and interwoven with the process of social reform leading to the 20th century welfare state. In spite of this modernity these ideas disclose the aspect of historical continuity. Conservative collectivism adheres to the basic foundations of conservatism and socialist collectivism grounds the origin of municipality as consumer organization on the period before industrialization. The various assumptions of collectivist ideas which had broken the basic principles of 19th century laissez-faire were not all created as new instruments.

⁵⁸ *The Speaker*, 3 Oct. 1891.

Session 3

British History and Global/World History

Recently a new research field of Global History tends to attract strong academic attention from British historians as well as from Asian and Japanese scholars. This session will try to locate British History into the context of Global History studies and to explore the possibility of creating new World/Global History from Asian perspectives. The key concepts of Global History are ‘comparison’ and ‘connection’ or ‘relationship’. We would like to use these two for presenting new interpretations. The first paper will make comparative studies between the English East India Company and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Asian waters in the ‘Long Eighteenth Century’. The second paper will cover the place of East Asian region in British imperialism, c. 1700-1945, and show how that History has been written in the last two decades. The third paper will deal with the change of historical consciousness on modernity or modernization in Korea from domestic-history perspective to world-history one in the 1990s. By combining these three papers, we may reconsider the historical roles of Great Britain and the British Empire with connection to the birth of Modern World and globalization.

Dutch Commercial Networks in Asia in Transition, 1760-1830

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Introduction

In the autumn of the year 1808, a vessel sailing under a Dutch flag called at Nagasaki. At that moment nobody in Japan could have expected that the arrival of this vessel would bring about the serious result of the *seppuku* (*harakiru*) suicide of the Japanese governor of Nagasaki.

On 4th October 1808 (15th August 1808 on the Japanese calendar), a vessel entered the bay of Nagasaki. Two Dutch officials approached it for a regular inspection on a small boat together with Japanese officers from the island of Deshima, where the Dutch trading office was maintained. As the two Dutch officials came close to a boat came to a boat from the vessel, both were seized by armed sailors and taken on board. At the same time, the vessel suddenly raised a British ensign. Everything became clear when one of the captured officials returned to the Dutch office in Deshima bringing a letter from Captain Fleetwood Pellew. The vessel was not a Dutch merchant vessel but a British frigate, the HMS *Phaeton*. The Phaeton had been around East Asian waters in order to capture Dutch vessels sailing from Batavia to Nagasaki for trade. Failing to capture any, the Phaeton entered the bay of Nagasaki firstly to make sure Dutch vessels in the harbour and secondly to procure foodstuffs and water.

Since the second half of the seventeenth century, Japan adhered to the principle that no political and commercial contacts with the British should be allowed. Should a British vessel enter the bay of Nagasaki, the local authorities were to drive it out as soon as possible. When the British requests were not accepted immediately they run amok around the port of Nagasaki, and the local authorities were unable to take any effective countermeasures, as they were faced with a shortage of troops and equipment. The city of Nagasaki was under the direct control of the Tokugawa shogunate and its governors had been appointed by the *shoguns* as direct vassals since the seventeenth century. In spite being directly under the shogunate, defence arrangements for the area around the bay of Nagasaki were charged to the domains of Saga and Fukuoka, under the general control of the governor of Nagasaki. At the time in question, the domain of Saga was in charge of such arrangements, yet because the Japanese had experienced peace in Nagasaki over a long period of time they did not suppose that full defences were necessary. Lacking sufficient military power, the Japanese authorities had to accept the British demands in the end. After obtaining a supply of foodstuffs and water, the frigate left Nagasaki on 17th August 1808. Although peace was restored, the Japanese, especially the governor of Nagasaki, thought that this incident had harmed the dignity of the shogunate. Indeed, the Nagasaki authorities did not win any concessions from the British and

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had to accept all their requests. Hence, the so-called Phaeton incident ended with the suicide of Matsudaira Yasuhide, the governor of Nagasaki.¹

Beyond a direct analysis of this Phaeton incident, what kinds of background events led to the incident of 1808 in Nagasaki? That is the central question of this paper. It aims to provide information about historical backgrounds in terms of the business activities in Asia of the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: VOC) before the Phaeton incident. First, the paper investigates Dutch trading activity in Asia. By this investigation, the paper makes clear not only the development of the Asian trade of the VOC but also sheds light on structural changes in the sources of its profits, which were somewhat hard to see, when the Dutch Company was faced with the growth of the commercial activities of the English East India Company (EIC) in Asian waters. Second, the paper surveys the structural changes in Dutch business in Asia during the period of political and economic transition around 1800 both in Europe and in Asia.

The VOC's Asian trading business in the eighteenth century

Recent studies on the Dutch East India Company have revealed the fact that the VOC still had great power even in the mid-eighteenth century.² A unique point of the Dutch Company was its success in being engaged not only in trade between Europe and Asia, but also in intra-Asian trade. Among several trading lines of the VOC, the one between Japan and India was exceptionally significant. The VOC imported Javanese sugar into Japan and in return received huge amounts of Japanese copper, which were carried on Dutch vessels to Dutch trading posts on the Indian subcontinent, such as those in the regions of Coromandel, Bengal and Gujarat. In exchange for Japanese copper, the VOC obtained cotton textiles, which were shipped on Dutch vessels to the markets in Europe as well as in Java. This intra-Asian triangular trade between Java, Japan and India was formed in the first half of the eighteenth century, although by then the VOC was already relying on another triangular trade in Asian waters between Siam, Japan and India which had been established in the mid-seventeenth century.³ In both of these trades, Japanese copper played an important role, contributing high Asian profits to the VOC.

Copper from Japan was sold by the VOC in several places. Their locations are shown in *Table 1*.⁴ In general, the Japanese copper was sold near the production areas of cotton textiles. Differently from other European companies, the Dutch Company had many trading posts in South Asia. In the case of the Coromandel Coast, this characteristic is obvious. Moreover, the Dutch trading posts under the control of the Dutch authorities in Colombo had two types in terms of location. One type is exemplified by the posts on Ceylon Island, where copper was not sold on a large scale. On the other hand, at the other type of post such as those along the

¹ Hideo Matsutake, ‘Fēton Gō Jiken to 19 Seiki Shotō no Kaiun Zyōsei (A Study of the ‘His Majesty’s Ship Phaeton’ Incident and the Maritime Situation in the Beginning of the 19th Century)’, *Tonan Ajia Kenkyū Nenpo*, Nagasaki University, 33-34, pp. 24-39.

² Femke S. Gaastra, *Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2009) pp. 181-182.

³ Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) pp. 17-18.

⁴ Table 1 is based on the data collected from the *Archief van de Boekhouder Generaal te Bataiva, 1700-1801* (BGB), the collection kept in the National Archives of the Netherlands (NA).

Table 1 South Asian establishments of the VOC ranked by the annual average amounts of Japanese copper sold, 1700/01-01/02, 1740/41-41/42 and 1775/76-76/77


(Dutch pounds)

(1) 1700/01-1701/02						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal	Patna				Hooghly	
Ceylon	Colombo; Jaffna; Mannar; Baticaloa				Tuticorin*; Alwar- tirunagarai*; Manapadu*	Kilakkrai*
Coromandel	Pulicat	Palakollu	Draksharama; Conjemere; Porto Novo	Nagappattinam; Bimlipatam	Masulipatam; Sadras	
Malabar		Quilon		Cochin; Cannanore		
Gujarat					Surat	
(2) 1740/41-1741/42						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal					Hooghly	
Ceylon	Galle; Matara; Mannar; Cape Comorin*; Trincomalee; Baticaloa; Kalpitiya				Colombo; Jaffna; Alwar- tirunagarai*; Manapadu*	Tuticorin*; Kilakkrai*
Coromandel				Kakinada; Porto Novo	Pulicat	Nagappattinam; Masulipatam; Sadras; Bimlipatam
Malabar	Quilon		Cannanore		Cochin	
Gujarat					Surat	
(3) 1775/76-1776/77						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal					Hooghly	
Ceylon	Galle; Matara; Mannar; Tuticorin*; Kilakkrai*; Trincomalee; Baticaloa; Kalpitiya			Jaffna	Colombo	
Coromandel				Pulicat	Bimlipatam	Nagappattinam; Jagannathapuram
Malabar						Cochin
Gujarat						Surat

[Note] The establishments in Ceylon added the asterisks (*) were located on the Fishery Coast in the Indian Subcontinent opposite the island of Ceylon. The data on Coromandel in the period from 1775/76 to 1776/77 was based on records of the book year 1774/75. 1 Dutch pound = ca. 0.494 kg.

[Sources] Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) pp. 88-89 [NA: BGB 10751, 10752, 10772, 10773, 10792, 10793].

Figure 1 Copper outflows from Japan (VOC) and Europe (EIC), 1650-1800



[Sources] VOC: Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) pp. 198-199; EIC: British Library: OIOC IOR L/AG/1/16-28.

Fishery Coast on the south-eastern tip of the Indian subcontinent, large volumes of Japanese copper were sold annually. These are indicated by asterisks (*) in *Table 1*. In any case, the VOC had the best network of the trading posts in South Asia, compared to the other European trading company, and this regional network contributed to the well-functioning of the intra-Asian trade and the Euro-Asian trade in the points of the sales of Japanese copper and the purchase of Indian cotton textiles. According to research by Ryuto Shimada, profits on the sales of Japanese copper in South Asia accounted for 12.1 per cent of the total gross sales profits of the VOC in all its Asian trading posts in 1701/02, 13.6 per cent in 1741/42 and 10.1 per cent in 1771/72.⁵

While the VOC enjoyed profitable conditions in its trading business in Asia, it experienced two significant changes during the eighteenth century. One concerned the inflows of British copper into India and the other the change in the composition of the sources of profits.

Around the 1730s, British copper began to be imported into India, with the background of the growth of the British copper mining industry. This trade in a European product was conducted by the English East India Company (EIC). *Figure 1* indicates the outflows of British copper from London into Asia, and the table also shows the annual exports of Japanese copper to Asia by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Until the 1750s, the export volumes of British copper never exceeded those of Japanese copper carried by the VOC, except for one year in the 1740s. The 1760s was the decade in which the competition between Japanese and British copper became palpable. Copper inflows from Britain then amounted to 600 tons per year. Around 1775, British copper inflows definitely exceeded those of Japanese copper. During the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, the annual outflow of British copper was around 1,500 tons, and in some years it exceeded 2,000 tons per annum. Thus, in terms of volume the Japanese copper trade conducted by the VOC was less significant than that in British copper by the end of the

⁵ Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper*, p. 142.

eighteenth century.⁶

Despite the large inflows of British copper into India, Japanese copper was preferred in the Indian market for minting as regards quality. In fact, the English Company attempted to increase the export trade in British copper by producing imitations of Japanese bar copper in terms of quality and shape, yet due to the additional costs of producing such imitations the business was still unprofitable,⁷ although there is no doubt that the huge copper market in India attracted the interests of copper producers in Britain, while the VOC's high commitment to Japanese copper could have caused it critical difficulties in the event of any British success in reducing production costs.

The second important change in the business of the VOC during the eighteenth century was a compositional change in the source of profits. In the early eighteenth century, each trading post gained large gross profits through sales of trading commodities. *Table 2* shows the gross profits of the VOC realised in Asia. In 1701/02, the VOC earned around 3.3 million guilders as gross profits. Of these, the sales profits of Asian products, i.e. profits from the intra-Asian trade, accounted for 81.9 per cent. However, in the mid-eighteenth century, about 20 per cent of the total gross profits were from other business, largely gains from land tenure. Indeed, as shown in *Table 3*, in the trading posts, where the VOC established colonial rule such as Batavia and Ceylon, gross profits from the category of "others" occupied large shares of the gross profits. In this way, the VOC was making a step from trading company to colonial powers in the course of the eighteenth century.⁸

Table 2 Asian gross profits of the VOC, 1701/02 and 1751/52

									(fl.)
	Sales of European products			Sales from Asian products					total
	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	others		
1701/02	160,710	135,708	20,407	24,833	2,689,610	18,522	232,325	3,282,114	
(%)	4.9	4.1	0.6	0.8	81.9	0.6	7.1	100.0	
1751/52	1,184,928	184,351	51,321	91,303	3,505,785	65,528	1,341,709	6,424,926	
(%)	18.4	2.9	0.8	1.4	54.6	1.0	20.9	100.0	

[Note] Asian heavy and light guilders are adjusted to the accounting procedure in the Dutch Republic.

[Sources] NA: BGB 10752, BGB 10776.

⁶ Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper*, p. 78.

⁷ Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper*, pp. 125-127.

⁸ Regarding the detailed analysis of Tables 2 and 3, see Ryuto Shimada, "18seiki Zenhan niokeru Oranda Higashi Indo Gaisha no Ajiakan Bōeki (The Intra-Asian Trade of the Dutch East India Company in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century)", *Seinan Gakuin Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū (The Economic Review of Seinan Gakuin University)*, 43(1/2), 2008, pp. 54-58.

Table 3 Asian gross profits of the VOC in 1751/02

	Sales of European products			Sales of Asian products			others
	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	
Batavia	1,158,250	13,267	35,899	61,506	880,881	0	421,463
Ceylon	26,678	11,128	1,058	0	203,339	19,498	172,975
Malabar	0	15,009	978	0	178,073	2,669	47,725
Bengal	0	20,550	0	0	226,145	0	133,430
Coromandel	0	5,510	19	29,797	656,271	24	65,280
Gujarat	0	20,887	1,084	0	450,178	150	159,121
Mocha	0	23	0	0	40,847	291	9,161
Persia	0	0	0	0	5,370	0	783
Basra	0	13,747	0	0	92,653	0	99
Japan	0	16,161	0	0	71,558	0	114,534
Siam	0	0	0	0	3,255	0	25
Malacca	0	1,047	1,877	0	13,169	477	13,655
Padang	0	3,544	836	0	66,279	4,223	11,091
Palembang					N.A.		
Banten	0	151	0	0	5,235	0	12,786
Semarang	0	23,997	2,321	0	25,728	13,509	62,332
Cirebon	0	1,302	60	0	10,046	113	488
Jambi	0	814	0	0	2,912	0	36
Ambon	0	297	1,285	0	36,205	1,845	30,436
Banda	0	480	2,410	0	9,105	3,843	23,574
Ternate	0	669	1,326	0	28,516	4,113	17,532
Timor	0	0	189	0	3,983	0	2,009
Maccasar	0	732	1,981	0	24,139	14,774	40,336
Banjarmasin	0	110	0	0	17,161	0	244
China	0	34,926	0	0	454,737	0	2,593

Trader or colonizer?

The Dutch Company was confronted by several serious incidents from the 1780s. First of all, Dutch commercial power was severely damaged by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War between 1780 and 1784. In this war, the Dutch Company was seriously attacked by the British, and as a result, the VOC lost many merchant vessels and trading posts in South Asia. For example, the VOC lost the trading post in Negappattinam in 1781, and other trading posts in India such as that at Chinsura in Bengal were captured by the British. After the war, these posts were returned to the Dutch Company, but in Negappattinam, the Dutch headquarters on the Coromandel Coast and the major commercial centre for the Dutch export trade in cotton textiles was ceded to the British according to the final Treaty of Versailles of 1784.⁹

⁹ Gaastra, *Geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 175; Jos Gommans *et al.* (eds.) *Dutch Sources on South Asia, c. 1600-1825*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001) pp. 301, 335.

The second stroke also came from Europe. As soon as the French revolutionary armies invaded the Netherlands in January 1795, William V of Orange, who was the Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, fled to England and the Batavian Republic was established in the Netherlands. At Kew in London, William V signed a document to inform all the employees of the VOC in Asia that all overseas property of the Dutch Company should be placed under British control.¹⁰

Following this instruction of William V, several Dutch trading posts were surrendered. In Malabar, the trading posts of Cochin and Quilon were transferred to the British in 1795. Dutch trading posts under the Dutch authorities at Colombo on the island of Ceylon fell to British hands in 1796. In Bengal the trading post in Chisura was again surrendered to the British.¹¹ Hence, the Dutch Company lost all its trading posts in South Asia by 1796, which meant that it became absolutely impossible for the VOC to conduct the export trade in cotton textiles from India for European and Asian markets.

In the home country, the States-General of the Batavian Republic had ordered the restructure of the governance system of the VOC by abolishing the Gentlemen XVII, the supreme decision-making body of the Dutch Company, and by launching the Committee for the Affairs of the East India Trade and Possessions (*Committee tot de zaken van Oostindische handel en Besitzingen*) in 1796.¹² In the Batavian Republic, liberalistic policies were introduced by mainstreamers of the Republic, called Patriots (*Patriotten*), under the strong influence of French revolutionary thinking. For example, Dirk van Hogendorf drew up a liberalistic plan to reform affairs in East Indies to permit free trade, liberty of cultivation and free sales of agricultural products in the Dutch colonial territory.¹³ On the last day of the year 1799, privileges to the VOC were stopped according to the schedule drawn up in 1798 and the Council of Asian Possessions and Establishments (*Raad van Aziaatsche Bezittingen en Etablissementen*) succeeded to the management of Asian affairs in 1800.¹⁴

After Louis Bonaparte, a younger brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, took the throne of the Kingdom of Holland in 1806, he appointed Herman Willem Daendels to post of governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. As shown in his military and Patriot career, this appointment aimed to defend revolutionary French influenced Java, and especially Batavia against the British in the same way as the homeland, and as British threats against the Dutch increased, the Phaeton incident occurred in Nagasaki in 1808. It is well known that Daendels made efforts to construct roads on the island of Java and to reconstruct the defense system of Batavia.¹⁵ Yet, while France annexed the Kingdom of Holland in 1810, the high government of Batavia

¹⁰ Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper*, p. 128.

¹¹ Gommans et al, *Dutch Sources on South Asia*, pp. 179, 221-223, 301.

¹² Gerardus Cornelius Klerk de Reus, "Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen und finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederlandisch-Ostindischen Compagnie", *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, 47(3), 1894, p. XLVI.

¹³ F.W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, pp. 196-197.

¹⁴ F.S. Gaastra, "The Organization of the VOC", in: R. Raben and H. Spijkerman (eds.) *De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (1602-1795)* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1992) p. 28.

¹⁵ E.S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, Vol. 2 (Amsterdam: B.M. Israël, 1975) pp. 13-27.

surrendered to the British in 1811 and Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed lieutenant-governor. After a short occupation of Java by the British, thanks to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814 (the Convention of London), which was realized after Napoleon's defeat and the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813, Java was returned to Dutch control in 1816.

During the years of political confusion in Batavia as well as in the homeland, the Dutch intra-Asian trade based in Batavia was seriously damaged. The most critical point was that the Dutch Company lost its Indian links. From the seventeenth century the VOC enjoyed the fruitful intra-Asian triangular trade between Japan, India and South-East Asia, as shown before. The South Asian trade of the Dutch Company in particular was so significant in procuring cotton textiles for the European as well as the Southeast Asian market throughout the eighteenth century that the loss of the trading posts in South Asia could only result in cutting off the lifeblood of the VOC as a trading company. In fact, due to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in the 1780s, the political changes in Europe and the rise in the British military power in Asian waters after 1795, the Dutch had to give up many of their trading posts in Asia and transfer them to the British authorities. Without question, disappearance of trading posts meant that the Dutch could no longer engage in the intra-Asian trade.

In response to the loss of Dutch merchant vessels and trading posts in South Asia as well as the threat of the British navy, the Dutch high government of Batavia attempted to continue the intra-Asian trade by chartering private ships from neutral countries. Many American private ships in particular were hired for the Dutch trade in Asian waters. Table 4 indicates ships from Batavia calling at Nagasaki for trading business on the financial account of the VOC or of the high government of Batavia. As may be seen, in 1795 one Dutch vessel called at Nagasaki but in the next year no ship visited from Batavia. Between 1797 and 1809, 17 ships called at Nagasaki only two of which belonged to the Dutch high government of Batavia, while the others were chartered private ships, many American. During the period of the British occupation in Batavia, three British ships called at Nagasaki, sent out from Batavia following the new plan of Thomas Stamford Raffles concerning British trade with Japan.

Table 4 Ships sent by the High Government of Batavia to Nagasaki, 1795-1817

year	ship's nationality	year	ship's nationality
1795	1 Dutch	1807	1 chartered American, 1 chartered Danish
1796	0	1808	0
1797	1 chartered American	1809	1 Dutch, 1 chartered American
1798	1 chartered American	1810	0
1799	1 chartered American	1811	0
1800	1 chartered American	1812	0
1801	1 chartered American	1813	2 British
1802	1 Dutch, 1 chartered American	1814	1 British
1803	1 chartered American	1815	0
1804	2 chartered Dutch	1816	0
1805	1 chartered Dutch	1817	2 Dutch
1806	1 chartered American, 1 chartered Bremer		

[Source] Madoka Kanai, *Nichiran Kōshōshi no Kenkyū (Studies in Dutch-Japanese Historical Relations)* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1986) p. 237.

In the second year of the British occupation of Batavia, Raffles decided to undertake a Japan trade, although he had to postpone it because the British authorities failed to collect merchandise suitable for the Japanese market. However, in 1813 the British authorities in Batavia sent out two vessels to Japan. But in Nagasaki Hendrik Doeoff, the chief of the Dutch trading post there since 1803, refused the surrender of the post to the British, threatening the commissioner of the British authorities of Batavia with possible attack on the British vessels by the Japanese, because trade with the British was prohibited in Japan at that time. Yet in 1814 the British authorities in Batavia again sent a vessel to Japan, but the project was in vain as in the previous year.¹⁶ Afterwards, the British decided to abandon the Japan trade from Batavia.

The reasons why the British gave up the Japan trade after the two trial projects are concerned not only with the tough refusal by the Dutch representative in Nagasaki, but also with the fact that Japan did not have any other export than copper. It is true that Japanese camphor had also been imported into India, yet without question copper had been the single most important product for the VOC to continue the Japan trade with ease throughout the eighteenth century. Once the VOC could purchase copper from Japan, the Dutch Company was able to gain huge amounts of sales profits in India. On the other hand, Japanese copper was a competitive or harmful product to the British, especially from the point of view of British industrial interests. Britain had had a highly developed copper production industry since the eighteenth century, and the British authorities had to take care of the interests of copper producers and exporters in Britain. In fact, from the first half of the eighteenth century, the EIC had been engaged in selling huge amounts of British copper on the Indian market. Large inflows of Japanese copper had been a great menace for British copper industry. When the British defeated the Dutch authorities in Asia, they had to take measures to obstruct the inflows of Japanese copper into India.¹⁷

Even after Batavia was returned to Dutch control in 1816, the Japan trade was not as successful as in the eighteenth century. The Dutch high government of Batavia annually resumed sending one or two vessels to Japan. By this annual trading project, the high government still continued to purchase copper from Japan, but it was already difficult to reship it to India from Batavia. Although Japanese copper was sent to India by chartering American vessels for a while, it became absolutely difficult for the Dutch to gain large profits from the sales of Japanese copper in the Indian market due to the final loss of the Dutch trading posts in 1725. In place of the Indian market for copper, Japanese copper was demanded in Java. Japanese copper was used for the production of copper coins under the Dutch colonial authorities in Java to meet the demand for small change.

Apart from trading business in Asian waters, the Dutch turned in another direction, namely colonialism. Certainly, some trading posts in South Asia were returned to the Dutch due to the agreement of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. For example, the British authorities returned the trading post in Bengal to the Dutch in 1817 and the one on the Fishery Coast in 1818. Nevertheless, there was no great opportunity for the Dutch to conduct trading business by themselves because of the shortage of Dutch merchant vessels. Indeed, in the year 1819, the number of ships

¹⁶ Hendrik Doeoff, *Herinneringen uit Japan* (Haarlem: F. Bohn, 1833) pp. 189-246.

¹⁷ Thomas Stamford Raffles, *Report on Japan to the Secret Committee of the English East India Company* (Kobe: J.L. Thompson, 1929) pp. 160-164.

calling at Batavia amounted to 171. Among them were 62 British and 50 American ships, yet Dutch ships amounted to no more than 19.¹⁸ Thus, it is not so surprising that the Dutch gave up their remaining trading posts in South Asia on the occasion of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.

Instead, the Dutch set up a series of new managerial measures. While the VOC had generally increased its dependency on colonial rule as a source of profit from the mid-eighteenth century as shown before, it was not until the second half of the 1810s that the Dutch really undertook to establish colonial rule and new trading patterns between the colony and the homeland. In 1816 Godert van der Capellen was appointed governor-general of the Dutch East Indies and he gradually turned down liberalistic policy in terms of international trade and cultivation for export such as sugar and coffee in Java. The Netherlands Trading Society (*Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*) was founded in 1824 to promote trade between the Netherlands and Java, and was later to be engaged in the export trade in cotton textiles from the homeland, and the Bank of Java (*Javasche Bank*) was established in 1828 as a central colonial bank with the privilege of issuing colonial bank notes.¹⁹ Moreover, in 1830 J. Graaf van den Bosch was appointed governor-general to push ahead with the so-called cultivation system (*cultuurstelsel*), while Singapore grew as a centre for intra-Asian and global trade.

¹⁸ Takashi Shiraishi, *Umi no Teikoku: Ajia o dō kangaeruka* (Maritime Empire: How to consider Asia) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2000) p. 70.

¹⁹ Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) pp. 117-118; De Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, Vol. 2, p. 135.

*East Asia, the British World System,
and the Writing of Global History'*

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Britain, Modernity and the Change of Historical Consciousness in Korea, 1960-2000¹

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I. British historians of Korea and the 'modernity complex'

The late 1970s are very important years in the studies of British history in Korea, because the historians' research trend was rapidly changed from the Tudor-Stuart period to the nineteenth century at that time. While older historians were interested in the political and social history of the English Revolution era, younger historians focused on industrialization, labour movement and socialism during the nineteenth century.²

What does the change from the Tudor-Stuart period to the nineteenth century mean? Sometimes the scholars' research interests reflect the political and social situation of their age. British historians in Korea have also tried to re-interpret British history in the light of the Korean situation. In Korea older British historians showed their strong desire for the formation of a liberal and democratic nation-state, and the following historians were influenced by a rapid industrialization. Studying British history on the viewpoint of the present situation in Korea, they seem to have had a kind of the 'modernity complex'. Here the complex means a belief or a prejudice that Korea has yet to become a modern society completely, and that the Korean people should find a desirable path toward modernization by studying the historical processes of West European countries, especially Britain.

Although most British historians in Korea tended to cling to the modernization of Britain, there were some differences between the former generation and the latter. First, the historians of the former generation regarded modernization as a desirable process to which the Korean people should look forward. They were, therefore, interested not in the contents of modernization, but in the transition to the modern age. So, they focused on capitalist development, the rise of the gentry, the Civil War and Puritanism in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Next, the historians of the latter generation were rather interested in the content of modernization. They asked the question, what kind of modernization should we achieve? According to them, the desirable modernization should be a more comprehensive process including the subjugation of capitalism. They focused their

¹ At 2007 National Conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean Society for Western History, I presented a paper on the trend of British history for half a century in Korea. This is an essay abstracted from it. See Young-Suk Lee, "Research Trends of British History for the Last 50 Years in Korea: A History as a Model of the Modern?", *Western History Review*, vol. 95 (Dec. 2007), pp. 337-371.

² Let's see my statistics on the basis of some major journals. Between 1950 and 1979 there were 81 articles on British history, among which essays on the Tudor-Stuart period were 52 and those on the 19th and 20th centuries were 12. But this trend was rapidly changed after that. From 1980 to 1998 there were 249 essays, among which essays on the Tudor-Stuart period were 90, and ones about the 19th and 20th centuries 135.

mind on clarifying the sources of serious social conflicts in nineteenth-century Britain. But they also had no objection to the pursuit of modernization.

After Korea's entrance into modern society, nowadays young British historians try to overcome the modernity complex, and then to criticize Euroentrism (especially Anglo-centrism). For a long time British history has been an embodiment of Eurocentric historical consciousness to Korean intellectuals. But following the age of anti-Eurocentrism British historians of Korea are now experiencing the crisis of their academic identity.

In this paper I survey the modernity complex inherent in the studies of some famous historians who belonged to the first generation, and then seek similarities and differences of historical conscious between the older and younger historians. In addition to them, I would like to think of how to study British history on the basis of a world historical perspective, and what characteristics of British history could help us to understand the development of world history.

2. British history as a model of the transition to capitalism and modern state

For the older British historians in Korea, the transition to capitalism and modern state was an important issue. The transition debates provoked by the publication of Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1946), were well known to them since the 1960s. Following Dobb and Paul Sweezy, Kohatchiro Takahashi, a Japanese scholar, also took part in the debates, and then some older Korean scholars could also easily know the content of the debates through the discussions in Japan.

What did the older historians find in Dobb's book and the debates? Dobb believed that English economic history could be a model of capitalist development. The transitional path from the extinction of the serfdom through the bipolar-disintegration of small producers to the rise of capitalism was a concrete reality that the English society had experienced since the Tudor-Stuart period. He explains the development of capitalism in the two sectors -agriculture and industry- as follows.

First, in the case of agriculture, the class relation between landlords, leaseholders and labourers (the tripartite system) shows such a transitional path. After the sixteenth century the enclosures by landlords continued to occur in several counties of England. While a large number of unpropertied classes were created in that process, only a small minority began to possess vast fields. Rich farmers, so called yeomen, appeared among the peasants. They cultivated their own lands, but they could also expand the scale of management on the basis of arable rented from landlords. They were able to employ in farming those labourers who lost their own land by enclosure.

Second, how was the handicraft industry changed? In the late Middle ages, most handicraft goods were produced under the regulation of urban guilds. But in the sixteenth century the guild regulation rather hindered the urban industry's adjustment to the expansion of market. When small producers began to increase their market share, guild masters tried to strengthen their exclusivity and monopoly power. Some of the small producers moved from towns to agricultural villages in order to get out of the control of guild masters, and then opened their own businesses. This 'urban exodus' meant that the center of handicraft industry shifted from the town to the village.

Here, the English model of economic development was standardized not so much by English as by Japanese scholars. The embodiment of this research is found in the studies of Hisao Otsuka and his school of thought. Otsuka tried to compare Japanese development with a model of autogenetic modernization in order to recognize the distorted features of Japanese modernization. He regarded the development process of Britain as a model of modernization. The English Revolution was related to the growth of the gentry and the yeomanry, and the Industrial Revolution also stemmed from the capital accumulation of the yeomanry. In short, he schematized a path of the capitalistic development by way of the self-growth of small producers.

In the 1960s and 1970s the older British historians of Korea were strongly influenced by the transition debates and the school of Otsuka. Here I would like to introduce some works on English history written by Sukhong Min, Jongil Na and Juwhan Oh. These earlier historians were mainly interested in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially the social history during the English Revolution. They placed the focus on the formation of modern English society, and tried to investigate the social change before and after the revolution or to clarify the character of the revolution itself. It is very interesting that the earlier historians were similar to each other in selecting the subject for their studies.

Jongil Na analyzed the change of social relations and economy in Tudor-Stuart England in an attempt to find out the social character of the English Revolution.³ The first half of his *Studies of Modern English History* is on this theme. It deals with the governmental reform and the enclosure movement during the Tudor period. Na analyzes the contents of important works of his predecessors -for example, R. H. Tawney and G. R. Elton- who had emphasized the modern character of the Tudor period. After he summarizes Elton's view that the Tudor state was able to change into a modern governmental organization by virtue of Thomas Cromwell's reform, he also introduces us to the criticisms about this view. On the enclosure movement, he takes the same descriptive form as well. After summarizing Tawney's interpretation that the rational management of agriculture was expanded in the sixteenth century, and the driving force of the capitalist management was the rising gentry, he introduces us to the criticisms directed at this perspective. What is important, here, is the fact that though he acknowledges the criticisms partially, he eventually supported Elton and Tawney instead of selecting a more eclectic view.⁴ Today many scholars criticize their views, and there are few historians interested in their views in Britain. The reason Jongil Na accepted the views of Tawney and Elton is that modern England was something not to be criticized, but given as it is.

Juwhan Oh focuses on analyzing the social classes of the Tudor-Stuart period structurally on the basis of his reference to the secondary sources. He follows the traditional view that regarded gentlemen and yeomen as a partial driving force for the modernization of England, but on the other hand he pursues the origin of new bourgeoisies such as merchants and jurists. According to his view, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the system of social status was dissolved owing to the economic change, and in the process a group of gentlemen and yeomen advanced into agriculture, commerce or industry, and accumulated wealth. These were the distinct features of modernization. Therefore, 'first' symptoms such as the first agricultural revolution, the first commercial revolution, the first industrial

³ Joingil Na, *Studies of Modern English History* (Seoul, 1979).

⁴ Na, *ibid.*, pp. 31-33, 109-10.

revolution or the first modernization originated from the growth of these social classes.

In this point of view, Juwhan Oh seems to adhere to the explanation of modernization as an ideal type more than Jongil Na did. He explains his view on England which he has had from his youth as follows. "The history of England, especially its modern history, was very fascinating to me at that time. The modern English society showed us originality and leadership unparalleled anywhere in the world. Oh! The country gave rise to the first political revolution in the West after the fall of the Roman Empire. It had experienced the first industrial revolution, and at the same time, it is the birthplace of parliamentary democracy and party politics. These are only a part of attractiveness of the modern English society." ⁵

While Jongil Na and Juwhan Oh placed their focuses on the social background of the English Revolution or on the social change before the revolution, Sukhong Min studied the revolution itself. There were hot debates concerning whether the revolution was a bourgeoisie revolution or not, probably a result of the cold war at that time. It is well known that the orthodoxy of the revolution was based upon the Whig interpretation which sees the revolution as the struggles for constitutional and religious liberty. But social historians affected by Marxism in the 1950s regarded it as a class revolution. From then on conservative historians continued to criticize the social interpretation of the English Revolution, and hot debates between the two camps attracted considerable attention. It is well known that the role of the gentry was a key point in the debate.

Some progressive historians paid attention to the levellers in the English Revolution. The levellers have been forgotten among historians for a long time. But the new vision expressed by them was based upon the most advanced social theory at that time. It has been said that their thought and social theory affected the formation of the political thought of England in spite of their frustration. Sukhong Min was a historian who had studied the French Revolution, but he was also interested in the levellers during the English Revolution. By studying the process in which the contents of the People's Charter was changed intermittently by the levelers themselves, he analyzed the political thought of the leaders such as John Lilburne. Generally he associated the radical contents of the charter with rising yeomen' political desire, which seems to be related with his academic interest for the sans-culottes during the French Revolution. Then, why are the levellers important in English history? According to his conclusion, it is because we could find out the political ideology of modern democracy in their political thought.⁶

Sukhong Min focused not on the movement of the levellers itself, but on their three versions of the People's Charter. What was more important to him, was what kind of people could have the suffrage. The charter permitted independent producers to have suffrage and eligibility for election. After summarizing several views on this issue, Min concluded that the capability of the political subject was based upon the extent of economic independence. Of course, this conclusion is quite obscure. But the political communities founded on the troops or the villages were small. So, he concluded that there must have been a certain standard on the right to vote among people, and that whether the standard was obvious or not must have been a trivial

⁵ Juwhan Oh, *Studies of Modern English Society* (Taegu, 1992), p. i.

⁶ Sukhong Min, *Studies of Modern Western History* (Seoul, 1975), pp. 69-90.

problem for them.⁷ Why did he focus on the small producers' independency? Perhaps because he was affected by Dobb's view that the origin of the driving force to capitalism should be searched in the disintegration of small producers. He has actually introduced the transition debates to Korean scholars for the first time.

3. The Nineteenth Century and Modernity

As I previously mentioned, the historians who have studied British history since the early 1980s, are interested in social problems and labour movement during the Industrial Revolution. According to the traditional interpretation, the Industrial Revolution was regarded as the first case of the modern economic growth, which was based upon the Agricultural Revolution and the Commercial Revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries. Nineteenth-century Britain built up the first urban society, and there were a series of liberal reforms including governmental reform in the first half of the same century. So, it seems that British history is associated with the first agricultural and commercial developments, the first industrialization, the first urban society, and the first welfare state etc.⁸ But nowadays there are few historians supporting this interpretation in Britain itself. These first revolutions have lost their revolutionary character in the recent studies. Today's historians tend to emphasize gradualism in British history instead of its rapid changes. For example, the Industrial Revolution did not produce the perfect victory of machinery and factory system over the traditional methods of production, and it was no more than a 'quiet revolution'. British labourers could not also form true class-consciousness in the first half of the nineteenth century. Instead, they cherished the radical politics of the previous century. Recent researches in Britain tend to emphasize continuity instead of change.⁹

But British historians in Korea have not yet been particularly interested in these revisionist interpretations. First, the Industrial Revolution has helped them to regard the 19th century as an age of change. Korean scholars have a dual attitude toward the revisionist perspective on the Industrial Revolution. Although a few historians sometimes used to be interested in the gradualist views, most of them do not care to approve of those interpretations. It is true that historians are apt to be influenced by the present situation. I would like to call it 'presentism'. In short,

⁷ Min, *ibid.*, pp. 81-87.

⁸ We can point out representative works as follow. J. R. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688 in England* (London, 1972); W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1960); R. M. Hartwell, ed., *The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England* (London, 1967); A. Briggs, *Victorian Cities* (Harmondsworth, 1968); Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963); J. Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform, 1640 ~ 1832* (Cambridge, 1973), O. MacDonagh, "The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government," *The Historical Journal*, 1 (1958); D. Roberts, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State* (New Haven, 1960); D. Fraser, *The Evolution of the British Welfare State* (London, 1973).

⁹ R. Samuel, "The Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology in Mid-Victorian Britain," *History Workshop Journal*, 3 (1977), pp. 6-72; N. F. R. Crafts, *British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution* (Oxford, 1985); W. D. Rubinstein, *Elites and the Wealthy in Modern British History* (Brighton, 1987); M. J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980* (Cambridge, 1981); J. Rule, *The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England 1750-1850* (London, 1986).

recent British revisionists on the Industrial Revolution could not be set free from the decline of British economy in the 1970s. If we admit the influence of presentism in historical writings, British industrialization might be seen as a rapid change to Korean scholars who had experienced the condensed modernization, with having memories of pre-industrial life in their youth. They used to seek for the evidence of rapid change by way of discourses analysis or the growth of non-industrial sections (for example, maritime trade), and to run after signs of discontinuity in the change of living conditions such as the range of labour movement or the specialization of occupations.

Second, the studies on British labour movement also attach greater importance to its progressive character than to the revisionist interpretation stressing the influence of 18th-century radicalism. Some historians tried to find anti-capitalistic tendency or aspiration toward social reform in the Factory Movement and Chartist Movement. Deep discourses about the labour aristocracy seem to uphold the classical issue-why was British labour movement changed into reformism?-. And the studies on New Liberalism, Fabianism or Guild Socialism also take focus not on their limits but on their progressive character. Especially Fabianism and Guild Socialism are understood as a peculiar socialism transformed under the situation of Britain.

Generally speaking, Korean scholars hesitate to agree with the recent revisionist views on nineteenth century history though they are interested in those interpretations and introduce them to other historians in Korea. They continue to emphasize the rapid social changes during the Industrial Revolution, the bourgeoisie hegemony of real politics in the mid-nineteenth century, the class consciousness of the working class, the revolutionary labour movement and the progressive character inherent in Fabianism and reforms of the Liberals.

This trend also seems to have stemmed from the modernity complex. It means the mental attitude that regards the present society of Korea as incomplete modernity. And if we consider the fact that most of Korean scholars spent their childhood in the age of condensed industrialization, we can sufficiently understand their historical view on modern Britain. I think that their complex would be deeply related to Edward Thompson.

The second generation of British historians of Korea was strongly affected by Edward Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). It was an intellectual source that had stirred up their inspirations constantly. In the 1980s young historians believed that Thompson achieved true 'history from below'. According to Thompson's interpretation, British labourers experienced new exploitations during the early stage of industrialization, and in the process their independent traditions functioned as an adjuster of those experiences. Thompson's conclusion that the British working people formed a real class during the first half of the nineteenth century was very impressive to young historians of Korea experiencing the rapid industrialization.

4. The escape from the modernity complex and world history

In fact most of Korean intellectuals had some kind of the modernity complex up to now. I think that this feeling was expressed into two courses in the academic studies. One is blind imitation of British (or European) civilization. This attitude is similar to a type of cultural toadyism. The other is an attitude that tries to seek for an

alternative to backwardness in European history. This seems to be similar to the mental attitude of Japanese economic historians in the 1950s.

Then, where and how should we search for it? Some Korean scholars believed that they could find an alternative in the formation of the modern society in Britain. There have been some successes or some failures in the process of modernization of Britain. Many historians believed that it would be possible to find an alternative for Korean modernization through their successes or failures. In short, Britain was regarded as an embodiment of modernization. With the structuralization of this prejudice, there were some errors unconditionally connecting social changes of Britain with modernization. The prejudice is directly related to 'the first symptoms'. The word 'first' has an important meaning in historical studies. Therefore, British history became an ideal type through which we should understand modernization, and seek an alternative of backwardness.

But nowadays there are few young historians with these attitudes in Korea. After successful modernization—especially industrialization and democratization within a short term—young intellectuals in Korea could escape from the modernity complex. Since 2000, Korean intellectuals began to criticize Euro-centrism or European exceptionalism inherent in the academic world. Some scholars seek the origin of Euro-centrism in the works of Marx and Weber who have been well-known to Korean scholars as founders of modern academic studies for a long time. So today, the study of British history in Korea is confronted with the crisis of its academic identity, because Euro-centrism is deeply related to historical experiences of Britain and its people.

After 2000, young historians tried to seek various themes in various ages unlike the former ones did. Above all the studies on the 18th and 20th centuries are increasing, and their research fields are changing from political and social history to cultural and micro history. Today, British history in Korea is one of the most productive fields in the studies of Western history. Especially, there are scholars producing many books which are very readable and popular among readers unlike other fields such as French history, German history or American history. I do not know the reason why British historians are more productive than those of other fields. Here, I will not be introducing these works in detail. Instead, I would like to talk about how to overcome the present crisis of British history or history as *Wissenschaftsgeschichte*.

First, we should study British history in the context of world history. Although it is true that British scholars have focused mainly on domestic history, modern British society has developed on the basis of its co-relationship with the other world or its colonies. Some studies of British history in the dimension of world history would give us a perspective for escaping from Euro-centrism.

For example, let's consider the Industrial Revolution which I have studied in my early years. Although traditionally economic historians in Britain have tried to seek its chief causes in the domestic conditions and situations, we do not yet know what the most important factors are. But it is true that British industrialization would have been impossible without the development of a triangular trade between Britain, India and America. These foreign factors stimulated Britain's industrialization. The introduction of machinery to the cotton industry was a result of that stimulation, and Lancashire, the center of that industry, had been not deeply related to the domestic economy for a long time.

K. Pomerantz's recent work, *The Great Divergence* (2000), is very interesting in this point of view. He understands the development of the world economy as a result of a co-relationship between various regions, and also tries to consider British industrialization in this point of view. According to his explanation, over-populated and commercialized regions in the eighteenth century such as China, India, Japan or Western Europe were all faced with the ecological crisis, and those could not find an alternative for escaping from the crisis within the traditional social structure based on the economic growth by intensive agriculture. At that time Europe, especially Britain could only privatize America's resources. With the help of its abundant coal, Britain could go forward to a road of energy revolution. This enabled Britain to go beyond the Smithian limit of power. His expression 'great divergence' means that Britain was able to surpass China by the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁰

Second, our studies should be expanded to the regions which were parts of the British Empire before World War II. Some peculiarities of Britain would be found in the fact that it had really experienced the history of the empire. The British Empire comprised various peripheries as well as white settlements. With globalization, the time for British historians to set about the study of real world history is now close at hand. I think that British historians in East Asian countries could also contribute to deepen the new tradition of world history. In Korea, some historians are interested in India or the introduction of subaltern studies.

Finally, we need to study the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. The study of the eighteenth century is closely related to the investigation of origins of modernity. If today we British historians intend to overcome the modernity complex or the limit of modernity, the century could help us to reflect on that issue more deeply. The twentieth century is also important to historians. As most of the evils of modern civilization originated from this century, the alternatives to overcome them should be sought in the studies of the twentieth century. Now we are about to change the present time into 'history'.

But, I would like to emphasize that all these orientations should be based on our desire and longing for seeking truths and relating our present-oriented consciousness with research issues. Twelve years ago I translated Richard Evans's *In Defence of History* (1997) into Korean. At that time I was deeply impressed with his citation from George Trevelyan's essay. Now, I would like to finish this paper with an excerpt from his work.

The appeal of history to us all is in the last analysis poetic. But the poetry of history does not consist of imagination roaring at large, but of imagination pursuing the fact and fastening upon it. That which compels the historian to 'scorn delights and live laborious days' is the ardor of his own curiosity to know what really happened long ago in that land of mystery which we call the past. To peer into that magic mirror and see fresh figures there every day is a burning desire that consumes and satisfies him all his life, that carries him each morning, eager as a lover, to the library and the muniment room. It haunts him like a passion of terrible potency, because it is poetic. The dead were and are not. Their place knows them no more, and is ours today. Yet they were once as real as we, and we shall tomorrow be shadows like them.....The poetry of history lies in the quasi-miraculous fact that once, on this earth, once, on this familiar

¹⁰ See K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, 2000), ch. 5.

spot of ground, walked other men and women, as actual as we are today, thinking their own thoughts, swayed by their own passions, but now all gone, one generation vanishing into another, gone as utterly as we ourselves shall shortly be gone, like ghosts at cockcrow.¹¹

¹¹ Recited in Richard Evans, *In Defence of History* (London, 1997), p. 250.

Closing Plenary

Tradition and Modernity in History

Two Island Empires Compared: Britain and Japan

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One hundred years have passed since Japan annexed Korea in August 1910, and this year 2010 has witnessed various conferences and meetings and media coverage about Japan's colonisation and rule of Korea. Among the major mass media NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) paid much attention to this problem and broadcast a TV series about the history of Japanese-Korean relations.

In this series the instalment that dealt with the samil (the March First) movement of 1919 included an episode in which a British Foreign Office memorandum criticised Japanese policy of "Japanising Corea completely", comparing it with the British colonial policy in India and Egypt, which was "trying to administer the country in the interest of the natives with a view to educating them up to take up a large share in the Government."¹²

The next instalment covered the 1930s and the war period, during which Japan pursued the policy of forcible assimilation and Japanisation (kominka seisaku). Just like the previous instalment, some comments by British diplomats on Japan's policy in Korea were to be presented, but those comments had to be dropped because of time constraint. The comments included that of Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador in Japan, about a detailed report on Japanese activities in Korea. He wrote: "[This] report gives a very vivid picture of the brutal exploitation of Korea which the Japanese have carried out for their own benefit and in complete disregard of the national feeling and culture of the subject people. For this reason ... I suggest that the material in the report would be suitable for publicity in India, Burma and any other British territories where Japanese propaganda is directed to proving that Japanese exploitation is preferable to British rule." An official of the Far Eastern Department added in his minute: "Our colonial, particularly Indian record may not be perfect, but our policy has striven to be enlightened and beside the J[alp]ane]se record it is as white as snow."¹³

These two examples show that the British policy-makers tended to think that British colonial rule was much better than that of Japan. One can naturally ask

¹² NHK special programme: Japan and the Korean Peninsula, No.2, The Samil Independence Movement and "Pro-Japanese Koreans", 16 May 2010. This memorandum by the Far Eastern Department was quoted in Dae-yeol Ku, *Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations*, Seoul, 1985, p.151. See also Motohiro Kajii, *A Historical Study of "Colonial" Rule: Examinations Based on British Diplomatic Reports about Inter-war Japan* (in Japanese), Kyoto, 2006, p.39.

¹³ R.L. Craigie to R.H. Scott, 21 May 1941, and minute by T.E. Bromley, 18 July 1941, FO371/27992.

whether this judgment was historically accurate, or, more fundamentally, whether there was good or better colonial rule in world history. With such a question in mind, I would like to examine several points which I think significant for the historical evaluation of Britain and Japan as colonial powers.¹⁴ In doing so the emphasis will be put on Japanese colonial rule of Korea.

Meaning of Difference in Time Scale and Spatial Expanse / Structure

It is needless to say that the British empire lasted much longer than the Japanese empire, which existed for about fifty years only from the time of the acquisition of Taiwan as the result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) to 1945, when Japan was forced to give up its overseas territories because of its defeat in the Second World War. As far as the relations between the two empires were concerned, these fifty years comprised the period of close amity under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and also the period of the war against each other.¹⁵

This difference in time scale meant that, when Japan started to build up its colonial empire at the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was already in possession of a vast and far-flung empire. It was natural that the British Empire served as an important model for Japanese empire builders. For example in a book titled *Hogokoku keiei no mohan Ejiputo* (Egypt as a Model of Protectorate Rule) and published in the crucial year of 1905, when Korea was turned into a Japanese protectorate, Fusazo Kato, a political journalist, pointed out that Britain was very skillful in governing Egypt by supervising, not by directly ruling, and by letting Egyptians exercise autonomy as much as possible. According to Kato, this was an ideal type of protectorate rule, but the Koreans were more backward than the Egyptians and not fit for autonomy. What was required in Korea was a much stronger rule by Japan.¹⁶

Kato was not the only person who regarded British rule of Egypt as a model of Japanese colonial rule. For example, Lord Cromer's book, *Modern Egypt*, which was published in 1908 and was based on his experience as Consul-General in Egypt, was translated into Japanese in 1911, immediately after Japan's formal annexation of Korea. In the introduction to this translation, Shigenobu Okuma, a veteran statesman, applauded Cromer's administration in Egypt as very instructive for Japan's rule of Korea.¹⁷

As for the spatial expanse of the empire, while the British empire was worldwide, the Japanese empire was concentrated in east Asia and the west Pacific in a concentric form. As long as this concentric empire of Japan did not infringe on

¹⁴ Some parts of this paper overlap my formerly published works, including Yoichi Kibata, *Igirisu teikoku to teikokushugi* (The British Empire and Imperialism), Tokyo, 2008, Ch.5.

¹⁵ See Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000*, Vol.1 and 2, Basingstoke, 2000.

¹⁶ Fusazo Kato, *Hogokoku keiei no mohan Ejiputo* (Egypt as a Model of Protectorate Rule), Tokyo, 1905, pp.214-220.

¹⁷ Shigenobu Okuma, "Foreword", in: Earl Cromer, *Saikin Ejiputo* (Modern Egypt), Tokyo, 1911, pp.12-13.

British territories or spheres of interests, Britain adopted magnanimous attitude towards Japanese expansion, as was shown in British policy of a kind of appeasement towards Japan after the Manchurian Incident.

There were also structural differences between the two empires. In the British empire the colonies of white settlement like Australia, New Zealand and Canada occupied important positions,¹⁸ but the Japanese empire did not have similar colonies. Though Karafuto (Sakhalin) and mandated islands in the South Pacific may be regarded as colonies of settlement, their significance in the Japanese empire cannot be compared to white dominions in the British empire.

As the result of the racial diversity in widely-spread colonial territories, the British empire displayed a distinctly hierarchical structure. In this hierarchy Britain itself occupied the top position, the settlement colonies came next, and the territories inhabited by coloured peoples formed the lower parts. This structure was accompanied by racial distinction. It was thought that “native” peoples under British domination were racially inferior, hence the right of the British to rule them and the duty of the British to raise them to the higher stage of civilization. We can find countless expressions about this, and here it might be sufficient to quote the words of Alfred Milner, who played a key role in British imperialism in the late 19th century and the early 20th century: “The white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the black man; steps which it will take the latter centuries to climb, and which it is quite possible that the vast bulk of the black population may never climb at all.....One of the strongest arguments why the white man must rule is because that is the only possible means of gradually raising the black man, not to our level of civilization—which it is doubtful whether he would ever attain—but up to a much higher level than that which he at present occupies.”¹⁹

In contrast to the British empire, the Japanese empire was, if only on the surface, less hierarchical. The spatially confined structure meant that the peoples under its colonial rule were racially similar to the Japanese and what amounted to racial feeling was often hidden under the assertion of the sameness of racial roots. But under the cloak of the assumption that the peoples in colonies were of the same stock as the Japanese, Japanese colonial rulers and Japanese public at large embraced a sense of racial superiority towards the colonized peoples. Inevitably such an attitude became very hypocritical. To take an example, Kazushige Ugaki, who was the War Minister in the 1920s, told the emperor in 1931 before he took up the post of governor-general in Korea, that as War Minister he had always advised his officers and soldiers to the following effect: “though it is of course necessary to have sense of superiority towards Koreans, that feeling should be hidden in your mind, and it should be used as a motive when you lead and instruct them, who are backward in every respect.”²⁰

One area in the Japanese empire where a kind of hierarchical structure was

¹⁸ The importance of white dominions is stressed in recent arguments about the British world. Bill Nasson, *Britannia's Empire. Making a British World*, Stroud, 2004.

¹⁹ C. Headlam, ed., *The Milner Papers. South Africa, 1899-1905*, Vol.2, London, 1933, p.467.

²⁰ Setsuko Miyata, *Chosen minshu to kominka seisaku* (The Korean People and Japanisation Policies), Tokyo, 1985, p.170.

evident was the mandated territory (islands) in the South Pacific. Here one could see clear racial hierarchy, in which Japanese occupied the top position, followed by the Okinawans, and then by the Koreans and the Taiwanese. In this hierarchy native islanders were placed at the bottom.²¹

Ireland and Okinawa

This position of the Okinawans leads us to a problem that I think important in considering the structure of the two empires, i.e. the similarity of two particular areas that occupied unique positions: Ireland and Okinawa.

While the colonization of Ireland in the late medieval period and in the 16th and 17th century, which finally resulted in its incorporation into the British state at the beginning of the 19th century, was the precursor of the expansion of the British empire, the incorporation of Okinawa, which had been at the same time a subordinate state of Satsuma and a vassal state of China during the Edo period, into the Japanese state in 1879 can be regarded as the first step of the building up of the Japanese empire.

What should be noted about these two areas is that they displayed the character of both being ruled and ruling in the imperial structure.

The colonial character of Ireland did not diminish after the Union in 1801 and nationalist movements against the British rule never lost momentum. The independence of southern Ireland after the partition in 1922 was the outcome of this process. But at the same time the Irish people formed a significant part of the ruling strata in the hierarchical order of the British imperial domination.²²

Okinawa also retained a kind of colonial character and the Okinawans were discriminated against by the people in mainland, as was shown by the treatment of Okinawa during and after the Second World War. But just like the Irish the Okinawans formed a part of the ruling strata in Japanese colonies, especially in the mandated islands, to which many Okinawans emigrated.

The reason why I talk about this analogy between Ireland and Okinawa is that during the period of the Japanese colonial rule over Korea Ireland was from time to time compared to Korea. The most representative case can be found in the writings of Tadao Yanaihara, a professor of colonial policy at Tokyo Imperial University until December 1937, when he was ousted from the university as a result of severe attacks on him by the military and right-wing elements. He analysed extensively Japanese colonial rule in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria, and, with these in mind, studied British colonial policies in India and Ireland, both of which "belonged to the same category of the colonial problem".²³ For him the practical interest of the Irish problem lay in the fact that Japan was facing similar problems in its colonial

²¹ Lin Poyer et al., *The Typhoon of War: Micronesian Experiences of the Pacific War*, Honolulu, 2001.

²² Keith Jeffrey, ed., *"An Irish Empire"? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire*, Manchester, 1996.

²³ Tadao Yanaihara, "Airurando mondai no enkaku" (History of the Irish Problem), (1937) , in: *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu* (Collected Works of Tadao Yanaihara), Vol.3, Tokyo, 1963, p.461.

territories, especially Korea. As a colony in which the process of colonial exploitation had been completed, Ireland was denied total independence and in appeasement an offer of dominion status was given, but the gulf of enmity separating Ireland from Britain was extremely wide and deep.²⁴ Though such a comparison between Ireland and Korea certainly had validity for contemporaries, my view is that for the purpose of historical analysis of empire and imperialism, the comparison between Ireland and Okinawa is more instructive.

Aspects of Colonial Rule

Now I would like to examine two aspects in the colonial rule of the two empires, bearing in mind the criticism of Japanese policy in Korea by the British Foreign Office that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, i.e. the assertion that Britain was trying to rule the colonies "in the interest of the natives with a view to educating them up to take up a large share in the Government".

As I said before the British colonial rule was based on the assumption that the ruling British people and the peoples under British domination were different racially and that there existed a wide gap in terms of respective levels of civilization. Under this assumption it was envisaged that the political participation of colonial peoples would develop step by step. The process of this development was to follow several steps: 1) the establishment of a legislature, 2) the formation of an electorate, 3) the control of legislature by the electorate, 4) the control of the executive by the legislature (responsible government), 5) the establishment of independence from the imperial government.²⁵

Of course the actual political developments in colonies did not follow such a path smoothly. For example, even after the Second World War, when the movement towards decolonisation began to gain momentum, a plan to widen the degree of local people's political participation in Hong Kong was not realised, and Hong Kong remained decidedly unrepresentative until the last years of British administration.²⁶ However, the notable fact in comparison with the Japanese empire was that a system existed by which peoples in colonies could have some sort of perspective about the future political development.

In the case of the Japanese empire, for ruling which the rhetoric of the racial affinity was widely used, such an idea as gradual extension of the scope of political participation did not exist. Though there were voices, including that of Tadao Yanaihara, which were critical of Japanese colonial policy and advocated the British model, they were lone voices, and colonial self-government, to say nothing of independence, never occupied a significant place in Japanese colonial thinking.

In Japanese colonies, while the Taiwanese concentrated on the creation of the colonial parliament in Taiwan, the Koreans demanded their participation in the

²⁴ Yanaihara, "Manshu mondai" (The Manchurian Problem"), (1934), in: *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu*, Vol.2, Tokyo, 1963, p.682.

²⁵ Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions 1947*, Oxford, 1952, pp.17-39.

²⁶ Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization*, London/New York, 2006, p.356.

Japanese diet (parliament) as well as the increase of their political power in Korea itself. But the Japanese colonial authorities did nothing to respond to these demands. It is true that after the First World War, "councils" at various local levels were set up both in Korea and Taiwan, but those were only consultative bodies and the elective element was very limited. It was as late as at the end of 1944 that the Japanese government started to discuss the granting of the franchise to the Koreans and the Taiwanese, and in April 1945 they were given the right to send their MPs to the Japanese diet. In the background for this decision lay the critical situation of the war, in which the Japanese government wanted to apply conscription to the Koreans and the Taiwanese, and this concession was nothing but a compensation for that. This reminds us with the fact that the granting of the franchise to the Okinawans was promised in 1899, one year after the imposition of conscription on them in 1898. The Okinawans exercised their voting rights in 1912 for the first time, but with the defeat of Japan immediately after the above concession neither the Koreans nor the Taiwanese could exercise their voting rights.

In order to compare the British and Japanese colonial policies in this respect the case of Malaya, which were ruled by Britain until Japan occupied it in the winter of 1941-42, may be interesting. Before the war in the Strait Settlements, which was under direct British rule, there existed partly elected Legislative Councils with minority of elected members. Japan abolished those, and nearly two years after the start of the occupation set up regional advisory councils. The British side observed that these bodies were only meant to serve "as a sop to the people who were denied the so-called independence of other countries" in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.²⁷

The second aspect that I want to discuss is education. As is well known, in the Minute on Education of 1835 Thomas Macaulay asserted that Western ideas, taught through the English language, would develop "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, opinion, in morals and intellect."²⁸ Here stress was laid on the education of Indian elites, who were to promote British imperial cause. Though this policy was partly successful, it also resulted in creating the basis of educated Indian nationalists who challenged British domination. With the knowledge about this Lord Cromer, who was stationed in Egypt after serving in India, observed about the situation of education in Egypt: "The process of manufacturing demagogues has not only already begun, but may be said to be well advanced."²⁹ It was only after Cromer's retirement from Egypt that a university was opened there, but its budget was so restricted that it could not make any real mark on Egyptian education until after the First World War.

In Japanese colonies Seoul Imperial University and Taihoku Imperial University were set up in 1926 and 1928 respectively. Though the Koreans and the Taiwanese were admitted to these universities, they were mainly for Japanese

²⁷ Memo. by the Far Eastern Bureau (Ministry of Information), "Malaya under the Japanese Rule", March 1945, Arkib Negara Malaysia, PS/412 PtII.

²⁸ C.C. Eldridge, *Victorian Imperialism*, London, 1978, p.61.

²⁹ The Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol.2, London, 1908, p.534.

students, and the Japanese colonial authorities did not permit the establishment of other universities or colleges. Whether or not the lesson of British rule in India and elsewhere was learned, education which might produce politically conscious elite who would challenge colonial rule was thus avoided.

As for primary education, the situation in the two empires differed especially at the final phase of the colonial rule. In the British colonies, in spite of demands from colonial peoples, the development of primary education was very slow. In India literacy among people of ten years old and over rose from 8.3% to only 15.1% between 1921 and 41, and at the time of independence only 35% of the children of school age were going to school.³⁰ This pointed to the hollow nature of the assertion of educating colonial peoples so that they could reach the stage of self-government. On the other hand in Korea in 1943 62% of the male children and 29% of female children of school age were enrolled in public primary schools.³¹ On the surface Japanese colonial education policy seems to have been more progressive than that of the British empire, but here again it should be pointed out that the acceleration of primary education occurred only after the 1930s --- around 1930 the rate of enrollment of male children was only 25% --- under the necessity of consolidating colonial rule to further the Japanese invasion of China and the advance southwards.

Colonial Modernisation / Modernity

The problem of education brings us to the next theme: colonial modernisation / colonial modernity, which relates to the theme of this conference.

Strictly speaking there is a distinction between the concept of colonial modernisation and that of colonial modernity. The former discusses how modernisation in various aspects of colonial societies, especially industrialisation and capitalist development, occurred under the colonial rule with the assumption that modernisation after European/western model is inherently a positive outcome, and the agents for such changes are sought in colonial powers. The latter deals with similar phenomena in colonial societies, but things that are regarded as modern are not viewed in completely positive light --- negative characters like oppressiveness or discrimination are often stressed ---, and the agents for those changes are sought in colonial subjects.³² But both theories share the same emphasis on the changes that are labelled as modern in colonial societies and on the continuity from the colonial period to the period after independence. Therefore, in the following part these two concepts are used without strict distinction.

As is well known, in the case of the British empire the clearest argument of

³⁰ Anathnath Basu, *Education in Modern India. A Brief Review*, New Delhi, 1992 (reprint ed.), pp.63, 92-103; Judith M. Brown, "India", in: Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol.5, *The Twentieth Century*, Oxford, 1999, p.428.

³¹ Noriko Furukawa, "Shokuminchi kindai shakai ni okeru shotokyoiku kozo" (The Structure of Primary Education in Colonial Modern Society), in: Takeshi Komagome and Shinya Hashimoto, eds., *Teikoku to gakko* (Empires and Schools), Kyoto, 2007, p.155.

³² Ryuta Itagaki, "<Shokuminchi kindai> wo megutte" (On "Colonial Modernity"), *Rekishi Hyoron*, 654, 2004.

colonial modernisation was recently put forward by Niall Fergusson in his widely-read book *Empire*. In concluding his very positive assessment of historical role of the British empire he maintained as follows:

Without the spread of British rule around the world, it is hard to believe that the structures of liberal capitalism would have been so successfully established in so many different economies around the world....[T]he nineteenth-century Empire undeniably pioneered free trade, free capital movements and, with the abolition of slavery, free labour. It invested immense sums in developing a global network of modern communications. It spread and enforced the rule of law over vast areas....³³

While Fergusson put forward a rosy image about the whole empire, the modernisation of India under British colonial rule is stressed by some historians. For example, Tirthankar Roy argues that "major forms of transformation --- class structure, commercialization, creation of a modern bureaucratic state, access to new technology, and even ideas of nationalism, equality, and freedom --- had roots in the colonial encounter."³⁴

As for the Japanese empire there are also advocates of the theory of colonial modernisation. According to Ahn Byongjick, throughout the 20th century, including the colonial period, Korea experienced 100 years of high economic growth. This was assisted by the Japanese colonial authorities that made it possible the development of Korean capitalists by promoting the building of social infrastructure, political and social reform and the introduction of Japanese capital.³⁵

But in recent years arguments about colonial modernity rather than colonial modernisation seem to have spread more widely. The term "colonial modernity" itself came to be known widely after the publication of a book with that title in 1999, which dealt with Korea during the colonial period.³⁶ Historians adopting this perspective have been analysing changes in colonial cities, schools, hospitals, etc. One of the leading Japanese protagonists of the theory of colonial modernity, Masahito Namiki, even evaluates highly the decision to grant limited franchise to Koreans at the last phase of the Second World War, to which I have referred to, arguing that by being given the voting rights the Koreans could finally enter into the "public sphere" of the empire. According to him, that was the moment when Koreans' entitlement as the members of imperial Japan was approved.³⁷

³³ Niall Ferguson, *Empire. The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, London, 2002, pp.358-359.

³⁴ Tirthankar Roy, *The Economic History of India 1857-1947*, New Delhi, 2006 (second ed.), p.5.

³⁵ Ahn Byongjick, "Kyacchi-appu katei to shite no Kankoku keizai seicho shi" (The History of Modern Korean Economic Growth as a Process of "Catching-Up", *Rekishigaku Kenkyu*, 802, 2005).

³⁶ Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, Cambridge, MA /London, 1999.

³⁷ Masahito Namiki, "Shokuminchi kokyosei' to Chosen shakai" ("Colonial Publicness and Korean Society), in: Park Choon-Seok and Hiroshi Watanabe, eds., *"Bunmei", "Kaika", "Heiwa": Nihon to Kankoku* ("Civilization", "Progress", "Peace": Japan and Korea), Tokyo,

Those arguments based on the theories of colonial modernisation/modernity are criticised in various ways. In the case of India, it has been pointed out that, if there were some non-colonial type of developments during the colonial period, they "occurred not as a result of colonialism but in spite of or in opposition to it."³⁸ And in a different vein it is maintained that, because the imperial state lacked legitimacy, it tended to drape itself in the authority of the collaborator groups and that sort of strategy might well produce traditionalisation instead of modernisation.³⁹

The most vehement criticism about colonial modernity arguments concerning Korea was delivered by Cho Kyeungdal, who asserted that the said modernity was confined within the upper strata in the colonial society and it did not reach the common people. The "colonial publicness", which was stressed by Namiki and others, did not extend further than the narrow sphere, the extent of which was set down by the colonial authorities.⁴⁰

Such debates about the meaning of modernisation/modernity in the colonial territories both in the British empire and the Japanese empire will continue, for they are highly relevant to the historical assessment of the process of development of those territories after their independence. And what should always be born in mind is that those changes at issue occurred in the colonial context. In talking about colonial modernisation/modernity stress should always be put on "colonial" and not on "modernisation/modernity". It is true that "we must view colonial hegemony as a historical process continuously negotiated, contested, defended, renewed, re-created, and alerted, by challenges from within and without."⁴¹ But the nature of the space or zone in which those activities took place was determined by the ruling power.

In my view, though these arguments of colonial modernisation/modernity are shedding fresh light on various aspects in colonial societies, which tended to be ignored before, there is a danger of the fundamental characteristics of imperial/colonial rule being obscured. Imperial/colonial rule both in the British and Japanese empires was based on hierarchical and discriminatory structure, whether explicit in the case of the British empire or not so explicit in the case of the Japanese empire. And the factor of violence, with which this paper could not deal with, permeated into daily practices in colonial life. It is noteworthy that in April 1919, when the samil movement had not yet come to an end in Korea, the Amritsar massacre occurred in India, in which nearly 400 Indians were shot down. In Egypt March and April of 1919 saw widespread anti-British revolts. In spite of this the Foreign Office memorandum, which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, criticised Japanese policy in Korea in comparison with British policy in India and

2006, p.229.

³⁸ Aditya Mukherjee, *The Return of the Colonial in Indian Economic History: The Last Phase of Colonialism in India* (Presidential Address, Indian History Congress), New Delhi, 2007, p.31.

³⁹ Maria Misra, "Lessons of Empire: Britain and India", *SAIS Review*, 23-2, 2003, p.150.

⁴⁰ Cho Kyeungdal, *Shokuminchiki Chosen no chishikijin to minshu: Shokuminchi kindaiseiron hihan* (Intellectuals and Common People in Colonial Korea: A Criticism of Colonial Modernity), Tokyo, 2008.

⁴¹ Shin and Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, p.9.

Egypt. It should be noted that the first issue of *Chosa shiryo* (Research Material) edited by the Governor-General's Office of Korea in the early 1920s was a booklet on the Egyptian revolt of 1919.⁴²

With this stress on the fundamental nature of colonial rule, I would like to finish my presentation. Though I could touch upon only a limited number of points, what I want to show is that the history of the British empire provides us, Japanese and Korean historians, with ample materials for thinking about the relations of our two countries, which will form the core of the future shape of East Asia.

⁴² Chosen sotokufu kanbo shomubu chosaka, ed., *1919 nen no Ejiput daibodo* (The Great Rebellion in Egypt in 1919), n.p., n.d. (1923?) This was the translation of Valentine Chirol's work on that topic.